Mitigation Strategy: Use Parameterized Queries / Prepared Statements Exclusively (Doctrine-Specific)
-
Description:
- QueryBuilder and DQL: Always use Doctrine's
createQueryBuilder()
or DQL for all database interactions. This ensures that Doctrine's built-in parameterization mechanisms are used. setParameter()
: For every value that originates from an untrusted source (user input, external APIs, etc.), use thesetParameter()
method of theQueryBuilder
orQuery
object to bind the value to a named placeholder. Never build queries by concatenating strings with user input.- Avoid
expr()->literal()
with User Input: Do not useexpr()->literal()
with any data derived from user input. If absolutely necessary, manually escape using$entityManager->getConnection()->quote()
, but this is strongly discouraged. - Code Review for Doctrine Usage: Enforce code reviews that specifically check for the correct use of
setParameter()
and the avoidance of string concatenation within Doctrine queries. - Automated testing for Doctrine usage: Include automated tests that attempt to inject malicious SQL through user input fields.
- QueryBuilder and DQL: Always use Doctrine's
-
Threats Mitigated:
- SQL Injection (Critical): Directly prevents SQL injection by ensuring that user input is treated as data, not executable code, within the context of Doctrine's query handling.
- Second-Order SQL Injection (High): Reduces the risk by ensuring consistent use of parameterized queries throughout all Doctrine interactions.
-
Impact:
- SQL Injection: Risk reduced from Critical to Negligible (if implemented correctly).
- Second-Order SQL Injection: Significantly reduced risk.
-
Currently Implemented: (Example - Adapt to your project)
- Implemented in new user management module (
src/Controller/UserController.php
,src/Repository/UserRepository.php
). - Partially implemented in product catalog module.
- Implemented in new user management module (
-
Missing Implementation: (Example - Adapt to your project)
- Legacy blog post module (
src/Controller/BlogController.php
) - high priority. - Search functionality (
src/Controller/SearchController.php
).
- Legacy blog post module (
Mitigation Strategy: Prefer DQL over Raw SQL (Doctrine-Specific)
-
Description:
- DQL as Default: Make DQL the default choice for all new database queries. DQL's object-oriented nature reduces the risk of accidental SQL injection vulnerabilities compared to raw SQL.
- Refactor Raw SQL to DQL: Actively identify and refactor existing raw SQL queries to use DQL, prioritizing those that handle user input.
EntityManager::getConnection()->quote()
(Last Resort): If raw SQL must be used (and thoroughly justified), use$entityManager->getConnection()->quote()
to escape values only as a last resort. Parameterized queries within DQL or QueryBuilder are always preferred. Document the reason for using raw SQL clearly.- Code review: Code reviews should flag any use of raw SQL.
-
Threats Mitigated:
- SQL Injection (Critical): Reduces the attack surface by minimizing the use of raw SQL, where injection vulnerabilities are more likely to be introduced.
- Code Maintainability (Medium): DQL is generally more maintainable, reducing the risk of future security issues.
-
Impact:
- SQL Injection: Risk reduced, dependent on the extent of raw SQL replacement.
- Code Maintainability: Improved maintainability.
-
Currently Implemented: (Example)
- New features generally use DQL.
- User authentication uses DQL.
-
Missing Implementation: (Example)
- Reporting module (
src/Controller/ReportController.php
) - needs review. - Utility scripts (
src/Command/
).
- Reporting module (
Mitigation Strategy: Validate Deserialized Doctrine Entities (Doctrine-Specific)
-
Description:
- Identify Deserialization: Locate all points where Doctrine entities are deserialized (from sessions, caches, etc.).
@ORM\PostLoad
Events: Use the@ORM\PostLoad
lifecycle event in your entity classes. This event is triggered after Doctrine hydrates the entity from the database.- Validation within
postLoad
: Inside thepostLoad
method, implement validation logic to check the integrity of the entity's properties. Verify data types, lengths, and allowed values based on your application's business rules. - Error Handling: If validation fails within
postLoad
, throw an exception or take appropriate corrective action. Do not allow the application to use an invalid entity. - Consider using validation library: Consider using validation library.
-
Threats Mitigated:
- Object Injection (High): Prevents attackers from manipulating serialized entity data to inject malicious objects or alter the entity's state. This is specifically relevant to how Doctrine handles object hydration.
- Data Integrity (Medium): Ensures entities are in a valid state after loading.
-
Impact:
- Object Injection: Significantly reduces risk.
- Data Integrity: Improves data integrity.
-
Currently Implemented: (Example)
- Implemented for
User
entity.
- Implemented for
-
Missing Implementation: (Example)
- Not implemented for
Product
,Order
,Comment
entities. - No validation after deserializing from cache.
- Not implemented for
Mitigation Strategy: Limit Data Exposure (Doctrine-Specific)
-
Description:
- Selective
select()
: When usingcreateQueryBuilder()
, use theselect()
method to explicitly specify only the fields you need from the database. Avoid selecting entire entities (select('u')
) unless you genuinely need all fields. This minimizes the amount of data retrieved and potentially exposed. - DTOs with Doctrine: Use Data Transfer Objects (DTOs) in conjunction with Doctrine. Instead of returning entities directly to views or API responses, create DTOs that represent the specific data you want to expose. Use Doctrine's
select()
andpartial
features, or manually map entity data to DTOs, to control which fields are included. - Avoid using
getResult(Query::HYDRATE_ARRAY)
: Avoid usinggetResult(Query::HYDRATE_ARRAY)
without specifying columns.
- Selective
-
Threats Mitigated:
- Information Disclosure (Medium): Reduces the risk of exposing sensitive data by limiting the data retrieved from the database and presented to users or external systems.
- Data Leakage (Medium): Prevents sensitive data from being inadvertently included in responses.
-
Impact:
- Information Disclosure/Data Leakage: Significantly reduces risk.
-
Currently Implemented: (Example)
- Some API endpoints use DTOs.
-
Missing Implementation: (Example)
- Many views directly access entity properties.
- Inconsistent use of DTOs.
Mitigation Strategy: Prevent DoS via ORM (Doctrine-Specific)
-
Description:
- Pagination with
setMaxResults()
andsetFirstResult()
: For all Doctrine queries that could potentially return a large number of results, usesetMaxResults()
andsetFirstResult()
on theQueryBuilder
orQuery
object to implement pagination. This prevents attackers from requesting excessively large result sets. - Avoid
count()
on Large Tables: Be extremely cautious when usingcount()
on potentially large tables. Ensure that appropriateWHERE
clauses are used to limit the scope of the count operation. Consider alternative approaches if necessary. - Avoid using
getResult()
withoutsetMaxResults()
: Avoid usinggetResult()
withoutsetMaxResults()
on queries that could return large result.
- Pagination with
-
Threats Mitigated:
- Denial of Service (DoS) (High): Reduces the risk of DoS attacks that exploit Doctrine to retrieve large amounts of data or perform expensive operations.
- Performance Degradation (Medium): Improves performance by preventing inefficient queries.
-
Impact:
- DoS: Significantly reduces DoS risk.
- Performance: Improves performance.
-
Currently Implemented: (Example)
- Pagination in some list views.
-
Missing Implementation: (Example)
- Pagination missing in admin dashboard and reporting.
- No checks on
count()
usage.
Mitigation Strategy: Authorization Checks Before Doctrine find()
Methods (Doctrine-Specific)
-
Description:
- Identify ID-Based Lookups: Locate all uses of Doctrine's
find()
,findBy()
,findOneBy()
, and related methods where the ID is provided by user input or an untrusted source. - Pre-
find()
Authorization: Before calling any of these Doctrine methods, implement authorization checks to verify that the currently authenticated user has permission to access the entity identified by the provided ID. This is a crucial step to prevent unauthorized access. - Input validation: Validate that ID is of expected type.
- Identify ID-Based Lookups: Locate all uses of Doctrine's
-
Threats Mitigated:
- Unauthorized Data Access (High): Prevents users from accessing entities they are not authorized to view by manipulating IDs. This is directly related to how Doctrine retrieves entities by ID.
- ID Enumeration (Medium): Makes ID enumeration more difficult.
-
Impact:
- Unauthorized Data Access: Significantly reduces risk.
- ID Enumeration: Provides some protection.
-
Currently Implemented: (Example)
- Partially implemented in user profile section.
-
Missing Implementation: (Example)
- Missing in product details, order information, blog posts.