attack-tree.md

Attack Tree Analysis for doctrine/inflector

Objective: Achieve Unexpected Application Behavior via Doctrine Inflector Manipulation

Attack Tree Visualization

                                      Attacker's Goal:
                                      Achieve Unexpected Application Behavior
                                      via Doctrine Inflector Manipulation
                                                  |
                                                  |
                                                  |
  1. Unexpected Class/Method Name Generation [CRITICAL]
        |
        |
  ------|
  |
1.1
Input
to
`camelize()`
or
`uncamelize()`
-> [HIGH RISK]
leading to
unexpected
class name
resolution. [CRITICAL]
        |
        |->[HIGH RISK]
        |
      1.1.2
      Security
      Control
      (e.g.,
      accessing
      a class
      not
      intended).
        |
        |
      1.1.1
      Bypass
      Security
      Control
      (e.g.,
      authorization
      check based
      on class
      name). [CRITICAL]

Attack Tree Path: 1. Unexpected Class/Method Name Generation [CRITICAL]

• Description: This is the root of the high-risk sub-tree. The attacker aims to manipulate the input to Doctrine Inflector's string transformation functions to generate class or method names that the application does not expect. This unexpected generation is the foundation for subsequent attacks.
  • Why Critical: This is the core vulnerability. If the application uses the Inflector's output without proper validation, it opens the door to several serious exploits.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: High
  • Effort: Low-Medium
  • Skill Level: Medium
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium

Attack Tree Path: 1.1 Input to camelize() or uncamelize() -> [HIGH RISK] leading to unexpected class name resolution. [CRITICAL]

• Description: The attacker provides specially crafted input to the camelize() or uncamelize() methods. These methods are designed to convert strings to CamelCase or remove camel casing, respectively. The goal is to produce a class name that the application will then use, for example, to instantiate an object.
  • Why High Risk: These methods are commonly used for class name generation, making them a prime target. The "unexpected class name resolution" is the direct mechanism of the attack.
  • Why Critical: This is the specific action the attacker takes that leads to the critical consequences. It's the point where the attacker's input directly influences the application's behavior in a dangerous way.
  • Example:
    • Application expects input like "user_profile".
    • Inflector converts this to "UserProfile".
    • Application uses "UserProfile" to load the UserProfile class.
    • Attacker provides input like "../../malicious_code".
    • Inflector might convert this to "MaliciousCode" (depending on how it handles special characters).
    • Application attempts to load the MaliciousCode class, potentially executing arbitrary code.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: High
  • Effort: Low-Medium
  • Skill Level: Medium
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium

Attack Tree Path: 1.1.2 Security Control (e.g., accessing a class not intended).

• Description: This is a consequence of successful manipulation of class name. The application, due to the attacker's input, attempts to access or instantiate a class that it was not designed to interact with. This could be a class containing sensitive data, administrative functions, or even malicious code injected by the attacker. * Why High Risk: Direct consequence of 1.1, leading to unauthorized access. * Example:
  • Attacker successfully generates the class name "AdminPanel" through manipulated input.
  • The application, believing it's dealing with a legitimate class, instantiates "AdminPanel" and grants the attacker access to administrative functions. * Likelihood: Medium * Impact: High * Effort: Medium * Skill Level: Medium * Detection Difficulty: Medium

Attack Tree Path: 1.1.1 Bypass Security Control (e.g., authorization check based on class name). [CRITICAL]

• Description: This is a specific type of security control bypass. The application might have authorization checks that are based on the class name. For example, it might only allow classes within a certain namespace to be accessed. By manipulating the class name, the attacker can bypass these checks.
  • Why Critical: Authorization bypass is a fundamental security failure, allowing the attacker to circumvent intended access restrictions.
  • Example:
    • Application has a rule: "Only classes in the 'App\Models' namespace can be loaded."
    • Attacker crafts input that generates a class name like "App\Evil\EvilClass".
    • The application's authorization check (if poorly implemented) might be bypassed because the generated class name starts with the allowed namespace, even though it's not a legitimate model class.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: High
  • Effort: Medium
  • Skill Level: Medium
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium