Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History
157 lines (127 loc) · 9.85 KB

attack-tree.md

File metadata and controls

157 lines (127 loc) · 9.85 KB

Attack Tree Analysis for guzzle/guzzle

Objective: Compromise the application using Guzzle to achieve data exfiltration, system manipulation, or information disclosure.

Attack Tree Visualization

Compromise Application Using Guzzle
├── 1. Data Exfiltration [HIGH RISK]
│   ├── 1.1.  Manipulate Redirects (CVE-2023-29197 related) [HIGH RISK]
│   │   ├── 1.1.1.1.  Exploit insufficient validation of `Location` header in redirect responses. (If not patched) [CRITICAL]
│   │   ├── 1.1.2.  Bypass redirect restrictions (e.g., `strict_redirects` not used or misconfigured). [HIGH RISK]
│   │   │   ├── 1.1.2.1.  Change request method on redirect (e.g., POST to GET, leaking POST data in URL). [CRITICAL]
│   │   │   ├── 1.1.2.2  Change protocol on redirect (e.g., HTTPS to HTTP, exposing data in transit). [CRITICAL]
│   │   │   └── 1.1.2.3  Change Host on redirect (send sensitive headers/cookies to attacker's domain). [CRITICAL]
│   │   └── 1.1.3.  Open Redirect (if application blindly uses user-supplied URLs with Guzzle). [HIGH RISK]
│   │       └── 1.1.3.1.  Application passes user input directly to Guzzle's `request()` method without validation. [CRITICAL]
│   ├── 1.3.  Exploit Request Options
│   │   ├── 1.3.1.  `debug` option enabled in production. [HIGH RISK]
│   │   │   └── 1.3.1.1.  Sensitive information (headers, request body) logged to accessible location. [CRITICAL]
│   ├── 1.4.  Exploit Proxy Configuration
│   │   ├── 1.4.2.  Application's proxy configuration is vulnerable to injection. [HIGH RISK]
│   │   │   └── 1.4.2.1.  Attacker can specify an arbitrary proxy server. [CRITICAL]
│   ├── 1.5.  Exploit SSL/TLS Configuration [HIGH RISK]
│   │   ├── 1.5.1.  `verify` option set to `false` (disables certificate verification). [HIGH RISK]
│   │   │   └── 1.5.1.1.  Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attack due to accepting any certificate. [CRITICAL]
├── 2. System Manipulation [HIGH RISK]
│   ├── 2.1.  SSRF (Server-Side Request Forgery) [HIGH RISK]
│   │   ├── 2.1.1.  Application allows attacker to control the URL used by Guzzle. [HIGH RISK]
│   │   │   ├── 2.1.1.1.  Access internal resources (e.g., metadata service, localhost APIs). [CRITICAL]
│   ├── 2.3.  Exploit Proxy Configuration (similar to 1.4)
│   │    └── 2.3.1  Use malicious proxy to modify requests to internal services. [CRITICAL]
├── 4. Information Disclosure
    ├── 4.1.  `debug` option enabled (as in 1.3.1) [HIGH RISK]
    │   └── 4.1.1.  Leak request/response details, including headers and potentially sensitive data. [CRITICAL]

Attack Tree Path: 1. Data Exfiltration

  • 1.1. Manipulate Redirects [HIGH RISK]

    • 1.1.1.1. Exploit insufficient validation of Location header (CVE-2023-29197 related) [CRITICAL]:

      • Description: If the application uses an unpatched version of Guzzle or doesn't properly validate the Location header in redirect responses, an attacker can craft a malicious redirect that leads to data exfiltration.
      • Likelihood: Low (if patched), Medium (if unpatched and validation is weak)
      • Impact: High
      • Effort: Medium
      • Skill Level: Medium
      • Detection Difficulty: Medium

    • 1.1.2. Bypass redirect restrictions [HIGH RISK]:

      • Description: If strict_redirects is not used or is misconfigured, Guzzle might follow redirects that change the request method, protocol, or host, leading to data leakage.

      • 1.1.2.1. Change request method on redirect (POST to GET) [CRITICAL]:

        • Description: A POST request containing sensitive data in the body is redirected to a GET request. The POST data is then appended to the URL, potentially exposing it to the attacker or logging systems.
        • Likelihood: Medium
        • Impact: High
        • Effort: Low
        • Skill Level: Low
        • Detection Difficulty: Medium

      • 1.1.2.2. Change protocol on redirect (HTTPS to HTTP) [CRITICAL]:

        • Description: A request initially made over HTTPS is redirected to HTTP. This exposes the entire request (including headers, cookies, and body) in plain text, making it vulnerable to interception.
        • Likelihood: Medium
        • Impact: Very High
        • Effort: Low
        • Skill Level: Low
        • Detection Difficulty: High

      • 1.1.2.3. Change Host on redirect [CRITICAL]:

        • Description: The request is redirected to a different host controlled by the attacker. Sensitive headers (e.g., authorization headers, cookies) intended for the original host are sent to the attacker's server.
        • Likelihood: Medium
        • Impact: High
        • Effort: Low
        • Skill Level: Low
        • Detection Difficulty: Medium

    • 1.1.3. Open Redirect [HIGH RISK]:

      • Description: The application uses user-supplied input to construct the URL for Guzzle requests without proper validation.

      • 1.1.3.1. Application passes user input directly to Guzzle [CRITICAL]:

        • Description: The attacker can provide a URL that redirects the user to a malicious site, potentially leading to phishing or data theft. This is a general web vulnerability, but it's exacerbated by Guzzle's automatic redirect handling if not configured correctly.
        • Likelihood: Medium
        • Impact: Very High
        • Effort: Low
        • Skill Level: Low
        • Detection Difficulty: Medium

  • 1.3. Exploit Request Options

    • 1.3.1. debug option enabled in production [HIGH RISK]:

      • Description: The debug option in Guzzle logs detailed information about requests and responses, including headers and potentially sensitive data in the request body.

      • 1.3.1.1. Sensitive information logged [CRITICAL]:

        • Description: If debug is enabled in a production environment, this information might be written to logs that are accessible to attackers, leading to data exfiltration.
        • Likelihood: Low (should be a rare configuration error)
        • Impact: Very High
        • Effort: Very Low
        • Skill Level: Very Low
        • Detection Difficulty: Very Low

  • 1.4. Exploit Proxy Configuration

    • 1.4.2. Application's proxy configuration is vulnerable to injection [HIGH RISK]:

      • Description: The application allows the attacker to control the proxy server used by Guzzle.

      • 1.4.2.1. Attacker can specify an arbitrary proxy server [CRITICAL]:

        • Description: The attacker can direct all of the application's outbound traffic through a malicious proxy, allowing them to intercept, modify, or block requests and responses.
        • Likelihood: Low (requires a significant vulnerability)
        • Impact: Very High
        • Effort: Medium
        • Skill Level: Medium
        • Detection Difficulty: Medium

  • 1.5. Exploit SSL/TLS Configuration [HIGH RISK]

    • 1.5.1. verify option set to false [HIGH RISK]:

      • Description: Disables SSL/TLS certificate verification.

      • 1.5.1.1. MITM attack due to accepting any certificate [CRITICAL]:

        • Description: Guzzle will accept any certificate presented by the server, even if it's invalid or self-signed. This makes the application vulnerable to Man-in-the-Middle attacks, where an attacker can intercept and modify the communication between the application and the server.
        • Likelihood: Low (should be a rare configuration error)
        • Impact: Very High
        • Effort: Medium
        • Skill Level: Medium
        • Detection Difficulty: High

Attack Tree Path: 2. System Manipulation

  • 2.1. SSRF (Server-Side Request Forgery) [HIGH RISK]

    • Description: The application allows an attacker to control the URL used by Guzzle, enabling them to make requests to internal or otherwise inaccessible resources.

    • 2.1.1. Application allows attacker to control the URL [HIGH RISK]:

      • Description: This is the root cause of SSRF vulnerabilities.

      • 2.1.1.1. Access internal resources [CRITICAL]:

        • Description: The attacker can use Guzzle to access internal services, such as metadata services (e.g., AWS metadata service), databases, or administrative interfaces, that are not normally exposed to the public internet.
        • Likelihood: Medium
        • Impact: High
        • Effort: Low
        • Skill Level: Low
        • Detection Difficulty: Medium

  • 2.3. Exploit Proxy Configuration

    • 2.3.1 Use malicious proxy to modify requests to internal services. [CRITICAL]:
      • Description: Similar to 1.4.2.1, but the impact is focused on manipulating requests after they leave the application, potentially targeting internal services that Guzzle is used to interact with.
      • Likelihood: Low
      • Impact: Very High
      • Effort: High
      • Skill Level: High
      • Detection Difficulty: High

Attack Tree Path: 4. Information Disclosure

  • 4.1. debug option enabled (as in 1.3.1) [HIGH RISK]

    • 4.1.1. Leak request/response details [CRITICAL]: (Same as 1.3.1.1)