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Attack Tree Analysis for doctrine/dbal

Objective: Compromise Application using Doctrine DBAL

Attack Tree Visualization

Compromise Application via Doctrine DBAL [CRITICAL NODE]
├───[AND] Exploit SQL Injection Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
│   ├───[OR] Unsafe Query Building Practices [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   ├─── String concatenation in raw SQL queries [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   │   └─── Actionable Insight: Enforce use of prepared statements and parameter binding for all dynamic queries. Code reviews should specifically check for string concatenation in SQL.
│   │   ├─── Incorrect usage of DBAL Query Builder without proper parameterization [HIGH RISK PATH]
│   │   │   └─── Actionable Insight:  Developers must be trained on secure usage of Query Builder, emphasizing parameter binding and avoiding manual escaping. Static analysis tools can detect potential issues.
│   │   └─── ORM bypass leading to raw SQL execution (edge cases, complex queries) [HIGH RISK PATH]
│   │       └─── Actionable Insight:  Understand the limitations of ORM and when raw SQL might be necessary.  Apply the same secure coding practices (parameterization) to raw SQL as well.
├───[AND] Exploit Configuration and Misconfiguration Issues [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
│   ├───[OR] Exposed Database Credentials [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   ├─── Hardcoded credentials in application code or configuration files [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]
│   │   │   └─── Actionable Insight:  Never hardcode credentials. Use environment variables or secure configuration management tools (e.g., HashiCorp Vault) to store and retrieve database credentials.
│   │   ├─── Insecure storage of configuration files (e.g., publicly accessible repository) [HIGH RISK PATH]
│   │   │   └─── Actionable Insight:  Ensure configuration files are not publicly accessible. Use `.gitignore` or similar mechanisms to exclude sensitive files from version control. Implement proper access control for configuration files on the server.
│   │   └─── Leaked credentials through logging or error messages [HIGH RISK PATH]
│   │       └─── Actionable Insight:  Implement secure logging practices. Avoid logging sensitive information like database credentials. Configure error handling to prevent exposing sensitive details in error messages.

Attack Tree Path: Exploit SQL Injection Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]

  • Why High-Risk: SQL Injection is consistently ranked as one of the most critical web application vulnerabilities. Successful exploitation can lead to complete database compromise, data breaches, data manipulation, and application takeover. It's often relatively easy to exploit, especially in applications with poor coding practices.

    • Unsafe Query Building Practices [CRITICAL NODE]:
      • String concatenation in raw SQL queries [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:
        • Attack Vector: Attackers inject malicious SQL code directly into user inputs that are then concatenated into SQL queries without proper sanitization or parameterization.
        • Example: A vulnerable query might look like: SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = '"+userInput+"'. An attacker could input ' OR '1'='1 to bypass authentication or inject more complex SQL to extract data or modify the database.
        • Why High-Risk: Extremely common vulnerability, easy to exploit, and has a devastating impact. Requires minimal attacker skill.
      • Incorrect usage of DBAL Query Builder without proper parameterization [HIGH RISK PATH]:
        • Attack Vector: Developers might use DBAL's Query Builder but still fail to use parameter binding correctly, resorting to manual escaping or string manipulation that is insufficient to prevent injection.
        • Example: Incorrectly building a query with setParameter() but still using string concatenation for parts of the query logic, or misunderstanding how parameterization works in complex queries.
        • Why High-Risk: While Query Builder is designed to help prevent SQL injection, improper usage negates its security benefits. Developers might have a false sense of security.
      • ORM bypass leading to raw SQL execution (edge cases, complex queries) [HIGH RISK PATH]:
        • Attack Vector: In complex scenarios, developers might bypass the ORM and write raw SQL queries directly using DBAL's connection. If these raw queries are not carefully parameterized, they become vulnerable to SQL injection.
        • Example: For performance reasons or when ORM functionality is insufficient, developers might execute raw SQL for specific operations, forgetting to apply the same security rigor as with ORM-generated queries.
        • Why High-Risk: Raw SQL execution increases the risk of manual errors and overlooking security best practices, especially if developers are not consistently security-minded when writing raw queries.

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Configuration and Misconfiguration Issues [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]

  • Why High-Risk: Configuration errors, especially those exposing database credentials, provide a direct and often easily exploitable path to application compromise. These vulnerabilities often require minimal attacker skill and can have immediate and severe consequences.

    • Exposed Database Credentials [CRITICAL NODE]:
      • Hardcoded credentials in application code or configuration files [HIGH RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE]:
        • Attack Vector: Database credentials (username, password, connection strings) are directly embedded in the application's source code, configuration files, or deployment scripts.
        • Example: Credentials stored as plain text in config.php, environment variables not properly secured, or directly in code.
        • Why High-Risk: Extremely common mistake, especially in development or quick deployments. Credentials become easily accessible if the code or configuration files are exposed (e.g., through repository access, server misconfiguration, or code leaks).
      • Insecure storage of configuration files (e.g., publicly accessible repository) [HIGH RISK PATH]:
        • Attack Vector: Configuration files containing database credentials are stored in publicly accessible locations, such as public version control repositories (e.g., GitHub, GitLab), unprotected web directories, or insecure cloud storage.
        • Example: Accidentally committing .env files with credentials to a public repository, leaving configuration files in a publicly accessible web directory, or storing backups in unsecured cloud buckets.
        • Why High-Risk: Simple misconfiguration can lead to immediate exposure of sensitive credentials to a wide audience. Automated tools can easily scan for and identify such exposed files.
      • Leaked credentials through logging or error messages [HIGH RISK PATH]:
        • Attack Vector: Database credentials are unintentionally included in application logs, error messages, or debug outputs, which are then accessible to attackers.
        • Example: Logging connection strings that include passwords, displaying database connection errors with full connection details in production error pages, or verbose debug logs containing sensitive information.
        • Why High-Risk: Poor logging and error handling practices can inadvertently expose credentials. Attackers can monitor logs or trigger errors to potentially extract sensitive information.