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Attack Tree Analysis for doctrine/instantiator

Objective: Compromise application using Doctrine Instantiator by exploiting its weaknesses.

Attack Tree Visualization

Attack Goal: Compromise Application via Doctrine Instantiator

└─── AND 1: Exploit Instantiator's Constructor Bypass Feature ├─── OR 1.1: Bypass Security Checks in Constructors │ └─── [HIGH-RISK PATH] OR 1.1.2.1: Application uses Instantiator for Deserialization │ └─── [Actionable Insight 1.1.2.1]: Analyze deserialization processes. If Instantiator is used, assess if bypassing constructors during deserialization can lead to vulnerabilities. └─── OR 1.2: Instantiate Internal or Restricted Classes └─── [HIGH-RISK PATH] OR 1.2.2.1: Class Name from User Input (Direct or Indirect) └─── [Actionable Insight 1.2.2.1]: If class names passed to Instantiator originate from user input (e.g., configuration, parameters), implement strict validation and sanitization to prevent instantiation of unintended classes.

Attack Tree Path: Application uses Instantiator for Deserialization (1.1.2.1)

  • Critical Node: Application uses Instantiator for Deserialization
  • Attack Vector Description: An attacker exploits the application's deserialization process where Doctrine Instantiator is used to instantiate objects. By manipulating the serialized data, the attacker can control the classes being instantiated (within the deserialization context) and bypass constructor logic due to Instantiator's behavior. This can lead to object injection vulnerabilities, where malicious objects are created and their methods are invoked during or after deserialization, potentially leading to Remote Code Execution (RCE) or other forms of compromise.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: High
  • Effort: Medium
  • Skill Level: Medium (Understanding deserialization, PHP object injection concepts)
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium (Depends on logging of deserialization and object creation)
  • Actionable Insight: Analyze deserialization processes within the application. If Doctrine Instantiator is used during deserialization, thoroughly assess if bypassing constructors can lead to vulnerabilities. Implement robust validation of deserialized data and consider alternative deserialization methods that do not bypass constructors if security is paramount. If constructor bypass is necessary, implement post-deserialization checks to enforce security measures that would have been in the constructor.

Attack Tree Path: Class Name from User Input (Direct or Indirect) (1.2.2.1)

  • Critical Node: Class Name from User Input (Direct or Indirect)
  • Attack Vector Description: An attacker exploits scenarios where the application dynamically determines the class to be instantiated by Doctrine Instantiator based on user-controlled input. This input could be directly provided by the user (e.g., via URL parameters, form data) or indirectly influenced (e.g., through configuration files that users can modify or influence). By manipulating this input, the attacker can specify arbitrary class names to be instantiated. If the application does not properly sanitize or validate these class names, the attacker can force the instantiation of internal, restricted, or even attacker-controlled classes. This can lead to arbitrary object instantiation, potentially allowing the attacker to execute arbitrary code if combined with other vulnerabilities or if the instantiated classes have exploitable methods or side effects. In the worst case, this can lead to Remote Code Execution (RCE).
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: Critical
  • Effort: Low
  • Skill Level: Low (Basic web exploitation skills) to Medium (Understanding object injection)
  • Detection Difficulty: Low (Input validation failures, unusual class instantiation attempts can be logged)
  • Actionable Insight: If class names passed to Doctrine Instantiator originate from user input (directly or indirectly), implement strict input validation and sanitization. Crucially, implement a whitelist of allowed classes that can be instantiated. Reject any instantiation requests for classes not on the whitelist. This significantly reduces the attack surface and prevents the instantiation of unintended or malicious classes. Ensure that input sources for class names are properly secured and access-controlled to prevent unauthorized modification.