Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History
74 lines (58 loc) · 8.02 KB

threat-modeling.md

File metadata and controls

74 lines (58 loc) · 8.02 KB

Threat Model Analysis for getgrav/grav

  • Threat: Plugin Remote Code Execution (RCE) via Unvalidated Input

    • Description: An attacker exploits a vulnerability in a third-party Grav plugin that doesn't properly sanitize or validate user-supplied input. The attacker crafts a malicious request (e.g., a form submission, a URL parameter) containing PHP code, which the plugin then executes. This could be due to insecure use of eval(), include(), require(), or similar functions, or improper handling of file uploads.
    • Impact: Complete server compromise. The attacker gains full control over the web server and can execute arbitrary commands, steal data, install malware, and pivot to other systems.
    • Grav Component Affected: A specific, vulnerable third-party plugin. The vulnerability lies within the plugin's PHP code (e.g., a controller, a helper function, or a Twig extension).
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Plugin Selection: Only install plugins from trusted sources and with a strong security track record.
      • Code Review: If possible, review the plugin's source code for insecure input handling practices before installation.
      • Regular Updates: Keep the plugin updated to the latest version to patch any known vulnerabilities.
      • Input Validation & Sanitization (Developer): Plugin developers must rigorously validate and sanitize all user-supplied input before using it in any potentially dangerous context. Use appropriate PHP functions for escaping and filtering data.
      • Web Application Firewall (WAF): A WAF can help detect and block malicious requests, but it's not a substitute for secure coding.
  • Threat: Direct File Modification via Compromised FTP/SFTP (Impacting Grav Files)

    • Description: An attacker gains access to the server's file system and directly modifies Grav's files. This is distinct from general file system compromise because the target is the Grav installation. The attacker injects malicious code into Markdown files (.md), PHP files (within plugins or themes), or configuration files (.yaml). The compromised FTP/SFTP account, while a general vulnerability, is the means to the Grav-specific threat.
    • Impact: RCE, site defacement, data modification/deletion, complete site compromise. The attacker can effectively take full control of the website.
    • Grav Component Affected: Any file within the Grav installation, including Markdown files (user/pages/), PHP files (within user/plugins/, user/themes/, or even system/ if write permissions are misconfigured), and configuration files (user/config/).
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Strong Authentication: Use strong, unique passwords for all FTP/SFTP accounts. Prefer SSH keys over passwords for SSH access.
      • Restricted Access: Limit FTP/SFTP access to only authorized users and IP addresses.
      • File System Permissions: Implement strict file system permissions. The web server user should only have write access to the necessary directories (e.g., user/pages/, user/data/, cache/, logs/). Other directories should be read-only for the web server user.
      • File Integrity Monitoring: Use a file integrity monitoring system (e.g., a security plugin, Tripwire, AIDE) to detect unauthorized file changes.
      • Regular Backups: Maintain frequent, off-site backups to allow for recovery from file tampering.
  • Threat: Admin Panel Brute-Force Attack

    • Description: An attacker attempts to guess the password for a Grav admin account by repeatedly submitting login attempts with different username/password combinations. This targets Grav's built-in authentication.
    • Impact: Unauthorized access to the Grav admin panel, leading to complete site compromise. The attacker can modify content, install malicious plugins, change configuration settings, and potentially gain access to the server.
    • Grav Component Affected: The Grav admin panel login functionality (specifically, the authentication logic within system/src/Grav/Common/User/User.php and related files, although direct modification of these files is not the attack vector).
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Strong Passwords: Enforce strong, unique passwords for all admin accounts.
      • Two-Factor Authentication (2FA): Implement 2FA for the Grav admin panel (available via plugins).
      • Rate Limiting/Account Lockout: Use a plugin (e.g., "Login" plugin with appropriate configuration) or web server configuration to limit login attempts and lock out accounts after multiple failed attempts.
      • IP Restriction: If feasible, restrict access to the admin panel to specific IP addresses.
  • Threat: Unpatched Grav Core Vulnerability

    • Description: An attacker exploits a known security vulnerability in an outdated version of the Grav core. This is a direct threat to Grav itself.
    • Impact: Varies depending on the specific vulnerability, but could range from information disclosure to RCE.
    • Grav Component Affected: The Grav core itself (files within the system/ directory). The specific vulnerable component depends on the nature of the vulnerability (e.g., a specific class, function, or template).
    • Risk Severity: High to Critical (depending on the vulnerability)
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Regular Updates: Keep the Grav core updated to the latest stable release. Grav's admin panel provides update notifications.
      • Security Advisories: Monitor Grav's security advisories and announcements for information about newly discovered vulnerabilities.
      • Staging Environment: Test updates in a staging environment before deploying them to the production site.
  • Threat: Twig Template Injection in a Custom Theme or Plugin

    • Description: If a custom theme or plugin uses user-supplied data directly within Twig templates without proper escaping, an attacker could inject malicious Twig code. This is similar to XSS, but specific to the Twig templating engine within Grav. While Grav's core and well-written plugins should handle this correctly, custom code might introduce vulnerabilities.
    • Impact: Potentially RCE (if the attacker can execute PHP code through Twig), data leakage, or manipulation of the rendered output.
    • Grav Component Affected: A custom Twig template within a theme (user/themes/yourtheme/templates/) or a plugin that uses Twig rendering.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Auto-Escaping: Ensure that Twig's auto-escaping feature is enabled (it usually is by default).
      • Manual Escaping: If you need to output raw HTML, use Twig's raw filter very carefully and only after thoroughly sanitizing the input.
      • Context-Specific Escaping: Use the appropriate escaping filter for the context (e.g., escape('html'), escape('js'), escape('css'), escape('url')).
      • Code Review: Carefully review any custom Twig templates for potential injection vulnerabilities.
      • Developer Best Practices: Developers should be familiar with Twig's security guidelines and avoid using user input directly in templates without proper escaping.