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Attack Tree Analysis for doctrine/instantiator

Objective: Compromise application by exploiting vulnerabilities related to Doctrine Instantiator's functionality of bypassing constructor execution, focusing on high-risk attack vectors.

Attack Tree Visualization

Compromise Application via Doctrine Instantiator [CRITICAL NODE]
├─── Bypass Constructor Security Checks [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   └─── Instantiate Object without Constructor Execution [CRITICAL NODE]
│       └─── Target Class relies on constructor for security initialization [CRITICAL NODE]
│           ├─── Exploit application logic that reads properties before proper initialization [CRITICAL NODE]
│           └─── Bypass Authentication/Authorization Checks [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│               └─── Constructor performs authentication or authorization checks [CRITICAL NODE]
│               └─── Exploit application logic relying on constructor auth [CRITICAL NODE]
│           └─── Exploit object methods vulnerable in uninitialized state [CRITICAL NODE]
├─── Object Injection/Manipulation via Class Name Control [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│   └─── Control Class Name passed to Instantiator [CRITICAL NODE]
│       └─── Application allows user-controlled input for class name [CRITICAL NODE]
│       └─── Instantiate Arbitrary Class [CRITICAL NODE]
│           ├─── Instantiate Malicious Class [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│           │   └─── Exploit methods of malicious class [CRITICAL NODE]
│           └─── Instantiate Vulnerable Class in Unexpected State [HIGH-RISK PATH]
│               └─── Instantiate class not intended without constructor [CRITICAL NODE]
│               └─── Exploit vulnerabilities in uninitialized state [CRITICAL NODE]

Attack Tree Path: Bypass Constructor Security Checks

Description: This path focuses on exploiting situations where the application relies on object constructors to enforce security measures. By using Doctrine Instantiator, an attacker can bypass these constructors, leading to objects in an insecure or uninitialized state.

  • Critical Nodes within this path:

    • Instantiate Object without Constructor Execution: This is the fundamental action enabled by Doctrine Instantiator that allows bypassing constructor logic. It's critical because it's the enabler for all subsequent vulnerabilities in this path.
    • Target Class relies on constructor for security initialization: This condition is critical. If a class does not rely on its constructor for security, bypassing it is less likely to be directly exploitable. Identifying classes with constructor-based security is crucial.
    • Exploit application logic that reads properties before proper initialization: This node highlights the vulnerability of accessing object properties that are intended to be securely initialized in the constructor. If application logic reads these properties prematurely, it can expose sensitive data or bypass security checks.
    • Constructor performs authentication or authorization checks: This is a specific, high-impact scenario within constructor-based security. If constructors are used for authentication or authorization, bypassing them directly undermines access control.
    • Exploit application logic relying on constructor auth: This node describes the exploitation of the bypassed authentication or authorization. If application logic assumes these checks have occurred during object creation, it can be tricked into granting unauthorized access.
    • Exploit object methods vulnerable in uninitialized state: This critical node focuses on the vulnerability of object methods when called on objects that haven't been properly initialized by their constructors. Methods might rely on constructor-initialized state for safe operation, and bypassing the constructor can lead to unexpected behavior or exploitable conditions.

  • Attack Vectors:

    • Sensitive Data Exposure: Accessing object properties that contain sensitive data intended to be initialized securely in the constructor.
    • Authentication Bypass: Circumventing authentication checks performed in the constructor, gaining unauthorized access to application features.
    • Authorization Bypass: Circumventing authorization checks performed in the constructor, gaining elevated privileges or access to restricted resources.
    • Vulnerable Method Invocation: Calling object methods that are vulnerable when the object is in an uninitialized state, potentially leading to DoS, data corruption, or further exploits.

Attack Tree Path: Bypass Constructor Security Checks -> Bypass Authentication/Authorization Checks

Description: This is a sub-path of "Bypass Constructor Security Checks," specifically focusing on the severe risk of bypassing authentication and authorization mechanisms implemented in constructors.

  • Critical Nodes within this path:

    • Constructor performs authentication or authorization checks: The critical condition where constructors are used for access control.
    • Exploit application logic relying on constructor auth: The exploitation step where the bypassed authentication/authorization leads to unauthorized access.

  • Attack Vectors:

    • Full Application Compromise: Successful bypass of constructor-based authentication or authorization can lead to complete application compromise, allowing the attacker to perform actions as any user or administrator.
    • Data Breach: Unauthorized access can lead to the exposure and exfiltration of sensitive data.
    • Account Takeover: Attackers might be able to bypass authentication to take over user accounts.

Attack Tree Path: Object Injection/Manipulation via Class Name Control

Description: This path focuses on the dangers of allowing user-controlled input to determine the class name that Doctrine Instantiator will instantiate. This can lead to object injection vulnerabilities, allowing attackers to instantiate arbitrary classes.

  • Critical Nodes within this path:

    • Control Class Name passed to Instantiator: This is the core vulnerability – the ability for an attacker to influence which class is instantiated.
    • Application allows user-controlled input for class name: This node highlights the source of the vulnerability – where user input is used to determine the class name. This could be through URL parameters, POST data, configuration files, etc.
    • Instantiate Arbitrary Class: The direct consequence of class name control, enabling the attacker to instantiate any class available to the application.

  • Attack Vectors:

    • Object Injection: Instantiating arbitrary classes, potentially leading to unexpected application behavior or vulnerabilities if these classes are not intended to be instantiated in this context.
    • Preparation for further attacks: Instantiating classes might be a stepping stone to more complex attacks, such as method chaining exploits or property-oriented programming.

Attack Tree Path: Object Injection/Manipulation via Class Name Control -> Instantiate Malicious Class

Description: This sub-path represents the most severe outcome of object injection – the ability to instantiate and execute methods of a malicious class, leading to Remote Code Execution (RCE).

  • Critical Nodes within this path:

    • Instantiate Malicious Class: The attacker successfully instantiates a class designed for malicious purposes. This class must either already exist in the application or its dependencies, or the attacker must be able to introduce it (which is a more complex attack).
    • Exploit methods of malicious class: After instantiation, the attacker can call methods of the malicious class to achieve their goals, such as executing system commands or accessing files.

  • Attack Vectors:

    • Remote Code Execution (RCE): Instantiating and executing methods of a malicious class can directly lead to RCE, allowing the attacker to execute arbitrary code on the server.
    • Full System Compromise: RCE often leads to full system compromise, allowing the attacker to control the server, access sensitive data, and potentially pivot to other systems.

Attack Tree Path: Object Injection/Manipulation via Class Name Control -> Instantiate Vulnerable Class in Unexpected State

Description: This sub-path focuses on exploiting legitimate, but vulnerable, classes by instantiating them in an unintended state (without constructor execution). This can expose vulnerabilities within these classes that are normally mitigated by constructor initialization.

  • Critical Nodes within this path:

    • Instantiate class not intended without constructor: The attacker targets a class that is designed to be used with its constructor, and instantiates it without constructor execution using Doctrine Instantiator.
    • Exploit vulnerabilities in uninitialized state: The attacker then exploits vulnerabilities that arise in the class due to its uninitialized state. This could be due to missing dependencies, incorrect initial values, or methods that rely on constructor-initialized state.

  • Attack Vectors:

    • Unexpected Application Behavior: Instantiating classes in an unintended state can lead to unpredictable application behavior, errors, or crashes.
    • Denial of Service (DoS): Vulnerable methods in uninitialized classes might lead to resource exhaustion or application crashes, causing DoS.
    • Data Corruption: Methods in uninitialized classes might operate on data in an incorrect state, leading to data corruption.
    • Further Exploitation: The vulnerable state of the object might create opportunities for further exploitation, such as memory corruption or other vulnerabilities.