Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History
73 lines (57 loc) · 6.86 KB

attack-tree.md

File metadata and controls

73 lines (57 loc) · 6.86 KB

Attack Tree Analysis for friendsofphp/goutte

Objective: To exfiltrate sensitive data from a target website through the vulnerable application using Goutte, or to manipulate the target website's state (e.g., submit forms) in an unauthorized manner via the vulnerable application.

Attack Tree Visualization

                                  [Attacker's Goal: Exfiltrate Data or Manipulate Target Website via Goutte-Using Application]
                                                    |
                                  ===================================================
                                  ||                                                 ||
                  [[1. Abuse Goutte's Scraping Capabilities]]      [[2. Bypass Form Validation/ ]]
                                  ||                                                 [[     Sanitization in App   ]]
                  ===================================                                               ||
                  ||													 ||

[[1.1. Bypass Intended ]] [[2.2.1. Exploit Weak Input]] [[ Target Selection]] [[Validation on Goutte's]] || [[Response Handling in App]]

|| [[1.1.1. Manipulate]] [[2.2.2.]] [[Goutte Config to]] [[Bypass]] [[Target Different]] [[CSRF ]] [[URLs/Domains ]] [[Protec-]] [[tions ]] [[in App]]

Attack Tree Path: 1. Abuse Goutte's Scraping Capabilities

  • Description: The attacker exploits the core functionality of Goutte (web scraping) to access unauthorized data or resources.
  • High-Risk Path: This is a high-risk path because it leads directly to the most critical vulnerability: bypassing intended target selection.

Attack Tree Path: 1.1. Bypass Intended Target Selection

  • Description: The application is designed to interact with specific, authorized websites. The attacker circumvents this restriction, directing Goutte to interact with arbitrary URLs.
  • Criticality: This is a critical node because it grants the attacker near-unrestricted access via Goutte. The impact is very high, and the likelihood can be medium to high depending on the application's design.
  • High-Risk Path: This is the most direct and dangerous path.

Attack Tree Path: 1.1.1. Manipulate Goutte Config to Target Different URLs/Domains

  • Description: The attacker modifies the application's configuration (e.g., a configuration file, a form field, a URL parameter) to change the target URL or domain used by Goutte.
  • Criticality: This is a critical node because it's the most direct way to bypass target selection. If this is possible, the application is severely compromised.
  • Likelihood: Medium (depends heavily on application design; well-designed apps prevent this).
  • Impact: Very High (allows targeting of any website).
  • Effort: Low (often trivial if the vulnerability exists).
  • Skill Level: Intermediate (requires understanding of web app vulnerabilities).
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium (requires monitoring outbound requests and config changes).

Attack Tree Path: 2. Bypass Form Validation/Sanitization in App

  • Description: The attacker exploits vulnerabilities within the application itself that are related to how the application handles Goutte's interactions and responses. This is not about vulnerabilities in the target website, but in the application using Goutte.
  • Criticality: This is a critical node because it represents vulnerabilities within the application that are triggered by Goutte.
  • High-Risk Path: This path leads to critical vulnerabilities within the application itself.

Attack Tree Path: 2.2.1. Exploit Weak Input Validation on Goutte's Response Handling in App

  • Description: The application fails to properly validate or sanitize the data received from Goutte after interacting with the target website. This can lead to vulnerabilities like XSS (if the scraped content is displayed without sanitization) or other injection flaws within the application. * Criticality: This is a critical node. It's a classic vulnerability – failing to sanitize output – but in this case, the output originates from Goutte. * Likelihood: Medium (developers often overlook validating Goutte's output). * Impact: High (can lead to XSS, SQL injection, etc., within the application). * Effort: Medium (requires crafting malicious input that will be reflected in the target's response). * Skill Level: Intermediate (requires understanding of injection vulnerabilities). * Detection Difficulty: Medium (requires monitoring application output and code analysis).

Attack Tree Path: 2.2.2. Bypass CSRF Protections in App

  • Description: If the application uses Goutte to interact with a third-party site on behalf of the user, and the application itself doesn't implement proper CSRF protection, an attacker could trick the application into making unauthorized requests to the target site via Goutte. * Criticality: This is a critical node because a lack of CSRF protection can lead to significant unauthorized actions. * Likelihood: Medium (CSRF protection is often overlooked or implemented incorrectly). * Impact: High (allows the attacker to perform unauthorized actions on behalf of the user on the target website). * Effort: Medium (requires understanding of CSRF and how to bypass any existing protections). * Skill Level: Intermediate (requires knowledge of web application security and CSRF attack techniques). * Detection Difficulty: Hard (requires monitoring of requests to the target website and analyzing the application's code for CSRF vulnerabilities. Often requires dynamic analysis).