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attack-surface.md

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Attack Surface Analysis for getgrav/grav

Attack Surface: Direct File System Access

  • 1. Direct File System Access

    • Description: Unauthorized access to, or modification of, files within the Grav installation directory.
    • How Grav Contributes: Grav's core design is entirely file-based. All content, configuration, plugins, and core code reside in the file system, making it the primary and most critical attack vector. There is no database abstraction layer to mitigate this risk.
    • Example: An attacker gains write access (via compromised credentials, a plugin vulnerability, or server misconfiguration) and modifies core PHP files to inject a backdoor, achieving persistent control.
    • Impact: Complete system compromise, data theft, defacement, malware distribution, potential for lateral movement to other systems.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Strict File Permissions: The web server user should have read-only access to the vast majority of the Grav directory. Write access must be extremely limited to only the absolutely necessary directories (e.g., user/pages, user/config, cache, logs, and specific plugin directories only if strictly required, and never to core files). Use the most restrictive permissions possible, following the principle of least privilege.
      • Strong Authentication: Use strong, unique passwords for all file access methods (FTP, SFTP, SSH, etc.). Disable any unnecessary access methods entirely.
      • File Integrity Monitoring (FIM): Implement a system (e.g., Tripwire, AIDE, Samhain) to actively monitor changes to critical files and directories. This can detect unauthorized modifications and provide alerts.
      • Regular Backups: Maintain regular, secure backups stored completely outside the webroot and ideally offsite. Test the restoration process regularly.
      • Web Application Firewall (WAF): A WAF can help block common web attacks that might lead to file system access, providing an additional layer of defense.
      • Security Hardening: Follow general server security best practices rigorously (e.g., disabling unnecessary services, keeping the operating system and web server software fully updated, using strong SSH keys).
      • Chroot Jail (Advanced): Consider running the web server process in a chroot jail to limit the scope of potential damage if the server is compromised. This is a more advanced mitigation technique.

Attack Surface: Vulnerable Plugins

  • 2. Vulnerable Plugins

    • Description: Exploitation of vulnerabilities in installed third-party or custom Grav plugins.
    • How Grav Contributes: Grav's plugin architecture allows for the execution of arbitrary PHP code within the Grav context. This provides a direct pathway for attackers if a plugin is vulnerable. The plugin system is a core feature of Grav, and its extensibility is directly linked to this risk.
    • Example: A plugin with an insecure file upload function allows an attacker to upload a PHP shell, leading directly to Remote Code Execution (RCE). Or, a plugin improperly handles user input, leading to a vulnerability that allows arbitrary code execution.
    • Impact: Remote Code Execution (RCE), data breaches, privilege escalation, complete site compromise.
    • Risk Severity: Critical to High (severity depends on the specific plugin and the nature of the vulnerability)
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Trusted Sources: Only install plugins from the official Grav plugin repository or from highly reputable developers with a proven track record of security.
      • Plugin Updates: Keep all installed plugins updated to their latest versions. Enable automatic update notifications and act on them promptly.
      • Code Review (Mandatory for Custom/Untrusted Plugins): If using custom-developed plugins or plugins from less-known sources, mandatorily perform a thorough security code review before installation. Focus on input validation, output encoding, file handling, and any interaction with the file system or external resources.
      • Principle of Least Privilege: Ensure plugins only have the absolute minimum necessary file system permissions. Never grant write access unless it is demonstrably required, and scope it as narrowly as possible.
      • Disable Unused Plugins: Remove or disable any plugins that are not actively in use. This reduces the attack surface.
      • Vulnerability Scanning: Use a vulnerability scanner that can identify known vulnerabilities in installed plugins.
      • Sandboxing (Advanced): Explore techniques to sandbox plugin execution (e.g., using separate PHP-FPM pools with highly restricted permissions). This is a complex but potentially very effective mitigation.

Attack Surface: Admin Panel Brute-Force Attacks

  • 3. Admin Panel Brute-Force Attacks

    • Description: Repeated attempts to guess the administrator's login credentials, targeting the Grav admin panel.
    • How Grav Contributes: Grav provides a web-based administration panel, which is a standard and easily discoverable target for brute-force attacks. The existence of this panel is inherent to Grav's design.
    • Example: An attacker uses a dictionary attack or a brute-force tool to try common passwords against the admin login page, eventually succeeding.
    • Impact: Unauthorized access to the admin panel, granting complete control over the site, including content modification, plugin installation, and user management.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Strong Passwords: Enforce the use of strong, unique passwords for all administrator accounts. Use a password manager.
      • Two-Factor Authentication (2FA): Implement 2FA (via a plugin) to add a crucial extra layer of security, making brute-force attacks significantly more difficult.
      • Rate Limiting: Limit the number of login attempts from a single IP address within a defined time period. This can be implemented using a Grav plugin or through server-level configuration (e.g., fail2ban).
      • Account Lockout: Automatically lock accounts after a specified number of failed login attempts.
      • Change Default Admin URL (If Possible): If Grav's configuration allows it, change the default URL of the admin panel to make it less easily discoverable by automated scanners.
      • Monitor Login Logs: Regularly review login logs for any suspicious activity, such as repeated failed login attempts from the same IP address.
      • IP Whitelisting (If Feasible): If the administrators access the panel from a limited set of known IP addresses, restrict access to only those IPs.

Attack Surface: Configuration File Exposure

  • 4. Configuration File Exposure

    • Description: Unauthorized access to Grav's YAML configuration files, potentially revealing sensitive information that could be used in further attacks.
    • How Grav Contributes: Grav stores its configuration in human-readable YAML files. The file-based nature of Grav and the use of YAML for configuration are direct contributors to this risk.
    • Example: An attacker discovers a misconfigured web server that allows directory listing and downloads the user/config/system.yaml or user/config/plugins/*.yaml files, revealing database credentials used by a plugin or other sensitive API keys.
    • Impact: Data breaches (exposure of sensitive configuration data), potential for escalation of attacks (e.g., if database credentials are leaked, leading to database compromise).
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • File Permissions: Ensure strict file permissions on all configuration files. The web server user should ideally have read-only access, and only if absolutely necessary. Other users should have no access.
      • Web Server Configuration: Configure the web server (Apache, Nginx, etc.) to explicitly deny access to .yaml files and any other sensitive file types or directories. This is a critical configuration step.
      • Secrets Management: Avoid storing highly sensitive information (like API keys, database passwords, or encryption keys) directly in the YAML configuration files. Instead, use environment variables or a dedicated secrets management solution (e.g., HashiCorp Vault, AWS Secrets Manager).
      • Regular Audits: Regularly review the contents of all configuration files to identify and remove any unnecessarily exposed sensitive data.