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attack-surface.md

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Attack Surface Analysis for cachethq/cachet

Attack Surface: Unauthorized API Access/Manipulation

  • Description: Gaining unauthorized access to the Cachet API to control or extract data.
  • Cachet Contribution: Cachet's core functionality is fundamentally API-driven. Nearly all actions, from creating incidents to updating component status, are performed via the API. This makes the API the primary attack vector.
  • Example: An attacker uses a leaked or guessed API key to create a false incident, reporting a major outage that didn't occur.
  • Impact: Disruption of service, misinformation, reputational damage, potential data loss or exposure.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developers: Implement robust API key management (generation, storage, rotation, revocation, strong entropy). Enforce strong authentication and fine-grained authorization (RBAC) for all API endpoints, with no exceptions. Implement strict input validation and sanitization, assuming all API input is potentially malicious. Implement rate limiting and throttling.
    • Users: Use strong, unique API keys (long, random). Regularly rotate API keys (automate if possible). Monitor API usage logs proactively for suspicious activity (unusual IP addresses, unexpected requests). Implement a WAF or API gateway to filter malicious traffic and enforce rate limits.

Attack Surface: Subscriber Data Exposure/Manipulation

  • Description: Unauthorized access to or modification of subscriber information (email addresses, phone numbers).
  • Cachet Contribution: Cachet stores and manages subscriber data specifically for the purpose of sending notifications. This data is a direct consequence of Cachet's functionality.
  • Example: An attacker gains access to the database and exports the entire subscriber list, then uses it for spam or phishing campaigns.
  • Impact: Privacy violation, potential legal repercussions (GDPR, etc.), reputational damage.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developers: Encrypt subscriber data at rest (using strong encryption) and in transit (HTTPS). Implement strict, least-privilege access controls to subscriber data. Sanitize and validate all subscriber input rigorously. Implement data minimization principles – only store necessary data.
    • Users: Use strong passwords for administrative accounts. Regularly audit subscriber data and access logs. Implement multi-factor authentication (MFA) for all administrative access.

Attack Surface: False Status Reporting / Metric Data Manipulation

  • Description: Altering component status or metric data to misrepresent system health.
  • Cachet Contribution: Cachet's core purpose is to display status and metrics. The ability to update this data is a fundamental feature of Cachet, and thus a direct attack vector.
  • Example: An attacker modifies metric data to hide a denial-of-service attack, making it appear that the system is operating normally.
  • Impact: Delayed response to real issues, incorrect operational decisions, potential escalation of problems, masking of security incidents.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developers: Implement very strict access controls to component and metric update functionality, ideally requiring multiple approvals for changes. Use digital signatures or checksums to verify the integrity of metric data, especially if sourced externally. Implement anomaly detection to identify unusual changes and flag them for review.
    • Users: Restrict access to the component and metric update features to a minimal number of authorized personnel. Implement a robust change management process. Monitor for unexpected changes in status or metrics continuously.

Attack Surface: Incident Data Manipulation / Disclosure

  • Description: Creating, modifying, deleting, or accessing incident data without authorization.
  • Cachet Contribution: Cachet stores and manages incident details, which are often sensitive and contain information about vulnerabilities or outages. This is a direct function of the application.
  • Example: An attacker deletes incident records to cover up evidence of a security breach.
  • Impact: Loss of critical information, hindered incident response, potential exposure of sensitive data, compliance violations.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developers: Implement strong, least-privilege access controls to incident management features. Consider encrypting sensitive information within incident descriptions at rest. Implement comprehensive audit logging for all incident-related actions, including reads. Enforce immutability of incident logs where possible.
    • Users: Restrict access to incident management features to a minimal set of authorized personnel. Regularly review audit logs for any unauthorized access or modifications. Implement data retention policies and secure deletion procedures.

Attack Surface: Vulnerabilities in Third-Party Plugins/Extensions

  • Description: Exploiting vulnerabilities in installed plugins to compromise the Cachet instance.
  • Cachet Contribution: Cachet's plugin architecture directly enables the introduction of third-party code, expanding the attack surface.
  • Example: An attacker exploits a known vulnerability in a poorly maintained plugin to gain shell access to the server.
  • Impact: Complete system compromise, data loss, potential lateral movement to other systems.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developers: Provide very clear guidelines and security requirements for plugin development. Implement a mandatory and rigorous plugin vetting process before allowing plugins to be listed or used. Consider sandboxing plugins.
    • Users: Extremely carefully vet all plugins before installation – research the developer, review the code if possible, and check for known vulnerabilities. Keep plugins updated to the latest versions immediately upon release. Remove all unused plugins. Monitor for security advisories related to installed plugins. Consider a "no plugins" policy if security is paramount.

Attack Surface: Exploitation of Scheduled Tasks

  • Description: Tampering with scheduled tasks to execute malicious code.
  • Cachet Contribution: If Cachet uses scheduled tasks for maintenance, updates, or metric collection, these tasks are potential targets created by Cachet's operation.
  • Example: An attacker modifies a scheduled task that updates metrics to instead execute a script that exfiltrates data.
  • Impact: Code execution, data exfiltration, system compromise.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Developers: Securely configure scheduled tasks, limiting permissions of the user running them to the absolute minimum required. Validate the integrity of scripts executed by tasks using checksums or digital signatures.
    • Users: Monitor scheduled task execution and logs proactively. Restrict access to modify scheduled tasks to a minimal number of authorized users.