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Threat Model Analysis for elastic/elasticsearch-php

Threat: Rogue Elasticsearch Server Impersonation

  • Threat: Rogue Elasticsearch Server Impersonation

    • Description: An attacker sets up a fake Elasticsearch server and tricks the elasticsearch-php client into connecting to it. This relies on the client not properly verifying the server's identity.
    • Impact: Data leakage (attacker receives sensitive data), data manipulation (attacker injects false data), denial of service.
    • Affected Component: Connection handling within Elasticsearch\ClientBuilder and transport layers (e.g., Http\Curl, Http\Stream), specifically the hosts configuration and SSL/TLS verification logic.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Enforce Strict HTTPS: Always use https in the hosts configuration.
      • Enable SSL Verification: Set sslVerification to true in the ClientBuilder. Provide a CA bundle path if needed.

Threat: Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) Attack

  • Threat: Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) Attack

    • Description: An attacker intercepts communication between the elasticsearch-php client and the Elasticsearch server, modifying requests or responses. This is only possible if the client is not using encrypted communication.
    • Impact: Data leakage, data manipulation, denial of service.
    • Affected Component: Communication layer; transport implementation (e.g., Http\Curl, Http\Stream) and handling of HTTP requests/responses.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Mandatory HTTPS: Always use HTTPS for all communication. Configure https in the hosts setting.

Threat: Credential Exposure (through client misconfiguration)

  • Threat: Credential Exposure (through client misconfiguration)

    • Description: While credentials themselves aren't part of the client library, misconfiguration of the client (e.g., hardcoding credentials within a script that uses the client, or accidentally logging the client object which might contain credentials) can lead to exposure. This is a direct threat because the client handles credentials.
    • Impact: Unauthorized access to the Elasticsearch cluster; potential for complete cluster compromise.
    • Affected Component: Elasticsearch\ClientBuilder (where credentials are provided), and any application code that instantiates or logs the client object.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Secure Credential Storage: Never hardcode credentials. Use environment variables, a secrets management system, or a secure configuration service.
      • Avoid Logging Client Object: Do not log the entire Elasticsearch\Client object, as it may contain the credentials in its internal state.

Threat: Dependency Vulnerabilities

  • Threat: Dependency Vulnerabilities
    • Description: The elasticsearch-php client itself, or one of its dependencies (e.g., Guzzle), has a known security vulnerability that allows for remote code execution or other severe impacts.
    • Impact: Varies depending on the specific vulnerability, but could range from information disclosure to remote code execution, potentially compromising the entire application server.
    • Affected Component: The elasticsearch-php library itself and its dependencies, as listed in composer.json.
    • Risk Severity: Critical (depending on the vulnerability, but assume critical until assessed)
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Keep Dependencies Updated: Regularly update the elasticsearch-php client and its dependencies to the latest versions using Composer (composer update).
      • Vulnerability Scanning: Use a software composition analysis (SCA) tool to scan for known vulnerabilities in dependencies.
      • Monitor Security Advisories: Subscribe to security advisories for elasticsearch-php and its dependencies (especially Guzzle, if used).