Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History
104 lines (87 loc) · 7.71 KB

File metadata and controls

104 lines (87 loc) · 7.71 KB

Attack Tree Analysis for elastic/elasticsearch-php

Objective: Exfiltrate Data, Disrupt Service, or Execute Arbitrary Code on Elasticsearch Cluster via elasticsearch-php

Attack Tree Visualization

                                  +-------------------------------------------------+
                                  |  Exfiltrate Data, Disrupt Service, or Execute   |
                                  |  Arbitrary Code on Elasticsearch Cluster via    |
                                  |                elasticsearch-php                |
                                  +-------------------------------------------------+
                                                    |
     +------------------------------------------------+------------------------------------------------+
     |                                                |                                                |

+---------------------+ +---------------------+ +---------------------+ | Exploit Client-Side | | Manipulate Client | | Abuse Legitimate | | Vulnerabilities | | Configuration | | Client Features | +---------------------+ +---------------------+ +---------------------+ | | | +--------+--------+ +--------+--------+ +--------+--------+ | Deserialization | | Insecure Defaults | | Search Query | | Issues | | or Overrides | | Injection | +--------+--------+ [CRITICAL] +--------+--------+ +--------+--------+ | | | +--------+--------+ +--------+--------+ +--------+--------+ | Untrusted Data | | Missing Hostname | | Script Injection| | in Serialized | | Verification | | (e.g., Painless)| | Objects | +--------+--------+ [CRITICAL] +--------+--------+ [CRITICAL] +--------+--------+ [CRITICAL] | Exposure of | | | Sensitive Config | +--------+--------+ +--------+--------+ [CRITICAL] | RCE via | | PHP Object | | Injection | +--------+--------+ [CRITICAL]

Overall Description: This attack vector focuses on exploiting vulnerabilities related to the deserialization of data received from the Elasticsearch cluster. If the application using elasticsearch-php deserializes untrusted data without proper validation, it can lead to severe consequences, including Remote Code Execution (RCE).

Critical Node: Deserialization Issues: Description: The root problem is the unsafe handling of serialized data. This is a class of vulnerabilities, not a single specific flaw. Likelihood: Medium Impact: Very High Effort: Medium Skill Level: Intermediate to Advanced Detection Difficulty: Medium

Critical Node: Untrusted Data in Serialized Objects: Description: The application receives data from Elasticsearch (e.g., in a response to a query) and uses PHP's native serialize/unserialize functions (or a vulnerable alternative) to deserialize this data without first validating its contents or structure. An attacker can craft a malicious serialized object that, when deserialized, triggers unintended code execution. Likelihood: Medium Impact: Very High Effort: Medium Skill Level: Intermediate to Advanced Detection Difficulty: Medium

Critical Node: RCE via PHP Object Injection: Description: This is the consequence of successfully exploiting the Untrusted Data in Serialized Objects vulnerability. By injecting a carefully crafted serialized object, the attacker can trigger the execution of arbitrary PHP code on the application server. This gives the attacker full control over the server running the PHP application. Likelihood: Medium (Dependent on successful deserialization exploit) Impact: Very High Effort: Medium Skill Level: Advanced Detection Difficulty: Medium to Hard

Overall Description: This attack vector targets the configuration of the elasticsearch-php client itself. Insecure configurations can create opportunities for attackers to intercept data, redirect connections, or gain access to sensitive information.

Critical Node: Missing Hostname Verification: Description: The elasticsearch-php client is configured to connect to the Elasticsearch cluster without verifying the server's hostname against the certificate presented during the TLS/SSL handshake. This allows an attacker to perform a Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attack. The attacker can intercept the connection, present a fake certificate, and eavesdrop on or modify the communication between the application and the Elasticsearch cluster. Likelihood: Low to Medium Impact: High Effort: Medium Skill Level: Intermediate Detection Difficulty: Medium to Hard

Critical Node: Exposure of Sensitive Config: Description: The application inadvertently exposes the configuration settings of the elasticsearch-php client. This could happen through error messages, debug logs, insecure storage (e.g., hardcoded credentials in the source code, configuration files exposed to the web), or other information disclosure vulnerabilities. Exposed configuration can include Elasticsearch cluster addresses, usernames, passwords, API keys, and other sensitive details. Likelihood: Low to Medium Impact: High Effort: Very Low Skill Level: Novice Detection Difficulty: Easy to Medium

Overall Description: This attack vector exploits the intended functionality of the elasticsearch-php client – sending queries to Elasticsearch – but uses it maliciously. If the application doesn't properly sanitize user input before incorporating it into Elasticsearch queries, an attacker can inject malicious code or manipulate the query to achieve unintended results.

Critical Node: Search Query Injection: Description: The root problem is the lack of proper input validation and sanitization/escaping of user-provided data that is used to construct Elasticsearch queries. Likelihood: Medium Impact: Very High Effort: Medium Skill Level: Intermediate to Advanced Detection Difficulty: Medium to Hard

Critical Node: Script Injection (e.g., Painless): Description: The application allows user input to directly influence Elasticsearch queries, and this input is not properly sanitized or escaped. An attacker can inject malicious scripts (using Elasticsearch's scripting languages, such as Painless) into the query. These scripts are then executed on the Elasticsearch cluster, potentially giving the attacker Remote Code Execution (RCE) capabilities on the cluster itself. Likelihood: Medium Impact: Very High Effort: Medium Skill Level: Intermediate to Advanced Detection Difficulty: Medium to Hard