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attack-surface.md

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Attack Surface Analysis for doctrine/instantiator

Attack Surface: Bypassing Constructor-Based Security Checks

  • Description: Attackers can circumvent security measures implemented within class constructors by using doctrine/instantiator to create objects without constructor invocation.
  • Instantiator Contribution: doctrine/instantiator's core functionality is to instantiate objects without calling their constructors, directly enabling the bypass.
  • Example: An application has a User class with a constructor that checks for admin privileges. An attacker uses instantiator to create a User object directly, bypassing the privilege check and potentially gaining admin access.
  • Impact: Unauthorized access, privilege escalation, data manipulation, security policy violations.
  • Risk Severity: High to Critical, depending on the criticality of the bypassed security checks.
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Reduce Reliance on Constructor-Only Security: Implement security checks outside of constructors, such as in dedicated security middleware or access control lists.
    • Validate Object State Post-Instantiation: If constructors are bypassed, implement explicit validation logic after object creation to ensure the object is in a secure and expected state.

Attack Surface: Object Injection via Class Name Manipulation

  • Description: If the application uses doctrine/instantiator to instantiate classes based on user-controlled input, attackers can inject malicious class names, leading to instantiation of arbitrary classes and potentially Remote Code Execution.
  • Instantiator Contribution: doctrine/instantiator provides the mechanism to dynamically instantiate classes based on names, making it the direct tool exploited in object injection scenarios when class names are derived from untrusted sources.
  • Example: An application takes a class name from a URL parameter to instantiate a logging class. An attacker modifies the parameter to point to a malicious class that executes system commands in its __destruct() method. When the application instantiates this class using instantiator, and the object is later destroyed, the malicious code executes.
  • Impact: Remote Code Execution (RCE), Denial of Service (DoS), Information Disclosure, Privilege Escalation.
  • Risk Severity: Critical, as it can lead to Remote Code Execution.
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Never Instantiate User-Controlled Classes Directly: Avoid using instantiator (or any dynamic instantiation mechanism) with class names directly derived from user input or untrusted external sources.
    • Strict Whitelisting of Allowed Classes: If dynamic instantiation is necessary, implement a strict whitelist of allowed class names. Only permit instantiation of classes that are explicitly intended for this purpose and are considered safe.