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Attack Tree Analysis for cachethq/cachet

Objective: Disrupt Service Availability and/or Manipulate Status Information

Attack Tree Visualization

Goal: Disrupt Service Availability and/or Manipulate Status Information

├── 1.  Denial of Service (DoS) Specific to Cachet [HIGH RISK]
│   ├── 1.1  Exploit Inefficient Database Queries (Cachet-Specific) [CRITICAL]
│   │   └── 1.1.1  Craft requests that trigger complex joins or full table scans on large datasets (e.g., incidents, metrics). [HIGH RISK]
│   ├── 1.2  Resource Exhaustion via API Abuse (Cachet-Specific) [HIGH RISK]
│   │   └── 1.2.1  Rapidly create a large number of incidents, components, or subscribers. [HIGH RISK]
│   └── 1.3  Exploit known vulnerabilities in Cachet or its dependencies. [CRITICAL]
│
└── 2.  Manipulation of Status Information [HIGH RISK]
    ├── 2.1  Unauthorized Modification of Incidents/Components (Cachet-Specific)
    │   └── 2.1.1  Bypass authentication/authorization checks for API endpoints related to incident/component management. [HIGH RISK] [CRITICAL]
    └── 2.2  Unauthorized Access to Subscriber Data [HIGH RISK]
        ├── 2.2.1  Exploit vulnerabilities in the subscriber management API to view, modify, or delete subscriber information. [HIGH RISK] [CRITICAL]
        └── 2.2.2  Gain access to the database and directly extract subscriber data. [CRITICAL]

Attack Tree Path: 1. Denial of Service (DoS) Specific to Cachet [HIGH RISK]

  • Overall Description: Attacks aimed at making the Cachet status page unavailable or unresponsive to legitimate users. This directly impacts the core functionality of the application.

Attack Tree Path: 1.1 Exploit Inefficient Database Queries (Cachet-Specific) [CRITICAL]

  • Description: Leveraging poorly designed database queries to consume excessive resources, leading to slowdowns or complete service outages.
  • 1.1.1 Craft requests that trigger complex joins or full table scans on large datasets (e.g., incidents, metrics). [HIGH RISK]
    • Likelihood: Medium
    • Impact: High (Service outage)
    • Effort: Medium (Requires understanding of database structure)
    • Skill Level: Medium (Database knowledge)
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium (May appear as performance issues initially)
    • Mitigation:
      • Database query optimization.
      • Indexing of frequently queried columns.
      • Rate limiting on API endpoints that fetch large datasets.
      • Regular database performance audits.

Attack Tree Path: 1.2 Resource Exhaustion via API Abuse (Cachet-Specific) [HIGH RISK]

  • Description: Overloading the Cachet API with requests to consume server resources (CPU, memory, disk space, network bandwidth).
  • 1.2.1 Rapidly create a large number of incidents, components, or subscribers. [HIGH RISK]
    • Likelihood: Medium
    • Impact: High (Service outage or significant degradation)
    • Effort: Low (Scripting)
    • Skill Level: Low (Basic scripting)
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium (Unusual API activity)
    • Mitigation:
      • Strict API rate limiting.
      • Input validation (limit lengths, prevent unreasonable values).
      • CAPTCHA on public-facing forms (if applicable).

Attack Tree Path: 1.3 Exploit known vulnerabilities in Cachet or its dependencies. [CRITICAL]

  • Description: Taking advantage of publicly disclosed or zero-day vulnerabilities in the Cachet codebase or its third-party libraries.
  • Likelihood: Medium (Depends on vulnerability disclosure and patching)
  • Impact: Very High (Complete system compromise)
  • Effort: Varies (From Low to High, depending on the vulnerability)
  • Skill Level: Varies (From Low to High)
  • Detection Difficulty: Varies (From Low to High)
  • Mitigation:
    • Regularly update Cachet and all its dependencies.
    • Monitor security advisories for Cachet and related projects.
    • Conduct regular penetration testing.

Attack Tree Path: 2. Manipulation of Status Information [HIGH RISK]

  • Overall Description: Attacks that aim to alter the status information displayed by Cachet, leading to misinformation and loss of trust.

Attack Tree Path: 2.1 Unauthorized Modification of Incidents/Components (Cachet-Specific)

  • Description: Changing the status of incidents or components without proper authorization.
  • 2.1.1 Bypass authentication/authorization checks for API endpoints related to incident/component management. [HIGH RISK] [CRITICAL]
    • Likelihood: Low (If proper auth is implemented) / High (If not)
    • Impact: High (False status information, reputational damage)
    • Effort: Medium (Requires understanding of API)
    • Skill Level: Medium (API exploitation)
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium (Unusual API activity, audit logs)
    • Mitigation:
      • Thoroughly review and test API endpoint security.
      • Ensure proper role-based access control (RBAC) is implemented and enforced.
      • Use strong authentication mechanisms.

Attack Tree Path: 2.2 Unauthorized Access to Subscriber Data [HIGH RISK]

  • Description: Gaining access to, modifying, or deleting subscriber information (e.g., email addresses).
  • 2.2.1 Exploit vulnerabilities in the subscriber management API to view, modify, or delete subscriber information. [HIGH RISK] [CRITICAL]
    • Likelihood: Low (If API is secured) / High (If not)
    • Impact: High (Data breach, privacy violation)
    • Effort: Medium (Requires understanding of API)
    • Skill Level: Medium (API exploitation)
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium (Unusual API activity, audit logs)
    • Mitigation:
      • Secure API endpoints.
      • Implement RBAC.
      • Validate all input.
      • Encrypt sensitive subscriber data at rest.
  • 2.2.2 Gain access to the database and directly extract subscriber data. [CRITICAL]
    • Likelihood: Low (If database is secured)
    • Impact: Very High (Data breach, privacy violation)
    • Effort: High (Requires significant access)
    • Skill Level: High (Database exploitation)
    • Detection Difficulty: High (Unless database auditing is in place)
    • Mitigation:
      • Strong database credentials.
      • Restrict database access to only necessary users/services.
      • Database encryption at rest.
      • Regular database security audits.