attack-surface.md

Attack Surface Analysis for doctrine/orm

Attack Surface: SQL Injection via Raw SQL/DQL Fragments

• Description: Vulnerability where attackers inject malicious SQL code into database queries, leading to unauthorized data access, modification, or deletion.
• ORM Contribution: Doctrine ORM, while offering parameterized queries, allows developers to use raw SQL or DQL fragments. Improper handling of user input within these fragments bypasses ORM's security features, directly exposing the application to SQL injection.
• Example: Dynamically building a DQL WHERE clause by directly concatenating user-provided search terms without sanitization: createQuery("SELECT u FROM User u WHERE u.username LIKE '" . $_GET['username'] . "%'"). An attacker could inject '; DROP TABLE User; -- in the username parameter.
• Impact: Critical. Full database compromise, data breach, data loss, application downtime, and potential server takeover.
• Risk Severity: Critical
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Always use Parameterized Queries: Utilize Doctrine's Query Builder or named parameters in DQL/SQL queries.
  • Avoid Raw SQL/DQL Fragments with User Input: Minimize or eliminate the use of raw SQL or DQL fragments, especially when incorporating user-provided data.
  • Input Sanitization (Defense in Depth, but not primary): While parameterization is key, consider input validation and sanitization as an additional layer of defense.
  • Code Review and Security Audits: Regularly review code for instances of raw SQL/DQL construction with user input.

Attack Surface: Business Logic Bypass via DQL/SQL Manipulation

• Description: Attackers manipulate complex or dynamically generated DQL/SQL queries to circumvent intended business rules, access unauthorized data, or perform actions they shouldn't.
• ORM Contribution: Doctrine's flexibility in query construction, especially with complex DQL and dynamic query building, can inadvertently create logical vulnerabilities if not carefully designed and tested.
• Example: A DQL query intended to only retrieve public posts for a user might be manipulated by an attacker to retrieve private posts by altering query parameters or conditions, exploiting flaws in the query logic.
• Impact: High. Unauthorized data access, privilege escalation, data manipulation, and circumvention of application functionalities.
• Risk Severity: High
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Thorough Query Review and Testing: Carefully review and test all DQL/SQL queries, especially those dynamically constructed, to ensure they enforce intended business logic correctly under various input conditions.
  • Principle of Least Privilege in Queries: Design queries to only retrieve the necessary data and avoid over-fetching.
  • Independent Authorization Layer: Implement robust authorization checks outside of query logic. Verify user permissions before executing queries, regardless of query structure.
  • Unit and Integration Tests: Write tests specifically to verify that queries enforce business logic and prevent unauthorized data access.

Attack Surface: Inefficient Queries Leading to Denial of Service (DoS)

• Description: Poorly optimized ORM queries consume excessive server resources, leading to performance degradation or application unavailability.
• ORM Contribution: Doctrine's ORM abstraction, while beneficial, can sometimes mask underlying query inefficiencies, especially with complex relationships and lazy loading, potentially leading to the "N+1 query problem" and other performance issues.
• Example: Repeatedly accessing lazy-loaded related entities in a loop, resulting in numerous database queries instead of a single efficient join. An attacker could trigger this by requesting a large number of entities with lazy-loaded relationships.
• Impact: High. Application slowdown, service disruption, resource exhaustion, and potential application downtime in critical systems.
• Risk Severity: High
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Query Optimization and Performance Monitoring: Regularly monitor query performance and identify slow or resource-intensive queries. Use Doctrine's query profiling tools.
  • Eager Loading: Utilize eager loading (fetch: EAGER or JOIN FETCH in DQL) for relationships accessed frequently to reduce the N+1 query problem.
  • Database Indexing: Ensure proper database indexing for columns used in WHERE clauses and joins to improve query performance.
  • Caching (Query and Result Cache): Implement Doctrine's query and result caching mechanisms to reduce database load for frequently executed queries.
  • Rate Limiting and Resource Management: Implement rate limiting to prevent excessive requests and resource management to limit resource consumption by individual requests.

Attack Surface: Mass Assignment Vulnerabilities

• Description: Attackers modify unintended entity properties by providing extra parameters during data updates if mass assignment is not properly controlled.
• ORM Contribution: Doctrine ORM automatically maps request parameters to entity properties if not configured to prevent mass assignment. This default behavior can be exploited if developers are not aware of the security implications.
• Example: A user profile update form might allow modification of the isAdmin property if not explicitly protected. An attacker could send a request with an isAdmin=1 parameter to elevate their privileges if mass assignment is enabled for this property.
• Impact: High. Privilege escalation, unauthorized data modification, and potential compromise of application integrity.
• Risk Severity: High
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Explicitly Define Allowed Fields for Updates: Use mechanisms like DTOs (Data Transfer Objects), form handling libraries, or explicit entity setters to control which fields can be updated from user input.
  • Restrict Mass Assignment: Configure Doctrine to prevent mass assignment by default or explicitly define which properties are fillable. Use mechanisms to whitelist allowed properties.
  • Input Validation and Sanitization: Validate and sanitize all user input before mapping it to entity properties.
  • Code Review: Review code to identify areas where mass assignment might be occurring unintentionally and implement proper protection.

Attack Surface: Lifecycle Events and Event Listener/Subscriber Vulnerabilities

• Description: Vulnerabilities in custom logic implemented within Doctrine's lifecycle events (listeners/subscribers) can be exploited by triggering these events with malicious input or application states.
• ORM Contribution: Doctrine's event system allows developers to extend ORM functionality by hooking into entity lifecycle stages. If these extensions are not securely implemented, they can introduce new attack vectors.
• Example: A prePersist event listener that performs file operations based on user-provided entity data. An attacker could manipulate this data to perform path traversal or other file system attacks through the listener.
• Impact: High. Depends on the vulnerability introduced in the event listener/subscriber. Could range from information disclosure to remote code execution depending on the flaw.
• Risk Severity: High
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Secure Coding Practices in Event Handlers: Apply secure coding practices when developing event listeners and subscribers. Treat input data with caution and avoid vulnerable operations.
  • Input Validation and Sanitization in Event Handlers: Validate and sanitize all input data processed within event handlers.
  • Principle of Least Privilege in Event Handlers: Grant event handlers only the necessary permissions and access to resources.
  • Regular Security Audits of Event Handlers: Regularly review and audit custom event listeners and subscribers for potential security vulnerabilities.

Attack Surface: Outdated Doctrine ORM Version and Dependencies

• Description: Using outdated versions of Doctrine ORM or its dependencies exposes the application to known security vulnerabilities that have been patched in newer versions.
• ORM Contribution: Like any software library, Doctrine ORM and its dependencies may have security vulnerabilities discovered over time. Using outdated versions means missing out on security fixes.
• Example: A known SQL injection vulnerability in an older version of Doctrine DBAL (Database Abstraction Layer) could be exploited if the application is not updated to a patched version.
• Impact: Critical. Depends on the severity of the known vulnerabilities in the outdated version. Could lead to various attacks including SQL injection, remote code execution, etc.
• Risk Severity: Critical
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Keep Doctrine ORM and Dependencies Up-to-Date: Regularly update Doctrine ORM and all its dependencies to the latest stable versions.
  • Monitor Security Advisories: Subscribe to security advisories for Doctrine ORM and its dependencies to be informed about new vulnerabilities and updates.
  • Automated Dependency Scanning: Use automated tools to scan dependencies for known vulnerabilities and alert on outdated packages.
  • Regular Security Patching Process: Establish a process for regularly applying security patches and updating dependencies.