Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History
67 lines (51 loc) · 5.07 KB

File metadata and controls

67 lines (51 loc) · 5.07 KB

Attack Tree Analysis for doctrine/lexer

Objective: Execute Arbitrary Code or Cause Denial of Service (DoS) via doctrine/lexer Exploitation [CRITICAL]

Attack Tree Visualization

[Attacker's Goal: Execute Arbitrary Code or Cause DoS via doctrine/lexer] [CRITICAL]
    |
    -------------------------------------------------
    |						|
    [1. Input Manipulation Attacks] [CRITICAL]	  [2. Resource Exhaustion] [HIGH]
    |						|
    -------------------------			   -------------------------
    |				   |			   |				   |
    [1.2. Boundary	  ]   [2.2.1. Very Long]   [2.2.2. Nested	 ]
    [Condition Issues] [HIGH]  [Input Strings] [HIGH]  [Structures] [HIGH]
    [Extremely Long	]
    [Input Strings] [HIGH]
  • Description: This is the fundamental entry point for the majority of attacks. The attacker leverages their control over the input provided to the application, which is subsequently processed by doctrine/lexer. Without input control, most of these attacks are impossible.
  • Why Critical: It's the gateway to exploiting vulnerabilities within the lexer. The attacker must be able to provide input to the system.
  • Description: The attacker exploits the lexer's handling of input at the boundaries of its defined rules or limitations. This often involves providing input that is excessively large, small, or otherwise unexpected at the edges of what the lexer is designed to handle.
  • Why High-Risk: These attacks are often easy to attempt (low effort) and have a high likelihood of success because many applications fail to properly validate input before passing it to the lexer.
  • Description: The attacker provides an input string that is significantly longer than what the lexer (or the application using it) is designed to handle. This can lead to various issues, primarily:
    • Buffer Overflows: If the lexer or application doesn't properly allocate memory for the input string, the attacker might be able to overwrite adjacent memory regions, potentially leading to arbitrary code execution (though this is less likely with modern memory protections).
    • Memory Exhaustion (DoS): The lexer might attempt to allocate a large amount of memory to store the input string or intermediate data structures, leading to a denial-of-service condition.
  • Likelihood: High
  • Impact: Medium to High (DoS is most likely, but buffer overflows are possible.)
  • Effort: Very Low
  • Skill Level: Novice
  • Detection Difficulty: Easy (DoS is usually obvious. Memory errors might be detected by monitoring tools.)
  • Description: The attacker aims to consume excessive system resources (CPU, memory, stack space) by providing specially crafted input to the lexer. This typically leads to a Denial of Service (DoS) condition, where the application becomes unresponsive or crashes.
  • Why High-Risk: These attacks are often relatively easy to execute and have a high probability of success, especially if the application doesn't have proper safeguards against resource exhaustion.
  • Description: (Same as 1.2.1 - it's a high-risk attack vector under both categories). The attacker provides an extremely long input string.
  • Likelihood: High
  • Impact: Medium to High (DoS is most likely, but buffer overflows are possible.)
  • Effort: Very Low
  • Skill Level: Novice
  • Detection Difficulty: Easy (DoS is usually obvious. Memory errors might be detected by monitoring tools.)
  • Description: The attacker provides input containing deeply nested structures, such as comments within comments, annotations within annotations, or other recursive constructs that the lexer might need to process. This can lead to:
    • Stack Overflow (DoS): If the lexer uses recursion to handle nested structures, a deeply nested input can cause the call stack to overflow, leading to a crash.
    • Memory Exhaustion (DoS): Even if the lexer doesn't use recursion, deeply nested structures might require it to allocate a large number of objects or data structures to represent the nested hierarchy, leading to memory exhaustion.
  • Likelihood: Medium to High
  • Impact: Medium to High (DoS is the most likely outcome.)
  • Effort: Low
  • Skill Level: Novice to Intermediate
  • Detection Difficulty: Easy to Medium (DoS is usually obvious. Stack overflows might be detected by monitoring tools.)