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Threat Model Analysis for bcosca/fatfree

Threat: Hive Variable Tampering

  • Threat: Hive Variable Tampering
    • Description: An attacker injects malicious data into F3's hive (global variable storage) through unvalidated input that is then used unsafely by F3 itself or a core F3 component. This is distinct from general input validation issues; it's about F3 relying on the hive for security-critical operations without internal validation. This is a direct threat because the hive is a core F3 feature.
    • Impact: Data corruption, unauthorized access, application instability, potential code execution (if the tampered variable is used in an unsafe way by F3).
    • Affected F3 Component: The F3 hive ($f3->set(), $f3->get(), and related functions).
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • While developers should validate all input, F3 itself could implement internal checks before using hive variables in security-sensitive contexts (e.g., before using a hive variable to determine authorization). This is a mitigation that could be applied within F3.
      • F3 could provide more explicit guidance in its documentation about the security implications of using the hive and recommend alternative storage mechanisms for sensitive data.

Threat: AUTOLOAD Path Manipulation

  • Threat: AUTOLOAD Path Manipulation
    • Description: An attacker manipulates the AUTOLOAD configuration to include malicious files. This is a direct threat because AUTOLOAD is a core F3 feature for class loading. The vulnerability exists if F3 doesn't sufficiently restrict or validate the paths used for autoloading.
    • Impact: Remote code execution, complete server compromise.
    • Affected F3 Component: The AUTOLOAD global variable and F3's class loading mechanism.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • F3 could implement stricter validation of AUTOLOAD paths, potentially using a whitelist approach or disallowing relative paths. This is a mitigation within F3.
      • F3's documentation should strongly emphasize the security risks of AUTOLOAD and provide clear guidance on secure configuration.

Threat: Template Injection (via F3's Default Template Engine)

  • Threat: Template Injection (via F3's Default Template Engine)
    • Description: An attacker injects malicious code into the application's templates specifically exploiting vulnerabilities in F3's default template engine. This is distinct from general template injection; it focuses on flaws within F3's built-in templating. If the default engine lacks robust escaping mechanisms or has known vulnerabilities, this is a direct threat.
    • Impact: Cross-site scripting (XSS), potential server-side code execution (depending on the vulnerability), data theft, defacement.
    • Affected F3 Component: F3's default template engine (Template class, and its built-in escaping mechanisms).
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • F3's default template engine must have robust and secure escaping mechanisms. This is a mitigation within F3.
      • F3 should undergo regular security audits of its default template engine.
      • F3's documentation should clearly explain how to use the escaping mechanisms correctly and emphasize the importance of escaping all user-provided data.

Threat: Configuration File Tampering (If F3 loads config in an unsafe way)

  • Threat: Configuration File Tampering (If F3 loads config in an unsafe way)
    • Description: While file permissions are a server-level concern, if F3 itself has vulnerabilities in how it loads or processes configuration files (e.g., allowing code execution within config files, or not properly validating the contents of config files before using them), then this becomes a direct F3 threat. This is not about file permissions, but about F3's internal handling of configuration data.
    • Impact: Application misconfiguration, data breaches, denial of service, potential code execution (if the attacker can inject malicious code into the configuration and F3 executes it).
    • Affected F3 Component: Configuration files and F3's configuration loading mechanism (e.g., how it parses INI files or other config formats).
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • F3 must load and process configuration files securely. This includes validating the contents of the files and avoiding any mechanisms that could allow code execution within the configuration. This is a mitigation within F3.
      • F3 should provide clear documentation on secure configuration practices, including recommendations for file permissions and the use of environment variables.