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attack-surface.md

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Attack Surface Analysis for doctrine/dbal

Attack Surface: SQL Injection (Primary Vector)

  • Description: Unauthorized execution of arbitrary SQL commands on the database due to improper use of DBAL's query building and execution methods.
  • DBAL Contribution: DBAL provides prepared statements and parameter binding as core features to prevent SQL injection. The vulnerability arises when the application fails to use these features correctly, bypassing the intended protection. This is a direct misuse of DBAL's API.
  • Example: 
    // VULNERABLE: Direct string concatenation with DBAL
$userInput = $_GET['username'];
$sql = "SELECT * FROM users WHERE username = '" . $userInput . "'";
$result = $connection->executeQuery($sql); // Using DBAL, but incorrectly!

// VULNERABLE: executeQuery/executeStatement without parameters
$userInput = $_GET['id'];
$sql = "SELECT * FROM products WHERE id = ?";
$result = $connection->executeQuery($sql); // Placeholder present, but no parameters!
  • Impact: Complete database compromise. Attackers can read, modify, or delete any data. Potential for remote code execution on the database server in some scenarios.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • 1.a. Mandatory Prepared Statements: Always use DBAL's executeQuery() or executeStatement() with placeholders and the $params array for all user-supplied data. This is the primary defense.
    • 1.b. Input Validation (Secondary Defense): Validate all user input before passing it to DBAL, even when using prepared statements. This adds a layer of defense-in-depth.
    • 1.c. Strictly Avoid Dynamic Table/Column Names: Do not allow user input to dictate table or column names. If absolutely necessary, use a very strict whitelist.
    • 1.d. Code Reviews Focused on DBAL Usage: Regularly review code, specifically looking for any instance where user input might be concatenated into a SQL string, even if DBAL is being used.
    • 1.e. SAST Tools: Employ static analysis tools to automatically detect potential SQL injection vulnerabilities related to DBAL usage.

Attack Surface: Data Exposure through DBAL Errors

  • Description: Sensitive database information (queries, table names, data) revealed through DBAL's exception messages or error output if not handled correctly by the application.
  • DBAL Contribution: DBAL throws exceptions that may contain sensitive information. The application's error handling (or lack thereof) directly determines whether this information is exposed. This is a direct consequence of how the application interacts with DBAL's error reporting.
  • Example: A try-catch block around a DBAL executeQuery() call that, in the catch block, echoes the exception message directly to the user. This message might contain the full SQL query, including injected malicious code.
  • Impact: Provides attackers with valuable information about the database structure and the queries being executed, significantly aiding in the development of further attacks.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • 2.a. Production Error Handling: Never display raw DBAL exception messages or stack traces to users in a production environment.
    • 2.b. Robust try-catch Blocks: Wrap all DBAL interactions in try-catch blocks.
    • 2.c. Secure Logging: Log detailed error information (including exception details) to a secure location (file, dedicated logging service) not accessible to users.
    • 2.d. Generic User-Facing Errors: Display only generic, non-descriptive error messages to users (e.g., "An unexpected error occurred.").

Attack Surface: Insecure Database Connection Management (Credentials)

  • Description: Exposure of database credentials due to improper configuration of DBAL connection parameters.
  • DBAL Contribution: DBAL requires connection parameters (username, password, host, etc.) to function. How the application provides these parameters to DBAL is the critical security factor. This is a direct consequence of how the application configures and uses DBAL.
  • Example: Hardcoding database credentials directly within the PHP code that uses DBAL, or storing them in an insecure configuration file that is accessible to unauthorized users.
  • Impact: Complete database compromise if the credentials are leaked. An attacker gains full access to the database.
  • Risk Severity: High (Critical if credentials are leaked and easily accessible)
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • 3.a. Secure Credential Storage: Never hardcode credentials. Use environment variables, secure configuration files (outside the web root), or a dedicated secrets management service.
    • 3.b. Principle of Least Privilege: Ensure the database user configured in DBAL has only the absolute minimum necessary permissions.