Mitigation Strategy: Careful Plugin/Theme Selection and Management
Mitigation Strategy: Rigorous selection, updating, and removal of unused plugins and themes. This is the most important Grav-specific mitigation.
Description:
- Selection: Before installing any plugin or theme:
- Check its source. Prefer the official Grav repository or well-known, reputable developers.
- Examine the "Last Updated" date. Avoid plugins/themes that haven't been updated in a long time (e.g., over a year).
- Read reviews and community feedback. Look for reports of security issues or instability.
- If possible, briefly review the plugin/theme's code. Look for red flags like direct database queries,
eval()
, or insecure file handling.
- Updating:
- Enable automatic update checks in Grav's admin panel.
- Immediately update Grav core, plugins, and themes after any new release. Do not delay updates. Use Grav's built-in update mechanism.
- Subscribe to the Grav newsletter and any relevant plugin/theme developer newsletters or forums to receive security alerts.
- Removal:
- Identify any plugins or themes that are not actively used.
- Completely remove them from the
user/plugins
anduser/themes
directories. Disabling is not sufficient. Use Grav's admin panel or manually delete the directories.
Threats Mitigated:
- Remote Code Execution (RCE) via Plugin/Theme Vulnerability (Severity: Critical): A vulnerable plugin or theme could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code on the server.
- Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) via Plugin/Theme Vulnerability (Severity: High): A vulnerable plugin or theme could inject malicious JavaScript.
- Privilege Escalation via Plugin/Theme Vulnerability (Severity: High): A vulnerable plugin could allow unauthorized access to the Grav admin panel.
- Information Disclosure via Plugin/Theme Vulnerability (Severity: Medium): A vulnerable plugin or theme could leak sensitive information.
Impact:
- RCE: Risk significantly reduced.
- XSS: Risk significantly reduced.
- Privilege Escalation: Risk significantly reduced.
- Information Disclosure: Risk significantly reduced.
Currently Implemented: (Example: Partially - We update regularly, but haven't thoroughly reviewed all plugin code.) <-- YOU FILL THIS IN
Missing Implementation: (Example: We need to implement a more formal process for reviewing plugin code before installation.) <-- YOU FILL THIS IN
Mitigation Strategy: Secure Grav Configuration and Feature Management
Mitigation Strategy: Properly configure Grav settings within the admin panel and YAML files, and disable unnecessary features.
Description:
- Configuration Review (Admin Panel & YAML):
- Use the Grav admin panel to review and configure settings.
- Carefully review all YAML files in
user/config
, especiallysystem.yaml
andsecurity.yaml
. - Ensure
security.yaml
has a strong, randomly generatedsalt
. This is set during installation but should be verified. - Set
system.yaml
->debugger: enabled: false
in production. This is a critical Grav-specific setting. - Review and configure
uploads_dangerous_extensions
insecurity.yaml
. This is Grav's built-in (but basic) file upload restriction.
- Feature Disablement (Admin Panel):
- Use the Grav admin panel to disable any Grav features (e.g., specific caching methods, unused plugins) that are not essential.
- Admin Path Change:
- Change the default admin path from
/admin
to a less predictable path insystem.yaml
(e.g.,/my-secret-admin
). This is a Grav-specific configuration change.
- Change the default admin path from
Threats Mitigated:
- Information Disclosure via Configuration Files (Severity: High): Incorrect settings could expose sensitive information.
- Privilege Escalation via Debugger (Severity: High): The debugger, if enabled in production, can expose sensitive information and allow attackers to gain control.
- Various Attacks via Misconfiguration (Severity: Variable): Incorrect configuration settings can create various vulnerabilities.
Impact:
- Information Disclosure: Risk reduced by ensuring correct settings.
- Privilege Escalation: Risk eliminated by disabling the debugger in production.
- Various Attacks: Risk reduced by ensuring correct configuration and disabling unnecessary features.
Currently Implemented: (Example: We have disabled the debugger, but haven't changed the default admin path.) <-- YOU FILL THIS IN
Missing Implementation: (Example: We need to change the default admin path and document our configuration review process.) <-- YOU FILL THIS IN
Mitigation Strategy: Strict File Upload Handling (Using Grav's Features)
Mitigation Strategy: Utilize Grav's built-in file upload restrictions and, if developing custom plugins, implement robust validation.
Description:
uploads_dangerous_extensions
:- Use Grav's
uploads_dangerous_extensions
setting insecurity.yaml
to define a list of disallowed file extensions. This is a baseline and should be as restrictive as possible.
- Use Grav's
- Custom Plugin Validation (If Applicable):
- If you are developing a custom plugin that handles file uploads, you must implement robust server-side validation within the plugin's PHP code. This is not handled automatically by Grav.
- Check:
- Content Type (MIME Type): Use PHP's
finfo_file()
or a similar reliable method. - File Extension: Compare against a whitelist of allowed extensions.
- Magic Numbers (File Signatures): Check the file's header bytes.
- Content Type (MIME Type): Use PHP's
- Reject any file that doesn't match all criteria.
- Rename uploaded files to randomly generated names within your plugin's code.
Threats Mitigated:
- Remote Code Execution (RCE) via Malicious File Upload (Severity: Critical): Attackers could upload a PHP shell.
- Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) via Malicious File Upload (Severity: High): Attackers could upload an HTML file with malicious JavaScript.
Impact:
- RCE: Risk reduced by using
uploads_dangerous_extensions
and significantly reduced by implementing robust validation in custom plugins. - XSS: Risk reduced similarly to RCE.
Currently Implemented: (Example: We use uploads_dangerous_extensions
, but have a custom plugin that needs review.) <-- YOU FILL THIS IN
Missing Implementation: (Example: We need to thoroughly review and update the file upload handling in our custom plugin.) <-- YOU FILL THIS IN
Mitigation Strategy: Preventing File Inclusion Vulnerabilities (Within Grav and Plugins)
Mitigation Strategy: Avoid dynamic file inclusion based on user input within Twig templates and plugin code. Whitelist allowed files if necessary.
Description:
- Avoid Dynamic Inclusion (Twig & PHP):
- Do not use user-supplied data directly in Twig's
include
statements or PHP'sinclude
/require
. This applies to both core Grav templates and any custom plugins you develop. - Example of bad code (Twig):
{% include page_name ~ '.html.twig' %}
(wherepage_name
comes from user input) - Example of bad code (PHP - within a plugin):
include($_GET['page'] . '.php');
- Do not use user-supplied data directly in Twig's
- Whitelisting (If Necessary):
- If dynamic inclusion is absolutely necessary (rarely the case), create a whitelist of allowed file paths within your PHP code (plugin or page logic).
$allowed_pages = [ 'home' => 'templates/home.html.twig', 'about' => 'templates/about.html.twig', ]; $page = $_GET['page']; if (isset($allowed_pages[$page])) { include($allowed_pages[$page]); // Safe }
- If dynamic inclusion is absolutely necessary (rarely the case), create a whitelist of allowed file paths within your PHP code (plugin or page logic).
- Sanitization (Within Plugin Code):
- If user input must be used to construct a file path (again, avoid this if possible), sanitize it thoroughly within your PHP code:
- Use
basename()
andrealpath()
. - Remove malicious characters.
- Use
- If user input must be used to construct a file path (again, avoid this if possible), sanitize it thoroughly within your PHP code:
Threats Mitigated:
- Local File Inclusion (LFI) (Severity: High): Attackers could include local files.
- Direct File Inclusion (DFI) (Severity: High): Similar to LFI.
Impact:
- LFI/DFI: Risk significantly reduced by avoiding dynamic inclusion and using whitelisting/sanitization where absolutely necessary.
Currently Implemented: (Example: We avoid dynamic inclusion in Twig, but need to audit all plugin code.) <-- YOU FILL THIS IN
Missing Implementation: (Example: We need to conduct a thorough code review of all plugins to identify and fix any instances of dynamic inclusion.) <-- YOU FILL THIS IN
Mitigation Strategy: CSRF Protection (Using Grav's Form Plugin)
Mitigation Strategy: Utilize Grav's built-in form.nonce
system for all forms, both in standard templates and custom plugins.
Description:
- Twig Template:
- Include
{{ form.nonce }}
within every form in your Twig templates. This is a Grav-provided function.<form method="post" action="..."> {{ form.nonce }} <input type="text" name="my_field"> <button type="submit">Submit</button> </form>
- Include
- Form Processing (Plugin or Page):
- In your PHP code (within a plugin or a page's event handlers), validate the nonce using Grav's
form
object:if ($form->validateNonce()) { // Process the form data } else { // Handle invalid nonce }
- This is typically done within a plugin's
onFormProcessed
event or a page'sonPageContentProcessed
event.
- In your PHP code (within a plugin or a page's event handlers), validate the nonce using Grav's
- Plugin Development:
- If you are creating custom plugins with forms, always follow steps 1 and 2. Use Grav's built-in nonce system.
Threats Mitigated:
- Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) (Severity: High): Attackers could trick users into submitting unintended actions.
Impact:
- CSRF: Risk significantly reduced by using Grav's built-in nonce system correctly.
Currently Implemented: (Example: We use form.nonce
in most forms, but need to verify all forms, especially in older parts of the site.) <-- YOU FILL THIS IN
Missing Implementation: (Example: We need to audit all forms to ensure form.nonce
is present and validated.) <-- YOU FILL THIS IN
Mitigation Strategy: Caching (Using Grav's Built-in System)
Mitigation Strategy: Utilize and properly configure Grav's built-in caching mechanisms.
Description:
- Configuration (Admin Panel):
- Use the Grav admin panel to configure caching settings. This is entirely within Grav's control.
- Choose appropriate caching levels (e.g., page caching, Twig caching) based on your content and traffic.
- Set appropriate cache lifetimes.
- Cache Clearing:
- Regularly clear the cache (using the admin panel) when content is updated.
Threats Mitigated:
- Denial of Service (DoS) (Severity: Medium): Caching can reduce the load on the server, mitigating some DoS attacks.
Impact:
- DoS: Risk reduced by caching, improving performance and resilience.
Currently Implemented: (Example: We have basic caching enabled.) <-- YOU FILL THIS IN
Missing Implementation: (Example: We need to review and optimize our caching configuration for better performance.) <-- YOU FILL THIS IN
Mitigation Strategy: YAML Parsing Vulnerabilities (Reliance on Grav Updates)
Mitigation Strategy: Keep Grav updated. This relies entirely on the Grav team addressing any vulnerabilities in the underlying Symfony YAML component.
Description:
- Keep Grav Updated:
- This is the primary mitigation. Follow the update procedures outlined in Mitigation Strategy #1, using Grav's built-in update mechanism.
Threats Mitigated:
- Remote Code Execution (RCE) via YAML Parser Vulnerability (Severity: Critical, but very unlikely): A vulnerability in the YAML parser.
Impact:
- RCE: Risk is extremely low if Grav is kept updated.
Currently Implemented: (Example: We keep Grav updated.) <-- YOU FILL THIS IN
Missing Implementation: (Example: None, as long as we maintain our update schedule.) <-- YOU FILL THIS IN