mitigations.md

Mitigation Strategies Analysis for doctrine/instantiator

Mitigation Strategy: Strict Input Validation and Sanitization

Description:

1. Identify all points in the application where doctrine/instantiator is used to create objects based on external input, especially during deserialization or object reconstruction.
2. Define and enforce strict validation rules for all input data that influences class names or object properties used with doctrine/instantiator. This includes:
   • Data Type Validation: Ensure input data conforms to expected types (string, integer, etc.).
   • Format Validation: Validate input formats (e.g., specific string patterns for class names).
   • Whitelist Validation: If input is expected to be from a predefined set (e.g., allowed class name prefixes), validate against a strict whitelist.
3. Sanitize input data to remove or escape potentially harmful characters before using it to determine class names or object properties for instantiation with doctrine/instantiator.
4. Implement validation and sanitization immediately before the input data is used with doctrine/instantiator.
5. Log invalid input attempts related to doctrine/instantiator usage for security monitoring.

Threats Mitigated:

• Object Injection via Deserialization (High Severity): Prevents attackers from injecting arbitrary classes or manipulating object states by controlling class names or properties used with doctrine/instantiator during deserialization.
• Unintended Object State (Low to Medium Severity): Reduces the risk of objects being instantiated with unexpected or invalid properties due to malicious or malformed input used with doctrine/instantiator.

Impact:

• Object Injection via Deserialization: Significantly reduces the risk by making it much harder to control the instantiation process via malicious input used with doctrine/instantiator.
• Unintended Object State: Partially reduces the risk by ensuring input used with doctrine/instantiator is valid, but might not cover all state issues if constructor logic is bypassed.

Currently Implemented: No. General input validation exists, but it's not specifically tailored to the context of doctrine/instantiator usage and the risks of class name/property manipulation during deserialization or object reconstruction.

Missing Implementation: Specific input validation and sanitization needs to be implemented in areas where doctrine/instantiator is used to create objects from external data, focusing on validating class names and properties derived from input before they are used with instantiator.

Mitigation Strategy: Whitelist Allowed Classes for Instantiation (with doctrine/instantiator)

Description:

1. Identify all code locations where doctrine/instantiator is used to create objects based on input that could be influenced externally.
2. Define a strict whitelist of classes that are explicitly permitted to be instantiated using doctrine/instantiator in these specific locations. This whitelist should only include classes necessary for the application's intended functionality in these contexts and considered safe to instantiate without constructor execution.
3. Implement a check before using doctrine/instantiator to verify if the class to be instantiated is present in the defined whitelist.
4. If the class is not whitelisted, prevent instantiation using doctrine/instantiator and log the attempt as a potential security event.
5. Regularly review and update the whitelist to ensure it remains secure and aligned with application needs as it evolves and as doctrine/instantiator usage changes.

Threats Mitigated:

• Object Injection via Deserialization (High Severity): Effectively prevents object injection by restricting doctrine/instantiator to only instantiate classes explicitly deemed safe, even if attackers can control class names in input.

Impact:

• Object Injection via Deserialization: Significantly reduces the risk. Whitelisting provides a strong control over what classes can be instantiated via doctrine/instantiator.

Currently Implemented: No. There is no explicit class whitelisting mechanism specifically for doctrine/instantiator usage.

Missing Implementation: Whitelisting needs to be implemented in all areas where doctrine/instantiator is used to instantiate classes based on potentially untrusted input. This requires creating and maintaining a whitelist and enforcing it before any instantiator based instantiation.

Mitigation Strategy: Careful Code Review of doctrine/instantiator Instantiation Points

Description:

1. Conduct focused code reviews specifically targeting all instances where doctrine/instantiator is used within the codebase.
2. During these reviews, specifically analyze:
   • Justification for doctrine/instantiator Usage: Is bypassing the constructor with doctrine/instantiator truly necessary in each instance? Are there alternative approaches that could avoid bypassing constructors?
   • Security Implications of Constructor Bypass: For each class instantiated with doctrine/instantiator, assess the security implications of bypassing its constructor. Are security checks, critical initialization, or validation logic within the constructor being circumvented?
   • Object State after doctrine/instantiator: Verify that the application logic correctly handles objects instantiated without constructor execution by doctrine/instantiator. Ensure the objects are in a valid and secure state for subsequent operations despite constructor bypass.
   • Input Sources for doctrine/instantiator: Identify the sources of input that influence class names or properties used with doctrine/instantiator. Evaluate the trustworthiness of these input sources.
3. Document the rationale for using doctrine/instantiator in each specific location and explicitly document the security considerations and mitigations taken due to constructor bypass.
4. Involve security-minded developers in these code reviews to ensure a thorough assessment of the security implications of doctrine/instantiator usage.

Threats Mitigated:

• Bypassing Constructor Security Checks (Medium to High Severity): Code review focused on doctrine/instantiator helps identify instances where bypassing constructors might unintentionally circumvent critical security measures implemented in constructors.
• Unintended Object State (Low to Medium Severity): Reviews can catch cases where objects instantiated without constructors via doctrine/instantiator might end up in an invalid or unexpected state.
• Circumventing Initialization Logic (Medium Severity): Code review can identify situations where using doctrine/instantiator skips essential initialization steps, potentially leading to insecure objects.

Impact:

• Bypassing Constructor Security Checks: Partially reduces the risk. Focused code review can identify potential issues related to doctrine/instantiator and constructor bypass.
• Unintended Object State: Partially reduces the risk. Reviews can help catch some state-related issues arising from doctrine/instantiator usage.
• Circumventing Initialization Logic: Partially reduces the risk. Reviews can highlight missing initialization due to doctrine/instantiator, but might not catch all subtle issues.

Currently Implemented: Yes, general code reviews are performed. However, there is no specific, targeted code review process focused on the security implications of doctrine/instantiator usage.

Missing Implementation: Enhance code review processes to include a specific checklist or guidelines for reviewing code that uses doctrine/instantiator. This checklist should specifically prompt reviewers to consider the security implications of constructor bypass and to verify the context and justification for instantiator usage.

Mitigation Strategy: Consider Alternatives to doctrine/instantiator for Security-Critical Object Creation

Description:

1. For classes where constructor logic is crucial for security, validation, or essential initialization, critically re-evaluate the necessity of using doctrine/instantiator.
2. Actively explore and prioritize alternative object creation patterns that minimize or eliminate the need to bypass constructors, such as:
   • Factory Methods: Implement static factory methods that encapsulate object creation logic, including necessary security checks and initialization steps within the factory, before returning the object. Factories can internally use doctrine/instantiator for parts of object creation if absolutely needed, but provide a controlled entry point that can execute security-critical logic.
   • Builder Pattern: Utilize the builder pattern to construct objects step-by-step, allowing for validation and initialization at each step or at the final build stage, thus controlling the object creation process more granularly than direct doctrine/instantiator usage.
3. If viable and offering improved security, refactor code to use these alternative patterns instead of directly relying on doctrine/instantiator for creating security-sensitive objects.
4. Document the decision-making process when choosing between doctrine/instantiator and alternative object creation patterns, especially when security is a significant factor.

Threats Mitigated:

• Bypassing Constructor Security Checks (Medium to High Severity): By shifting away from direct doctrine/instantiator usage for critical objects and using patterns like factories or builders, this strategy eliminates or significantly reduces the risk of bypassing constructor-based security measures.
• Circumventing Initialization Logic (Medium Severity): Alternative patterns ensure controlled initialization, preventing the risk of objects being created in an uninitialized or insecure state due to bypassed constructors when using doctrine/instantiator directly.

Impact:

• Bypassing Constructor Security Checks: Significantly reduces the risk. By avoiding constructor bypass for critical objects (by reducing direct doctrine/instantiator usage), this strategy ensures security logic is executed during object creation.
• Circumventing Initialization Logic: Significantly reduces the risk. Alternative patterns ensure proper and controlled object initialization, mitigating risks associated with doctrine/instantiator's constructor bypass.

Currently Implemented: No. The application currently uses direct instantiation and, in some cases, doctrine/instantiator without consistent use of factory methods or builder patterns, especially for security-sensitive object creation scenarios where constructor bypass could be problematic.

Missing Implementation: For security-critical classes, refactoring is needed to introduce factory methods or builder patterns as alternatives to direct doctrine/instantiator usage. This involves identifying classes where constructor logic is essential for security and implementing these safer object creation patterns.

Mitigation Strategy: Implement Post-Instantiation Validation (after doctrine/instantiator)

Description:

1. Identify classes that are instantiated using doctrine/instantiator where constructor logic is bypassed, and where object state validation is crucial for security or application integrity because constructors are bypassed.
2. For these classes, implement dedicated validation methods (e.g., isValid(), validateState()) that perform comprehensive checks on the object's properties to ensure it is in a valid and secure state specifically because the constructor was bypassed by doctrine/instantiator.
3. Call these validation methods immediately after instantiating the object with doctrine/instantiator and before the object is used in any security-sensitive operations or application logic. This validation becomes a critical step to compensate for the bypassed constructor.
4. If validation fails, handle the error appropriately (e.g., throw an exception, log a security error, reject the object).
5. Document the post-instantiation validation logic and clearly identify the classes for which it is implemented as a direct mitigation for doctrine/instantiator's constructor bypass.

Threats Mitigated:

• Bypassing Constructor Security Checks (Medium to High Severity): Post-instantiation validation acts as a crucial secondary security check specifically because constructors are bypassed by doctrine/instantiator. It can catch some security issues that might arise from this bypass.
• Unintended Object State (Low to Medium Severity): Validation ensures that even if objects are created without constructors using doctrine/instantiator, they are still in a valid state before being used, mitigating risks of application errors or vulnerabilities due to invalid object states resulting from constructor bypass.
• Circumventing Initialization Logic (Medium Severity): Post-validation can, to some extent, compensate for missing initialization logic in constructors bypassed by doctrine/instantiator by explicitly checking for required properties or states after instantiation.

Impact:

• Bypassing Constructor Security Checks: Partially reduces the risk. Post-validation provides a necessary safety net due to constructor bypass by doctrine/instantiator, but it is not as robust as constructor-based validation itself.
• Unintended Object State: Partially reduces the risk. Validation helps ensure state validity after doctrine/instantiator usage, but might not cover all potential state issues if constructor logic is complex and bypassed.
• Circumventing Initialization Logic: Partially reduces the risk. Post-validation can check for some missing initialization caused by doctrine/instantiator, but might not replicate all constructor initialization steps.

Currently Implemented: No. There is no systematic post-instantiation validation implemented specifically for objects created using doctrine/instantiator to compensate for constructor bypass.

Missing Implementation: Post-instantiation validation needs to be implemented for classes where doctrine/instantiator is used and constructor logic is bypassed, especially for classes involved in security-sensitive operations. This involves identifying these classes and adding explicit validation methods that are called immediately after instantiation with doctrine/instantiator to mitigate the risks of constructor bypass.