mitigations.md

Mitigation Strategies Analysis for doctrine/dbal

Mitigation Strategy: Use Parameterized Queries Consistently (DBAL-Specific)

• Description:

  1. Identify all DBAL query methods: Focus on executeQuery(), executeStatement(), and all uses of the QueryBuilder (which ultimately uses these methods).
  2. Replace string concatenation with placeholders: Within the SQL strings passed to these DBAL methods, never directly concatenate user-supplied data. Use placeholders (? or :namedParameter).
  3. Pass data via DBAL's parameter binding: Use the second argument of executeQuery() and executeStatement(), or the setParameter() method of the QueryBuilder, to provide the user data as a separate array. This is how DBAL handles the secure parameterization.
  4. DBAL-specific testing: Test specifically that data passed through DBAL's parameter binding mechanisms is handled correctly and does not lead to injection, even with crafted input.
  5. Automated Static Analysis (DBAL Focus): Configure static analysis tools to specifically flag string concatenation within the first argument (the SQL string) of executeQuery(), executeStatement(), and within QueryBuilder methods like where(), andWhere(), orWhere(), if raw SQL fragments are used.

• List of Threats Mitigated:

  • SQL Injection (Critical): Direct injection of malicious SQL code via DBAL's query methods. This is the primary threat DBAL's parameterized queries are designed to prevent.
  • Data Breaches (Critical): Unauthorized data access resulting from SQL injection through DBAL.
  • Data Modification/Deletion (Critical): Unauthorized data changes via SQL injection through DBAL.
  • Denial of Service (High): DoS attacks leveraging SQL injection through DBAL.

• Impact:

  • SQL Injection: Risk reduced to near zero if implemented correctly and consistently within DBAL usage.
  • Data Breaches: Significantly reduces breaches caused by DBAL-related SQL injection.
  • Data Modification/Deletion: Significantly reduces modification/deletion via DBAL-related SQL injection.
  • Denial of Service: Reduces DoS attacks exploiting DBAL-related SQL injection.

• Currently Implemented:

  • Example: "Parameterized queries are used consistently in all User model methods that interact with DBAL (e.g., getUserById, createUser, updateUser all use $connection->executeQuery() with placeholders)." Specify file paths and function names.

• Missing Implementation:

  • Example: "The Report model's generateCustomReport function uses $connection->executeQuery() with string concatenation to build the SQL query based on user input. The searchProducts function in ProductController also uses string concatenation within a QueryBuilder where() clause." Specify file paths and function names.

Mitigation Strategy: Minimize Dynamic Table/Column Names and Use Whitelisting (DBAL-Specific)

• Description:

  1. Identify DBAL usage with dynamic identifiers: Find all instances where quoteIdentifier() is used, or where table/column names are constructed dynamically within strings passed to DBAL methods.
  2. Refactor to avoid dynamic identifiers (if possible): Prioritize redesigning the application logic to eliminate the need for dynamic table/column names passed to DBAL.
  3. Implement a strict whitelist (if unavoidable): If dynamic identifiers must be used with DBAL, create a hardcoded whitelist of allowed values.
  4. Validate against the whitelist before DBAL interaction: Crucially, validate any user-supplied input against the whitelist before it is used in any way with DBAL, including with quoteIdentifier().
  5. Use quoteIdentifier() after whitelisting: Only after the identifier has been validated against the whitelist, use DBAL's quoteIdentifier() method to properly escape it. This is a secondary measure; the whitelist is the primary defense.

• List of Threats Mitigated:

  • SQL Injection (Critical): Injection of malicious table/column names to bypass access controls or execute arbitrary SQL via DBAL.
  • Information Disclosure (High): Revealing database schema details through DBAL error messages or unexpected behavior.

• Impact:

  • SQL Injection: Significantly reduces the risk of SQL injection through dynamic identifiers used with DBAL.
  • Information Disclosure: Reduces the risk of leaking schema information via DBAL.

• Currently Implemented:

  • Example: "Dynamic table/column names are not used in most DBAL interactions. A whitelist is implemented for the dynamic_reports feature, and quoteIdentifier() is used after validation against this list (stored in config/allowed_report_fields.php)."

• Missing Implementation:

  • Example: "The admin/data_export feature allows users to select tables and columns for export. This input is passed directly to quoteIdentifier() without prior validation against a whitelist, creating a potential vulnerability."

Mitigation Strategy: Proper DBAL Exception Handling and Secure Failure

• Description:

  1. try-catch around all DBAL calls: Enclose every interaction with Doctrine DBAL (connection, query execution, etc.) within try-catch blocks.
  2. Catch specific DBAL exceptions: Catch specific exception types provided by DBAL (e.g., Doctrine\DBAL\Exception\ConnectionException, Doctrine\DBAL\Exception\DriverException, Doctrine\DBAL\Exception). This allows for tailored error handling.
  3. Log exceptions (securely): Log detailed information about the DBAL exception, but ensure no sensitive data (like the raw SQL query with user input) is included in the logs.
  4. Generic error messages (no DBAL details): In the catch block, display a generic error message to the user. Never expose the DBAL exception message or stack trace to the user.
  5. Prevent further execution relying on DBAL: After handling the DBAL exception, prevent any further code execution that depends on the failed database operation.

• List of Threats Mitigated:

  • Information Disclosure (Medium): Prevents sensitive DBAL error messages (which might reveal schema details or parts of the SQL query) from being displayed to the user.
  • Error-Based SQL Injection (Medium): Makes it harder for attackers to use DBAL error messages to probe for vulnerabilities.
  • Application Instability (Low): Gracefully handles DBAL errors, preventing crashes.

• Impact:

  • Information Disclosure: Significantly reduces the risk of leaking information via DBAL error messages.
  • Error-Based SQL Injection: Makes error-based injection attacks targeting DBAL more difficult.
  • Application Instability: Improves stability by handling DBAL errors gracefully.

• Currently Implemented:

  • Example: "All DBAL interactions in the User and Product models are wrapped in try-catch blocks. Specific DBAL exceptions are caught, logged securely, and generic error messages are displayed to the user."

• Missing Implementation:

  • Example: "The Report generation module does not have proper exception handling for DBAL operations. Raw DBAL error messages might be displayed to the user, potentially revealing sensitive information."

Mitigation Strategy: Correct QueryBuilder Usage (DBAL-Specific)

• Description:

  1. Always use setParameter(): When using the QueryBuilder, always use the setParameter() method to bind user-supplied values to the query. This is the QueryBuilder's equivalent of parameterized queries.
  2. Avoid raw SQL fragments with user input: Minimize the use of methods like ->expr()->literal() or direct string concatenation within where(), andWhere(), orWhere(), especially if those fragments involve any user-supplied data.
  3. Review QueryBuilder code: Code reviews should specifically focus on how the QueryBuilder is used, ensuring consistent use of setParameter() and avoiding unsafe concatenation.
  4. Type Hinting: Use type hinting with setParameter() to enforce the expected data type, providing an additional layer of validation.

• List of Threats Mitigated:

  • SQL Injection (Critical): Injection of malicious SQL code through improper use of the QueryBuilder.
  • Data Breaches (Critical): Unauthorized data access due to QueryBuilder-related SQL injection.
  • Data Modification/Deletion (Critical): Unauthorized data changes via QueryBuilder-related SQL injection.

• Impact:

  • SQL Injection: Significantly reduces the risk if setParameter() is used correctly and consistently.
  • Data Breaches: Reduces breaches caused by QueryBuilder misuse.
  • Data Modification/Deletion: Reduces modification/deletion via QueryBuilder misuse.

• Currently Implemented:

  • Example: "The Product model uses the QueryBuilder extensively, and setParameter() is consistently used for all user-supplied values."

• Missing Implementation:

  • Example: "The searchProducts function in ProductController uses the QueryBuilder, but concatenates user input directly into the where() clause without using setParameter()."

Mitigation Strategy: Second-Order SQL Injection Prevention (DBAL-Specific)

• Description:

  1. Identify DBAL data retrieval: Locate all instances where data is retrieved from the database using DBAL.
  2. Re-validate or use DBAL's parameterized queries: When this retrieved data is subsequently used in new SQL queries via DBAL, treat it as potentially untrusted. Either re-validate the data rigorously, or, preferably, use DBAL's parameterized query mechanisms (placeholders and parameter binding, or setParameter() with the QueryBuilder) when constructing the new query.
  3. Focus on DBAL methods: This mitigation specifically applies to situations where data retrieved through DBAL is then used in another DBAL query.

• List of Threats Mitigated:

  • Second-Order SQL Injection (Critical): Prevents attackers from exploiting vulnerabilities where previously injected data (potentially inserted through a different vulnerability) is later used unsafely in a DBAL query.
  • Data Breaches (Critical): Reduces breaches caused by second-order SQL injection through DBAL.
  • Data Modification/Deletion (Critical): Reduces unauthorized changes via second-order SQL injection through DBAL.

• Impact:

  • Second-Order SQL Injection: Significantly reduces the risk of this type of attack involving DBAL.
  • Data Breaches: Reduces the likelihood of data breaches.
  • Data Modification/Deletion: Reduces the risk of unauthorized data changes.

• Currently Implemented:

  • Example: "In the User model, data retrieved via DBAL is always used with parameterized queries (using DBAL's mechanisms) in any subsequent DBAL operations."

• Missing Implementation:

  • Example: "The Comment model retrieves user comments using DBAL and then uses them directly in a subsequent DBAL query to display related comments, without using parameterized queries or re-validation, creating a potential second-order SQL injection vulnerability."