Mitigation Strategy: Choose Appropriate Validation Level
-
Description:
- Review Documentation: Thoroughly read the
egulias/email-validator
documentation on GitHub to understand the different validation levels (RFCValidation, NoRFCWarningsValidation, DNSCheckValidation, MultipleValidationWithAnd, SpoofCheckValidation, etc.). Pay close attention to the specific rules enforced by each level. - Assess Needs: Determine the specific requirements of your application. Do you need strict RFC compliance? Is DNS validation essential, or can you rely on format validation alone? Consider the user experience – overly strict validation can be frustrating.
- Select Level: Choose the validation level that best balances security and usability. Start with
RFCValidation
orNoRFCWarningsValidation
as a good default. If DNS validation is required, proceed with caution (see Mitigation #3). If usingMultipleValidationWithAnd
, ensure all validations are necessary. - Document Choice: Clearly document the chosen validation level and the rationale behind it in your project's documentation (e.g., in a README, security guidelines, or code comments).
- Regular Review: Periodically review the chosen validation level to ensure it still meets the evolving needs of the application and the threat landscape.
- Review Documentation: Thoroughly read the
-
Threats Mitigated:
- Invalid Email Format Injection (High Severity): Reduces the risk of accepting email addresses that violate RFC specifications, which could be used for various injection attacks. The correct level is key here.
- Denial of Service (DoS) via DNS (Medium Severity): By avoiding unnecessary
DNSCheckValidation
, you reduce the risk of DoS attacks targeting your DNS resolution. - User Frustration (Low Severity): Choosing an appropriately permissive level (while still being secure) prevents valid but unusual email addresses from being rejected.
-
Impact:
- Invalid Email Format Injection: Significantly reduces the risk. The library enforces RFC compliance at the chosen level.
- DoS via DNS: Reduces the risk by limiting the use of DNS lookups.
- User Frustration: Minimizes user frustration by accepting a wider range of valid email addresses.
-
Currently Implemented:
RFCValidation
is currently used in the user registration module (/app/Controllers/Auth/RegisterController.php
). -
Missing Implementation: The contact form (
/app/Controllers/ContactController.php
) currently uses no email validation library. This needs to be updated to useRFCValidation
.
Mitigation Strategy: Handle DNS Lookup Failures and Timeouts (if using DNSCheckValidation
)
-
Description:
- Implement Timeouts: Set a strict timeout for DNS lookups (e.g., 2-3 seconds) when using
DNSCheckValidation
. This prevents slow DNS servers from blocking your application. This is done when calling the library'sDNSCheckValidation
. - Handle Exceptions: Wrap the
DNSCheckValidation
call in atry-catch
block to handle potential exceptions (e.g.,Egulias\EmailValidator\Exception\NoDNSRecord
). This is specific to how you use the library. - Fallback Mechanism: Implement a fallback mechanism. If the DNS lookup fails or times out:
- Option 1 (Preferred): Log the failure and fall back to a less strict validation level (e.g.,
RFCValidation
). This involves switching to a different validation object from the library. - Option 2: Display a user-friendly error message indicating a temporary problem and asking the user to try again later. Do not simply reject the email address.
- Option 1 (Preferred): Log the failure and fall back to a less strict validation level (e.g.,
- Retry with Backoff: Consider implementing a retry mechanism with exponential backoff. If the first DNS lookup fails, wait a short period (e.g., 1 second), then retry. If it fails again, wait longer (e.g., 2 seconds), and so on. Limit the number of retries. This logic surrounds the use of the library.
- Log Failures: Log all DNS lookup failures and timeouts, including the email address, timestamp, and error details. This helps with debugging and identifying potential attacks.
- Monitor: Use application performance monitoring to track DNS resolution times and failure rates.
- Implement Timeouts: Set a strict timeout for DNS lookups (e.g., 2-3 seconds) when using
-
Threats Mitigated:
- Denial of Service (DoS) via DNS (Medium Severity): Prevents attackers from using slow or malicious DNS servers to make your application unresponsive. Directly related to how you handle the results of
DNSCheckValidation
. - Information Leakage (Low Severity): Reduces the risk of leaking information about your users (or your server's probing) to external DNS servers.
- Denial of Service (DoS) via DNS (Medium Severity): Prevents attackers from using slow or malicious DNS servers to make your application unresponsive. Directly related to how you handle the results of
-
Impact:
- DoS via DNS: Significantly reduces the risk by preventing long delays and handling failures gracefully.
- Information Leakage: Minimizes the impact by limiting the number of DNS lookups.
-
Currently Implemented: No DNS validation is currently used.
-
Missing Implementation: If
DNSCheckValidation
is ever implemented, all the steps above must be followed.
Mitigation Strategy: Address Spoofing Limitations (if using SpoofCheckValidation
)
-
Description:
- Use
SpoofCheckValidation
: If appropriate for your application, use theSpoofCheckValidation
to detect visually similar characters. This is a direct use of the library's functionality. - Combine with Other Measures: While not directly related to the library itself, if you are processing incoming email, consider combining
SpoofCheckValidation
with sender authentication technologies. - Regular Updates: Stay informed about new spoofing techniques.
- Use
-
Threats Mitigated:
- Phishing Attacks (Medium Severity): Helps detect some phishing attempts that rely on visually similar email addresses. This is a direct result of using
SpoofCheckValidation
. - Account Takeover (High Severity): By reducing phishing success, it indirectly helps prevent account takeover.
- Phishing Attacks (Medium Severity): Helps detect some phishing attempts that rely on visually similar email addresses. This is a direct result of using
-
Impact:
- Phishing Attacks: Reduces the risk, but it's not a foolproof solution.
- Account Takeover: Provides a small reduction in risk.
-
Currently Implemented:
SpoofCheckValidation
is not currently used. -
Missing Implementation: Consider adding
SpoofCheckValidation
to the user registration process.
Mitigation Strategy: Handle IDNs and Unicode (with SpoofCheckValidation
and Validation Level Considerations)
-
Description:
- Understand IDN Representations: Be aware of how
email-validator
handles IDNs, particularly the A-label (Punycode) representation it uses internally. - Homograph Awareness: Be aware of potential homograph attacks, and use
SpoofCheckValidation
to help mitigate them. This is a direct interaction with the library. - Validation Level: Ensure the chosen validation level correctly handles IDNs.
RFCValidation
and others should support them, but it's crucial to confirm.
- Understand IDN Representations: Be aware of how
-
Threats Mitigated:
- Homograph Attacks (Medium Severity):
SpoofCheckValidation
directly helps mitigate this. - Data Inconsistency (Low Severity): Understanding how the library handles IDNs prevents inconsistencies.
- Homograph Attacks (Medium Severity):
-
Impact:
- Homograph Attacks: Reduces the risk, especially when
SpoofCheckValidation
is used. - Data Inconsistency: Prevents issues by understanding the library's IDN handling.
- Homograph Attacks: Reduces the risk, especially when
-
Currently Implemented: The application does not explicitly use
SpoofCheckValidation
. -
Missing Implementation: The application should consider using
SpoofCheckValidation
to improve IDN-related security.