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attack-surface.md

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Attack Surface Analysis for doctrine/instantiator

Attack Surface: Constructor Bypass - Security Check Circumvention

  • Description: Constructors are often used to enforce critical security policies like authorization and access control. doctrine/instantiator enables bypassing these checks by instantiating objects without constructor invocation.

    • Instantiator Contribution: The core function of instantiator is to create class instances without executing their constructors. This directly allows attackers to circumvent security checks implemented within constructors.

    • Example: Consider a SecuredResource class where the constructor verifies if the requesting user has sufficient privileges. If an attacker can leverage instantiator (perhaps through a framework vulnerability or insecure deserialization) to create an instance of SecuredResource directly, they bypass the constructor's privilege check and gain unauthorized access to the resource.

    • Impact: Unauthorized access to sensitive resources, privilege escalation, potential for complete system compromise if critical access controls are bypassed.

    • Risk Severity: Critical

    • Mitigation Strategies:

      • Shift Security Checks Outside Constructors: Implement robust authorization and access control checks in methods that handle requests or actions, not solely in constructors. Utilize method-level security or interceptors that are consistently applied regardless of object instantiation method.
      • Enforce Security at Factory/Container Level: If using factories or dependency injection containers, ensure security policies are enforced during object creation or retrieval within these components, independent of constructor execution.
      • Mandatory Initialization Methods: If constructor bypass is unavoidable in certain scenarios (like framework internals), enforce a mandatory initialization method that must be called after instantiation to perform security setup. Ensure the application logic always calls this method before using the object.
      • Regular Security Audits: Conduct thorough security audits, specifically examining areas where instantiator is used and verifying that security mechanisms are not solely reliant on constructor execution.

Attack Surface: Constructor Bypass - Object Deserialization/Injection Insecurity

  • Description: In object deserialization or injection contexts, constructors might be designed to perform essential security initialization, such as establishing secure connections or setting up security contexts. doctrine/instantiator can bypass these crucial setups.

    • Instantiator Contribution: instantiator facilitates the creation of objects during deserialization or object injection without invoking constructors. This directly skips security-critical initialization steps that constructors are intended to perform in these scenarios.

    • Example: Imagine a system deserializing objects from an untrusted source. A class SecureDatabaseConnection might have a constructor that establishes an encrypted database connection and authenticates the user. If instantiator is used during deserialization, a SecureDatabaseConnection object can be created without the constructor being called, resulting in an insecure, unauthenticated database connection being used by the application, potentially leading to data breaches.

    • Impact: Exposure of sensitive data, unauthorized access to backend systems, potential for remote code execution if insecure connections are exploited, complete compromise of data integrity and confidentiality.

    • Risk Severity: High to Critical (Critical if sensitive data or critical systems are involved)

    • Mitigation Strategies:

      • Avoid Deserializing Untrusted Data: Minimize or completely eliminate deserialization of data from untrusted sources. Prefer safer data exchange formats like JSON and explicit parsing.
      • Secure Deserialization Practices (If unavoidable): If deserialization from untrusted sources is necessary, implement robust secure deserialization practices. This includes using signed serialization, whitelisting allowed classes for deserialization, and employing secure deserialization libraries that offer protection against object injection vulnerabilities.
      • Post-Deserialization Security Initialization: If constructors are bypassed during deserialization, implement a mandatory post-deserialization initialization step. This step should explicitly perform all security-related setup that was originally intended to be in the constructor. Ensure this step is reliably executed after object creation.
      • Input Validation After Deserialization: Thoroughly validate all properties of deserialized objects after instantiation and before they are used by the application to detect and mitigate potential malicious payloads or unexpected states.