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Mitigation Strategies Analysis for getgrav/grav

Mitigation Strategy: Rigorous selection, updating, and removal of unused plugins and themes. This is the most important Grav-specific mitigation.

Description:

  1. Selection: Before installing any plugin or theme:
    • Check its source. Prefer the official Grav repository or well-known, reputable developers.
    • Examine the "Last Updated" date. Avoid plugins/themes that haven't been updated in a long time (e.g., over a year).
    • Read reviews and community feedback. Look for reports of security issues or instability.
    • If possible, briefly review the plugin/theme's code. Look for red flags like direct database queries, eval(), or insecure file handling.
  2. Updating:
    • Enable automatic update checks in Grav's admin panel.
    • Immediately update Grav core, plugins, and themes after any new release. Do not delay updates. Use Grav's built-in update mechanism.
    • Subscribe to the Grav newsletter and any relevant plugin/theme developer newsletters or forums to receive security alerts.
  3. Removal:
    • Identify any plugins or themes that are not actively used.
    • Completely remove them from the user/plugins and user/themes directories. Disabling is not sufficient. Use Grav's admin panel or manually delete the directories.

Threats Mitigated:

  • Remote Code Execution (RCE) via Plugin/Theme Vulnerability (Severity: Critical): A vulnerable plugin or theme could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code on the server.
  • Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) via Plugin/Theme Vulnerability (Severity: High): A vulnerable plugin or theme could inject malicious JavaScript.
  • Privilege Escalation via Plugin/Theme Vulnerability (Severity: High): A vulnerable plugin could allow unauthorized access to the Grav admin panel.
  • Information Disclosure via Plugin/Theme Vulnerability (Severity: Medium): A vulnerable plugin or theme could leak sensitive information.

Impact:

  • RCE: Risk significantly reduced.
  • XSS: Risk significantly reduced.
  • Privilege Escalation: Risk significantly reduced.
  • Information Disclosure: Risk significantly reduced.

Currently Implemented: (Example: Partially - We update regularly, but haven't thoroughly reviewed all plugin code.) <-- YOU FILL THIS IN

Missing Implementation: (Example: We need to implement a more formal process for reviewing plugin code before installation.) <-- YOU FILL THIS IN

Mitigation Strategy: Properly configure Grav settings within the admin panel and YAML files, and disable unnecessary features.

Description:

  1. Configuration Review (Admin Panel & YAML):
    • Use the Grav admin panel to review and configure settings.
    • Carefully review all YAML files in user/config, especially system.yaml and security.yaml.
    • Ensure security.yaml has a strong, randomly generated salt. This is set during installation but should be verified.
    • Set system.yaml -> debugger: enabled: false in production. This is a critical Grav-specific setting.
    • Review and configure uploads_dangerous_extensions in security.yaml. This is Grav's built-in (but basic) file upload restriction.
  2. Feature Disablement (Admin Panel):
    • Use the Grav admin panel to disable any Grav features (e.g., specific caching methods, unused plugins) that are not essential.
  3. Admin Path Change:
    • Change the default admin path from /admin to a less predictable path in system.yaml (e.g., /my-secret-admin). This is a Grav-specific configuration change.

Threats Mitigated:

  • Information Disclosure via Configuration Files (Severity: High): Incorrect settings could expose sensitive information.
  • Privilege Escalation via Debugger (Severity: High): The debugger, if enabled in production, can expose sensitive information and allow attackers to gain control.
  • Various Attacks via Misconfiguration (Severity: Variable): Incorrect configuration settings can create various vulnerabilities.

Impact:

  • Information Disclosure: Risk reduced by ensuring correct settings.
  • Privilege Escalation: Risk eliminated by disabling the debugger in production.
  • Various Attacks: Risk reduced by ensuring correct configuration and disabling unnecessary features.

Currently Implemented: (Example: We have disabled the debugger, but haven't changed the default admin path.) <-- YOU FILL THIS IN

Missing Implementation: (Example: We need to change the default admin path and document our configuration review process.) <-- YOU FILL THIS IN

Mitigation Strategy: Utilize Grav's built-in file upload restrictions and, if developing custom plugins, implement robust validation.

Description:

  1. uploads_dangerous_extensions:
    • Use Grav's uploads_dangerous_extensions setting in security.yaml to define a list of disallowed file extensions. This is a baseline and should be as restrictive as possible.
  2. Custom Plugin Validation (If Applicable):
    • If you are developing a custom plugin that handles file uploads, you must implement robust server-side validation within the plugin's PHP code. This is not handled automatically by Grav.
    • Check:
      • Content Type (MIME Type): Use PHP's finfo_file() or a similar reliable method.
      • File Extension: Compare against a whitelist of allowed extensions.
      • Magic Numbers (File Signatures): Check the file's header bytes.
    • Reject any file that doesn't match all criteria.
    • Rename uploaded files to randomly generated names within your plugin's code.

Threats Mitigated:

  • Remote Code Execution (RCE) via Malicious File Upload (Severity: Critical): Attackers could upload a PHP shell.
  • Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) via Malicious File Upload (Severity: High): Attackers could upload an HTML file with malicious JavaScript.

Impact:

  • RCE: Risk reduced by using uploads_dangerous_extensions and significantly reduced by implementing robust validation in custom plugins.
  • XSS: Risk reduced similarly to RCE.

Currently Implemented: (Example: We use uploads_dangerous_extensions, but have a custom plugin that needs review.) <-- YOU FILL THIS IN

Missing Implementation: (Example: We need to thoroughly review and update the file upload handling in our custom plugin.) <-- YOU FILL THIS IN

Mitigation Strategy: Avoid dynamic file inclusion based on user input within Twig templates and plugin code. Whitelist allowed files if necessary.

Description:

  1. Avoid Dynamic Inclusion (Twig & PHP):
    • Do not use user-supplied data directly in Twig's include statements or PHP's include/require. This applies to both core Grav templates and any custom plugins you develop.
    • Example of bad code (Twig): {% include page_name ~ '.html.twig' %} (where page_name comes from user input)
    • Example of bad code (PHP - within a plugin): include($_GET['page'] . '.php');
  2. Whitelisting (If Necessary):
    • If dynamic inclusion is absolutely necessary (rarely the case), create a whitelist of allowed file paths within your PHP code (plugin or page logic).
      $allowed_pages = [
          'home' => 'templates/home.html.twig',
          'about' => 'templates/about.html.twig',
      ];
      $page = $_GET['page'];
      if (isset($allowed_pages[$page])) {
          include($allowed_pages[$page]); // Safe
      }
  3. Sanitization (Within Plugin Code):
    • If user input must be used to construct a file path (again, avoid this if possible), sanitize it thoroughly within your PHP code:
      • Use basename() and realpath().
      • Remove malicious characters.

Threats Mitigated:

  • Local File Inclusion (LFI) (Severity: High): Attackers could include local files.
  • Direct File Inclusion (DFI) (Severity: High): Similar to LFI.

Impact:

  • LFI/DFI: Risk significantly reduced by avoiding dynamic inclusion and using whitelisting/sanitization where absolutely necessary.

Currently Implemented: (Example: We avoid dynamic inclusion in Twig, but need to audit all plugin code.) <-- YOU FILL THIS IN

Missing Implementation: (Example: We need to conduct a thorough code review of all plugins to identify and fix any instances of dynamic inclusion.) <-- YOU FILL THIS IN

Mitigation Strategy: Utilize Grav's built-in form.nonce system for all forms, both in standard templates and custom plugins.

Description:

  1. Twig Template:
    • Include {{ form.nonce }} within every form in your Twig templates. This is a Grav-provided function.
      <form method="post" action="...">
          {{ form.nonce }}
          <input type="text" name="my_field">
          <button type="submit">Submit</button>
      </form>
  2. Form Processing (Plugin or Page):
    • In your PHP code (within a plugin or a page's event handlers), validate the nonce using Grav's form object:
      if ($form->validateNonce()) {
          // Process the form data
      } else {
          // Handle invalid nonce
      }
    • This is typically done within a plugin's onFormProcessed event or a page's onPageContentProcessed event.
  3. Plugin Development:
    • If you are creating custom plugins with forms, always follow steps 1 and 2. Use Grav's built-in nonce system.

Threats Mitigated:

  • Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) (Severity: High): Attackers could trick users into submitting unintended actions.

Impact:

  • CSRF: Risk significantly reduced by using Grav's built-in nonce system correctly.

Currently Implemented: (Example: We use form.nonce in most forms, but need to verify all forms, especially in older parts of the site.) <-- YOU FILL THIS IN

Missing Implementation: (Example: We need to audit all forms to ensure form.nonce is present and validated.) <-- YOU FILL THIS IN

Mitigation Strategy: Utilize and properly configure Grav's built-in caching mechanisms.

Description:

  1. Configuration (Admin Panel):
    • Use the Grav admin panel to configure caching settings. This is entirely within Grav's control.
    • Choose appropriate caching levels (e.g., page caching, Twig caching) based on your content and traffic.
    • Set appropriate cache lifetimes.
  2. Cache Clearing:
    • Regularly clear the cache (using the admin panel) when content is updated.

Threats Mitigated:

  • Denial of Service (DoS) (Severity: Medium): Caching can reduce the load on the server, mitigating some DoS attacks.

Impact:

  • DoS: Risk reduced by caching, improving performance and resilience.

Currently Implemented: (Example: We have basic caching enabled.) <-- YOU FILL THIS IN

Missing Implementation: (Example: We need to review and optimize our caching configuration for better performance.) <-- YOU FILL THIS IN

Mitigation Strategy: Keep Grav updated. This relies entirely on the Grav team addressing any vulnerabilities in the underlying Symfony YAML component.

Description:

  1. Keep Grav Updated:
    • This is the primary mitigation. Follow the update procedures outlined in Mitigation Strategy #1, using Grav's built-in update mechanism.

Threats Mitigated:

  • Remote Code Execution (RCE) via YAML Parser Vulnerability (Severity: Critical, but very unlikely): A vulnerability in the YAML parser.

Impact:

  • RCE: Risk is extremely low if Grav is kept updated.

Currently Implemented: (Example: We keep Grav updated.) <-- YOU FILL THIS IN

Missing Implementation: (Example: None, as long as we maintain our update schedule.) <-- YOU FILL THIS IN