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Attack Tree Analysis for egulias/emailvalidator

Objective: DoS or Unexpected Behavior (by exploiting vulnerabilities or limitations in the egulias/email-validator library)

Attack Tree Visualization

[Attacker's Goal: DoS or Unexpected Behavior] [C]
    |
    |-------------------------------------------------
    |						|
[Sub-Goal 1: Trigger Resource Exhaustion] [HR]	 [Sub-Goal 3: Trigger Unexpected Exceptions/Errors]
    |						|
    |-------------------------						|
    |						|
[1.1: Regex DoS (ReDoS)] [HR][C]				[3.2: Dependency Issues] [C]
    |						|
    |						|
[1.1.1: Craft  ]						[3.2.1: Exploit ]
[malicious regex]						[vulnerabilities in]
[pattern (CVE-  ] [HR]						[DNS or other	 ]
[2024-2823)    ]						[dependencies	 ]

  • Description: This is the overarching objective of the attacker. Success here means the application is either unavailable (DoS) or behaving in a way not intended by the developers, potentially leading to further exploitation.
  • Why Critical: This is the root of the entire tree; all other nodes contribute to this goal.
  • Description: The attacker aims to consume excessive server resources (CPU, memory) to make the application unresponsive or unstable.
  • Why High-Risk: Resource exhaustion is a relatively easy way to disrupt service, and email validation is a common entry point for user-supplied data.
  • Description: Exploiting regular expression denial-of-service vulnerabilities within the library.
  • Why Critical & High-Risk: ReDoS is a well-known attack vector against regular expression engines, and the email-validator library has had a documented vulnerability (CVE-2024-2823). This makes it a prime target.
  • Description: The attacker crafts a specific email address that triggers the known CVE-2024-2823 vulnerability, causing catastrophic backtracking in the regular expression engine.
  • Likelihood: High (before patching; Low after patching, but still a risk if the application hasn't been updated). The exploit is publicly known.
  • Impact: High. Can lead to complete denial of service.
  • Effort: Low. Exploit code is readily available.
  • Skill Level: Low. Script kiddies can easily use pre-made exploits.
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium. Requires monitoring CPU/memory usage and potentially analyzing logs to identify the malicious email.
  • Description: The email-validator library, or the application itself, relies on other libraries (dependencies). Vulnerabilities in these dependencies can be exploited.
  • Why Critical: Dependencies are often overlooked, but they can introduce significant vulnerabilities. A vulnerability in a dependency can be just as dangerous as a vulnerability in the main library.
  • Description: The attacker targets known vulnerabilities in the libraries that email-validator uses, such as those related to DNS resolution (for MX record checks) or other supporting functions.
  • Likelihood: Medium. Depends on the specific dependencies and their patch status. New vulnerabilities are regularly discovered in various libraries.
  • Impact: High to Very High. The impact depends on the specific dependency vulnerability. It could range from information disclosure to remote code execution.
  • Effort: Medium to High. Requires identifying the dependencies, finding known vulnerabilities, and crafting an exploit.
  • Skill Level: Medium to High. Requires knowledge of vulnerability research and exploitation techniques.
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium to High. Requires vulnerability scanning, dependency analysis, and potentially intrusion detection systems.