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Attack Tree Analysis for doctrine/dbal

Objective: To gain unauthorized access to, modify, or exfiltrate data stored in the database managed by Doctrine DBAL by exploiting SQL Injection vulnerabilities.

Attack Tree Visualization

[Compromise Application via Doctrine DBAL] | [Manipulate Data/Queries] [HR] | [SQL Injection] [HR] |

| | | [1] Unparameterized Queries [HR] [2] Improperly Used Query Builder [HR] [14] Second-Order SQL Injection [HR] [16] Blind SQL Injection [HR]

  • Description: The core vulnerability enabling attackers to inject malicious SQL code into database queries. This is the central point of failure for the high-risk paths.
  • Why it's Critical: It's the most direct and effective way to compromise the database if not properly mitigated. It allows for data exfiltration, modification, deletion, and potentially even gaining control of the database server.
  • Description: The application directly concatenates user-supplied input into SQL queries without using prepared statements or the Query Builder's parameter binding.
  • Likelihood: High (if unparameterized queries are present)
  • Impact: Very High (full database compromise)
  • Effort: Low (automated tools readily available)
  • Skill Level: Beginner (basic SQL injection techniques)
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium (detectable by WAFs, IDS, code analysis)
  • Mitigation:
    • Mandatory: Use prepared statements ($conn->prepare(), $stmt->bindValue()) or the Query Builder ($conn->createQueryBuilder()) with parameter binding for all database interactions involving user input.
    • Secondary: Input validation and sanitization (but never as the sole defense).
    • Additional: Code reviews, static analysis, WAF.
  • Description: Even when using the Query Builder, incorrect usage (e.g., expr()->literal() with untrusted input, dynamic table/column names without whitelisting) can lead to SQL injection.
  • Likelihood: Medium (requires specific misuse)
  • Impact: Very High (full database compromise)
  • Effort: Medium (requires understanding of Query Builder weaknesses)
  • Skill Level: Intermediate (more knowledge than basic SQL injection)
  • Detection Difficulty: Hard (requires deeper code analysis)
  • Mitigation:
    • Avoid expr()->literal() with user input.
    • Strictly whitelist dynamic table/column names.
    • Thorough Query Builder documentation review.
  • Description: Data previously stored in the database (potentially sanitized) is later retrieved and used in another query without proper parameterization.
  • Likelihood: Low to Medium (requires specific data flow and lack of consistent parameterization)
  • Impact: Very High (full database compromise)
  • Effort: Medium (requires understanding data flow)
  • Skill Level: Intermediate to Advanced (understanding of SQL injection and application logic)
  • Detection Difficulty: Hard (requires careful data flow analysis)
  • Mitigation:
    • Treat all data retrieved from the database as potentially untrusted.
    • Always use prepared statements or the Query Builder when constructing new queries based on retrieved data.
  • Description: SQL injection where the attacker doesn't receive direct feedback (e.g., error messages). They infer information by observing application behavior (response changes, timing).
  • Likelihood: Medium (requires lack of direct feedback)
  • Impact: Very High (full database compromise, though slower)
  • Effort: High (more time and effort than standard SQL injection)
  • Skill Level: Advanced (good understanding of SQL injection and application behavior)
  • Detection Difficulty: Very Hard (requires sophisticated monitoring)
  • Mitigation:
    • Same as for standard SQL injection (prepared statements, Query Builder, input validation).
    • Robust error handling that reveals no database-related information.