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Threat Model Analysis for getsentry/sentry-php

Threat: Sensitive Data Exposure in Error Reports

  • Description: Developers might inadvertently include sensitive data (PII, API keys, database credentials) in error messages or custom contexts when using the sentry-php SDK. This data is then transmitted to and stored within Sentry. An attacker with access to the Sentry dashboard (through a compromised account or a leaked DSN) could view this sensitive information.
    • Impact: Exposure of PII, PHI, financial data, credentials, or other confidential information. This could lead to identity theft, financial loss, reputational damage, legal penalties, and regulatory fines.
    • Affected Component: Client::captureMessage, Client::captureException, Client::captureEvent, any custom code that adds context using Scope::setContext, Scope::setUser, Scope::setExtra, Scope::setTags. Any SDK function that sends data to Sentry is a potential point of exposure.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Pre-Send Data Scrubbing (Essential): Implement the before_send callback (or event processors) to meticulously filter, redact, or anonymize all sensitive data before it leaves the application. Use regular expressions, whitelists, and blacklists. Prioritize client-side scrubbing. This is the most important mitigation.
      • Avoid Sensitive Data in Logs/Messages: Train developers to never include sensitive data directly in error messages or log statements that might be captured by Sentry.
      • Contextual Data Review: Carefully review and restrict the contextual data added to Sentry events using the SDK's context-setting functions. Only include information absolutely necessary for debugging.
      • Sentry Data Scrubbing Rules (Secondary): Use Sentry's server-side data scrubbing rules as an additional layer, but do not rely solely on them. Client-side is paramount.
      • Regular Audits: Conduct periodic audits of the data being sent to Sentry to identify and address any potential leaks.

Threat: Denial of Service via Error Flooding (SDK Misuse)

  • Description: A bug in the application's error handling logic, combined with the use of the sentry-php SDK, could lead to an excessive number of error reports being sent to Sentry. This could be due to an infinite loop, a misconfigured error handler, or a failure to properly handle exceptions. This flood of errors can overwhelm the SDK and potentially the Sentry service, consuming resources and exceeding rate limits.
    • Impact: Disruption of error reporting for legitimate issues. Potential performance degradation of the application due to the overhead of processing and sending numerous error reports via the SDK. Exceeding Sentry usage quotas.
    • Affected Component: Client::captureMessage, Client::captureException, Client::captureEvent, and the underlying transport mechanism used by the SDK.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Client-Side Rate Limiting: Implement rate limiting within the application code that uses the SDK to control the number of error reports sent to Sentry within a given time period. This is crucial to prevent the SDK from being overwhelmed.
      • Error Sampling: Configure the SDK (using Options::setSampleRate) to sample errors, sending only a percentage of them to Sentry. Adjust the sampling rate based on the application's expected error frequency.
      • Error Filtering: Use the SDK's filtering capabilities (e.g., before_send callback) to filter out known, non-critical, or repetitive errors that do not require reporting.
      • Circuit Breaker: Implement a circuit breaker pattern to temporarily disable error reporting via the SDK if a predefined threshold of errors is exceeded.

Threat: Sentry SDK/Dependency Vulnerability Exploitation

  • Description: An attacker exploits a known vulnerability in the sentry-php SDK itself or one of its dependencies. This could allow the attacker to execute arbitrary code within the context of the application, access sensitive data handled by the SDK, or disrupt the application's functionality.
    • Impact: Varies depending on the specific vulnerability. Could range from information disclosure to complete application compromise, especially if the vulnerability allows for remote code execution.
    • Affected Component: The entire sentry-php SDK and its dependencies.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Regular Updates: Keep the sentry-php SDK and all its dependencies up to date with the latest security patches. Use Composer's update command regularly and consider automated dependency update tools.
      • Vulnerability Scanning: Use tools like composer audit or dedicated vulnerability scanners (e.g., Snyk, Dependabot) to identify known vulnerabilities in the project's dependencies, including the Sentry SDK.
      • Security Advisories: Subscribe to security advisories and mailing lists related to the Sentry SDK and PHP security in general.

Threat: DSN Leakage/Misuse (Leading to SDK Abuse)

  • Description: An attacker obtains the Sentry DSN (Data Source Name) through code leaks, configuration file exposure, or other means. The attacker can then use the sentry-php SDK (or a custom client mimicking it) to send forged error reports to the Sentry project, potentially polluting the data, triggering false alerts, or masking legitimate errors.
    • Impact: Data integrity issues within Sentry. False positives in error reporting. Potential for attackers to hide real errors by flooding the system with fake ones, making it harder to detect and respond to actual problems.
    • Affected Component: The DSN configuration itself, and any code that handles or exposes the DSN. While the attacker might not directly exploit the installed SDK, they would use the concept of the SDK and its communication protocol.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Secure DSN Storage: Store the DSN securely using environment variables (e.g., .env files, server configuration) or a dedicated secrets management system. Never hardcode the DSN directly in the codebase.
      • Access Control: Restrict access to the DSN to authorized personnel only.
      • DSN Rotation: Regularly rotate the DSN to minimize the impact of a potential leak.

Threat: Sensitive Data in URLs/Query Parameters (Captured by SDK)

  • Description: The application includes sensitive data in URLs or query parameters. When an error occurs, the sentry-php SDK captures the URL, including this sensitive data, and sends it to Sentry.
    • Impact: Exposure of sensitive data within Sentry, similar to the general "Sensitive Data Exposure" threat, but specifically caused by the SDK capturing URLs.
    • Affected Component: Client::captureMessage, Client::captureException, Client::captureEvent, and any code within the SDK that captures request data, particularly the URL.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • URL Sanitization (Essential): Use the before_send callback to sanitize URLs before sending them to Sentry via the SDK. Remove or redact any sensitive query parameters or path segments. This is crucial.
      • Avoid Sensitive Data in URLs: Follow best practices and never include sensitive data in URLs. Use request bodies (POST, PUT, PATCH) for transmitting sensitive information. This prevents the SDK from capturing the data in the first place.