threat-modeling.md

Threat Model Analysis for doctrine/instantiator

Threat: Unintended Object State and Bypassed Constructor Logic

• Threat: Unintended Object State & Bypassed Constructor
• Description:
  • Attacker Action: An attacker might manipulate the application to instantiate objects using doctrine/instantiator where constructors are intended for security or data integrity.
  • How: Exploiting application logic that uses instantiator to create objects without proper validation or context awareness. This could involve providing crafted input that leads to instantiation of objects in vulnerable states, for example, if class names are derived from user input and used with instantiator.
• Impact:
  • Security Bypass: Circumventing authorization checks or security configurations implemented in constructors.
  • Data Integrity Issues: Creation of objects with invalid or inconsistent data, leading to application malfunction or data corruption.
  • Logic Exploitation: Enabling exploitation of application logic flaws that rely on specific object initialization states.
• Affected Instantiator Component: Instantiator::instantiate() method, Instantiator::instantiateWithoutConstructor() method, and internal reflection mechanisms.
• Risk Severity: High
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Minimize reliance on constructors for security; implement validation outside constructors.
  • Validate object state after instantiation via instantiator.
  • Control the context where doctrine/instantiator is used, restricting it to trusted contexts.
  • Consider alternative object initialization methods that respect constructors when possible.

Threat: Deserialization Gadget Chain Facilitation

• Threat: Deserialization Gadget Chain Facilitation
• Description:
  • Attacker Action: An attacker crafts malicious serialized data. When the application deserializes this data and uses doctrine/instantiator to instantiate objects based on class names within the deserialized data, the attacker can trigger a gadget chain.
  • How: Exploiting deserialization vulnerabilities in the application and leveraging instantiator as a component within a gadget chain. The attacker manipulates serialized data to include class names that, when instantiated by instantiator, lead to a sequence of method calls resulting in malicious code execution.
• Impact:
  • Remote Code Execution (RCE): Complete control over the server by executing arbitrary code.
  • Denial of Service (DoS): Crashing the application or exhausting server resources.
  • Data Exfiltration/Manipulation: Accessing or modifying sensitive data.
• Affected Instantiator Component: Instantiator::instantiate() method, Instantiator::instantiateWithoutConstructor() method, specifically when used in deserialization contexts with dynamically determined class names.
• Risk Severity: Critical
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Avoid deserializing untrusted data.
  • Restrict class name usage with instantiator in deserialization scenarios using a whitelist.
  • Regularly update dependencies to patch deserialization vulnerabilities.
  • Conduct code audits for deserialization vulnerabilities.
  • Implement input validation and sanitization for class name selection, especially in deserialization.