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Attack Tree Analysis for getsentry/sentry-php

Objective: Compromise Application using Sentry-PHP vulnerabilities (Focused on High-Risk Paths and Critical Nodes).

Attack Tree Visualization

Root Goal: Compromise Application via Sentry-PHP [CRITICAL]
├── 1. Exploit Data Transmission Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL]
│   ├── 1.1. Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) Attack on Sentry Communication [CRITICAL]
│   │   ├── 1.1.1. Weak or Missing HTTPS Configuration [HR]
│   │   │   ├── 1.1.1.1. Downgrade Attack to HTTP [HR]
├── 2. Exploit Client-Side Vulnerabilities in Sentry-PHP Integration [CRITICAL]
│   ├── 2.1. Injection Attacks via Context/Breadcrumbs [CRITICAL]
│   │   ├── 2.1.1. Inject Malicious Payloads into User Context [HR]
│   │   │   ├── 2.1.1.1. Manipulate User Input Fields Captured by Sentry [HR]
│   ├── 2.2. Denial of Service (DoS) via Error Flooding [HR]
│   │   ├── 2.2.1. Trigger Application Errors Repeatedly [HR]
│   │   │   ├── 2.2.1.1. Exploit Application Vulnerabilities to Generate Errors [HR]
│   │   │   ├── 2.2.1.2. Send Malicious Requests Designed to Cause Errors [HR]
├── 3. Exploit Configuration and Setup Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL]
│   ├── 3.1. Exposure of Sentry DSN (Data Source Name) [CRITICAL][HR]
│   │   ├── 3.1.2. DSN Exposed in Publicly Accessible Configuration Files [CRITICAL][HR]
│   ├── 3.2. Insecure Data Scrubbing Configuration [CRITICAL][HR]
│   │   ├── 3.2.1. Insufficient Data Scrubbing Rules [HR]
│   │   │   ├── 3.2.1.1. Sensitive Data (Passwords, API Keys, Personal Information) Not Masked [HR]
├── 4. Exploit Vulnerabilities in Sentry-PHP SDK or Dependencies [CRITICAL]
│   ├── 4.2. Vulnerabilities in Sentry-PHP Dependencies [CRITICAL][HR]
│   │   ├── 4.2.1. Outdated Dependencies with Known Vulnerabilities [HR]
│   │   │   ├── 4.2.1.1. Vulnerable HTTP Client Libraries (e.g., Guzzle, if used indirectly) [HR]
└── 5. Social Engineering Attacks Targeting Sentry Integration [CRITICAL]
    ├── 5.1. Phishing for Sentry Credentials [CRITICAL][HR]
    │   ├── 5.1.2. Obtain Sentry API Keys or Account Credentials [HR]

Attack Tree Path: 1. Root Goal: Compromise Application via Sentry-PHP [CRITICAL]

  • Threat Description: The attacker's ultimate goal is to gain unauthorized access to or control over the application using vulnerabilities related to Sentry-PHP.
  • Attack Vectors: All subsequent nodes in the tree represent potential attack vectors to achieve this goal.
  • Impact: Full compromise of the application, data breach, denial of service, reputational damage.
  • Actionable Insights: Implement comprehensive security measures across all identified high-risk paths and critical nodes.

Attack Tree Path: 2. 1. Exploit Data Transmission Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL]

  • Threat Description: Attackers target the communication channel between the application and the Sentry server to intercept or manipulate data.
  • Attack Vectors:
    • 1.1. Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) Attack on Sentry Communication [CRITICAL]
  • Impact: Data leakage of sensitive error information, replay attacks, potential data manipulation in Sentry.
  • Actionable Insights: Enforce HTTPS, implement network security measures, and use data scrubbing.

Attack Tree Path: 3. 1.1. Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) Attack on Sentry Communication [CRITICAL]

  • Threat Description: An attacker positions themselves between the application and the Sentry server to eavesdrop or tamper with the communication.
  • Attack Vectors:
    • 1.1.1. Weak or Missing HTTPS Configuration [HR]
  • Impact: Exposure of sensitive error data transmitted to Sentry.
  • Actionable Insights: Strictly enforce HTTPS for all Sentry communication.

Attack Tree Path: 4. 1.1.1. Weak or Missing HTTPS Configuration [HR]

  • Threat Description: The application or Sentry-PHP is not configured to use HTTPS properly, or allows fallback to HTTP.
  • Attack Vectors:
    • 1.1.1.1. Downgrade Attack to HTTP [HR]
  • Impact: Allows attackers to perform MitM attacks by downgrading the connection to unencrypted HTTP.
  • Actionable Insights:
    • Enforce HTTPS: Ensure Sentry-PHP is configured to only communicate over HTTPS.
    • HSTS: Implement HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS) to prevent downgrade attacks.
    • Regular Configuration Review: Periodically check HTTPS configuration for weaknesses.

Attack Tree Path: 5. 1.1.1.1. Downgrade Attack to HTTP [HR]

  • Threat Description: An attacker actively attempts to force the communication between the application and Sentry server to use HTTP instead of HTTPS.
  • Attack Steps:
    • Attacker intercepts the initial connection handshake.
    • Attacker manipulates the handshake to force the use of HTTP.
    • Subsequent communication is unencrypted and vulnerable to MitM.
  • Impact: Data leakage of sensitive error data, replay attacks.
  • Actionable Insights:
    • Enforce HTTPS: (Reiterate importance)
    • HSTS: (Reiterate importance)
    • Monitor Network Traffic: Detect unusual downgrade attempts.

Attack Tree Path: 6. 2. Exploit Client-Side Vulnerabilities in Sentry-PHP Integration [CRITICAL]

  • Threat Description: Attackers exploit vulnerabilities in how the application integrates Sentry-PHP, specifically focusing on data injection.
  • Attack Vectors:
    • 2.1. Injection Attacks via Context/Breadcrumbs [CRITICAL]
    • 2.2. Denial of Service (DoS) via Error Flooding [HR]
  • Impact: XSS in Sentry UI, log injection, denial of service.
  • Actionable Insights: Implement input sanitization, rate limiting, and secure coding practices.

Attack Tree Path: 7. 2.1. Injection Attacks via Context/Breadcrumbs [CRITICAL]

  • Threat Description: Attackers inject malicious payloads into data sent to Sentry through context or breadcrumbs, aiming to exploit vulnerabilities in systems that display or process this data.
  • Attack Vectors:
    • 2.1.1. Inject Malicious Payloads into User Context [HR]
  • Impact: Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) in Sentry UI or integrated systems, log injection, potential server-side injection in downstream systems.
  • Actionable Insights: Sanitize all data added to Sentry context and breadcrumbs, especially user-controlled data.

Attack Tree Path: 8. 2.1.1. Inject Malicious Payloads into User Context [HR]

  • Threat Description: Attackers manipulate user input or application logic to inject malicious code into the user context data that Sentry captures.
  • Attack Vectors:
    • 2.1.1.1. Manipulate User Input Fields Captured by Sentry [HR]
  • Impact: XSS in Sentry UI, log injection.
  • Actionable Insights:
    • Input Sanitization: Sanitize all user inputs before including them in Sentry context.
    • Output Encoding: Ensure Sentry UI and integrated systems properly encode output to prevent XSS.

Attack Tree Path: 9. 2.1.1.1. Manipulate User Input Fields Captured by Sentry [HR]

  • Threat Description: Attackers directly manipulate user input fields (e.g., form fields, URL parameters) that the application captures and sends to Sentry as part of the user context.
  • Attack Steps:
    • Attacker identifies input fields that are included in Sentry context.
    • Attacker injects malicious payloads (e.g., JavaScript code) into these input fields.
    • When an error occurs and Sentry captures the context, the malicious payload is sent to Sentry.
    • If Sentry UI or integrated systems render this data unsafely, XSS occurs.
  • Impact: XSS in Sentry UI, log injection.
  • Actionable Insights:
    • Input Sanitization: (Reiterate importance)
    • Output Encoding: (Reiterate importance)
    • Limit Context Data: Only include necessary data in Sentry context, avoid echoing back raw user input if possible.

Attack Tree Path: 10. 2.2. Denial of Service (DoS) via Error Flooding [HR]

  • Threat Description: Attackers intentionally generate a large volume of errors in the application to overload resources or disrupt Sentry's functionality.
  • Attack Vectors:
    • 2.2.1. Trigger Application Errors Repeatedly [HR]
  • Impact: Application performance degradation, potential unavailability, Sentry server overload (indirect application impact).
  • Actionable Insights: Implement rate limiting, fix application vulnerabilities, and optimize Sentry-PHP configuration for performance.

Attack Tree Path: 11. 2.2.1. Trigger Application Errors Repeatedly [HR]

  • Threat Description: Attackers actively try to cause errors in the application to trigger excessive error reporting to Sentry.
  • Attack Vectors:
    • 2.2.1.1. Exploit Application Vulnerabilities to Generate Errors [HR]
    • 2.2.1.2. Send Malicious Requests Designed to Cause Errors [HR]
  • Impact: Application DoS, Sentry server overload.
  • Actionable Insights:
    • Application Vulnerability Remediation: Fix vulnerabilities that can be easily exploited to generate errors.
    • Rate Limiting: Implement rate limiting to restrict the number of requests and errors from specific sources.

Attack Tree Path: 12. 2.2.1.1. Exploit Application Vulnerabilities to Generate Errors [HR]

  • Threat Description: Attackers leverage existing vulnerabilities in the application's code or logic to trigger errors.
  • Attack Steps:
    • Attacker identifies exploitable vulnerabilities (e.g., SQL injection, path traversal, etc.).
    • Attacker crafts requests that exploit these vulnerabilities, causing application errors.
    • Sentry-PHP reports these errors, potentially leading to DoS if errors are generated in high volume.
  • Impact: Application DoS, Sentry server overload.
  • Actionable Insights:
    • Vulnerability Scanning and Remediation: Regularly scan for and fix application vulnerabilities.
    • Secure Coding Practices: Implement secure coding practices to minimize vulnerabilities.

Attack Tree Path: 13. 2.2.1.2. Send Malicious Requests Designed to Cause Errors [HR]

  • Threat Description: Attackers send specifically crafted requests that are designed to trigger errors in the application, even without exploiting specific vulnerabilities. This could involve invalid input, requests to non-existent resources, or requests that trigger specific error conditions in the application logic.
  • Attack Steps:
    • Attacker analyzes application behavior to identify request patterns that cause errors.
    • Attacker sends a large volume of these error-inducing requests.
    • Sentry-PHP reports these errors, potentially leading to DoS.
  • Impact: Application DoS, Sentry server overload.
  • Actionable Insights:
    • Input Validation: Implement robust input validation to prevent errors caused by invalid input.
    • Rate Limiting: (Reiterate importance)
    • Error Handling Optimization: Optimize application error handling to minimize resource consumption during error conditions.

Attack Tree Path: 14. 3. Exploit Configuration and Setup Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL]

  • Threat Description: Attackers target misconfigurations in Sentry-PHP setup or application configuration that expose sensitive information or weaken security.
  • Attack Vectors:
    • 3.1. Exposure of Sentry DSN (Data Source Name) [CRITICAL][HR]
    • 3.2. Insecure Data Scrubbing Configuration [CRITICAL][HR]
  • Impact: Unauthorized access to Sentry project, data leakage of sensitive information to Sentry.
  • Actionable Insights: Securely manage DSN, implement comprehensive data scrubbing, and follow security best practices for configuration.

Attack Tree Path: 15. 3.1. Exposure of Sentry DSN (Data Source Name) [CRITICAL][HR]

  • Threat Description: The Sentry DSN, which grants access to the Sentry project, is unintentionally exposed to unauthorized parties.
  • Attack Vectors:
    • 3.1.2. DSN Exposed in Publicly Accessible Configuration Files [CRITICAL][HR]
  • Impact: Unauthorized access to Sentry project, data manipulation, data poisoning.
  • Actionable Insights: Securely store and manage DSN, restrict access to configuration files.

Attack Tree Path: 16. 3.1.2. DSN Exposed in Publicly Accessible Configuration Files [CRITICAL][HR]

  • Threat Description: The Sentry DSN is stored in configuration files (e.g., .env, configuration management systems) that are publicly accessible or improperly secured.
  • Attack Steps:
    • Attacker gains access to publicly accessible configuration files (e.g., via web server misconfiguration, version control leaks, or insider access).
    • Attacker extracts the Sentry DSN from the configuration file.
    • Attacker uses the DSN to access the Sentry project and potentially send malicious data.
  • Impact: Unauthorized access to Sentry project, data manipulation, data poisoning.
  • Actionable Insights:
    • Secure Configuration Storage: Store DSN in environment variables or secure configuration management systems, not in publicly accessible files.
    • Restrict Access to Configuration Files: Limit access to configuration files to authorized personnel and processes.
    • Regular Security Audits: Audit configuration file security and access controls.

Attack Tree Path: 17. 3.2. Insecure Data Scrubbing Configuration [CRITICAL][HR]

  • Threat Description: Data scrubbing in Sentry-PHP is not properly configured, leading to sensitive data being sent to and stored in Sentry.
  • Attack Vectors:
    • 3.2.1. Insufficient Data Scrubbing Rules [HR]
  • Impact: Data leakage of sensitive information (passwords, API keys, personal data) to Sentry.
  • Actionable Insights: Implement comprehensive and well-tested data scrubbing rules.

Attack Tree Path: 18. 3.2.1. Insufficient Data Scrubbing Rules [HR]

  • Threat Description: The data scrubbing rules configured in Sentry-PHP are not comprehensive enough to mask all types of sensitive data.
  • Attack Vectors:
    • 3.2.1.1. Sensitive Data (Passwords, API Keys, Personal Information) Not Masked [HR]
  • Impact: Data leakage of sensitive information to Sentry.
  • Actionable Insights:
    • Comprehensive Scrubbing Rules: Define scrubbing rules that cover all types of sensitive data relevant to the application.
    • Regular Review and Updates: Regularly review and update scrubbing rules as the application evolves and new types of sensitive data are introduced.
    • Testing Scrubbing Rules: Thoroughly test scrubbing rules to ensure they are effective and do not inadvertently mask important debugging information.

Attack Tree Path: 19. 3.2.1.1. Sensitive Data (Passwords, API Keys, Personal Information) Not Masked [HR]

  • Threat Description: Specific types of sensitive data, such as passwords, API keys, or personal information, are not included in the data scrubbing rules and are therefore sent to Sentry in error reports.
  • Attack Steps:
    • Developers fail to identify and configure scrubbing for all sensitive data types.
    • Sensitive data is included in error messages, context, or breadcrumbs.
    • Sentry-PHP sends this data to the Sentry server because it's not scrubbed.
    • Sensitive data is stored in Sentry and potentially accessible to unauthorized users with Sentry access.
  • Impact: Data leakage of sensitive information to Sentry.
  • Actionable Insights:
    • Identify Sensitive Data: Conduct a thorough review to identify all types of sensitive data handled by the application.
    • Implement Scrubbing for All Sensitive Data: Create scrubbing rules for each identified type of sensitive data.
    • Regular Review and Testing: (Reiterate importance)

Attack Tree Path: 20. 4. Exploit Vulnerabilities in Sentry-PHP SDK or Dependencies [CRITICAL]

  • Threat Description: Attackers exploit known vulnerabilities in the Sentry-PHP SDK itself or its dependencies.
  • Attack Vectors:
    • 4.2. Vulnerabilities in Sentry-PHP Dependencies [CRITICAL][HR]
  • Impact: Application compromise, data breach, denial of service.
  • Actionable Insights: Keep Sentry-PHP SDK and dependencies updated, monitor for vulnerability disclosures.

Attack Tree Path: 21. 4.2. Vulnerabilities in Sentry-PHP Dependencies [CRITICAL][HR]

  • Threat Description: Vulnerabilities exist in third-party libraries that Sentry-PHP relies upon.
  • Attack Vectors:
    • 4.2.1. Outdated Dependencies with Known Vulnerabilities [HR]
  • Impact: Exploitation of dependency vulnerabilities leading to application compromise.
  • Actionable Insights: Regularly update dependencies, use dependency vulnerability scanning tools.

Attack Tree Path: 22. 4.2.1. Outdated Dependencies with Known Vulnerabilities [HR]

  • Threat Description: Sentry-PHP is using outdated versions of its dependencies that have known security vulnerabilities.
  • Attack Vectors:
    • 4.2.1.1. Vulnerable HTTP Client Libraries (e.g., Guzzle, if used indirectly) [HR]
  • Impact: Exploitation of vulnerabilities in outdated dependencies.
  • Actionable Insights:
    • Dependency Management: Use a dependency manager (Composer) to track and update dependencies.
    • Regular Dependency Updates: Regularly update Sentry-PHP dependencies to the latest versions.
    • Vulnerability Scanning: Use dependency vulnerability scanning tools to identify outdated and vulnerable dependencies.

Attack Tree Path: 23. 4.2.1.1. Vulnerable HTTP Client Libraries (e.g., Guzzle, if used indirectly) [HR]

  • Threat Description: Sentry-PHP (or its dependencies) relies on HTTP client libraries (like Guzzle) that have known vulnerabilities in outdated versions.
  • Attack Steps:
    • Attacker identifies that the application is using an outdated and vulnerable HTTP client library (indirectly via Sentry-PHP).
    • Attacker exploits known vulnerabilities in the HTTP client library (e.g., RCE, SSRF).
    • Exploitation can lead to application compromise.
  • Impact: Application compromise, data breach, denial of service.
  • Actionable Insights:
    • Update Dependencies: Ensure Sentry-PHP and its dependencies, including HTTP client libraries, are updated to the latest secure versions.
    • Dependency Scanning: (Reiterate importance)

Attack Tree Path: 24. 5. Social Engineering Attacks Targeting Sentry Integration [CRITICAL]

  • Threat Description: Attackers use social engineering techniques to gain unauthorized access to the Sentry project.
  • Attack Vectors:
    • 5.1. Phishing for Sentry Credentials [CRITICAL][HR]
  • Impact: Unauthorized access to Sentry project, data manipulation, data poisoning.
  • Actionable Insights: Security awareness training, multi-factor authentication for Sentry accounts.

Attack Tree Path: 25. 5.1. Phishing for Sentry Credentials [CRITICAL][HR]

  • Threat Description: Attackers use phishing emails or other social engineering tactics to trick developers or operations staff into revealing their Sentry credentials.
  • Attack Vectors:
    • 5.1.2. Obtain Sentry API Keys or Account Credentials [HR]
  • Impact: Unauthorized access to Sentry project, data manipulation, data poisoning.
  • Actionable Insights: Security awareness training, multi-factor authentication for Sentry accounts.

Attack Tree Path: 26. 5.1.2. Obtain Sentry API Keys or Account Credentials [HR]

  • Threat Description: Attackers successfully trick users into providing their Sentry API keys or account login credentials through phishing or other social engineering methods.
  • Attack Steps:
    • Attacker crafts phishing emails or fake login pages that mimic Sentry login interfaces.
    • Attacker targets developers or operations staff who are likely to have Sentry access.
    • Users are tricked into entering their credentials or API keys on the fake pages.
    • Attacker captures the credentials and gains unauthorized access to the Sentry project.
  • Impact: Unauthorized access to Sentry project, data manipulation, data poisoning.
  • Actionable Insights:
    • Security Awareness Training: Train users to recognize and avoid phishing attacks.
    • Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA): Enforce MFA for all Sentry accounts to add an extra layer of security.
    • Regular Security Reminders: Periodically remind users about phishing risks and best practices for password security.