-
Threat: Controller/Action Spoofing via Route Manipulation
- Description: An attacker crafts malicious URLs or modifies request parameters to bypass intended routing logic and access controllers or actions they are not authorized to use. They might try variations of expected parameters, exploit weak regex constraints, or guess valid controller/action names. This directly exploits Laminas's routing mechanism.
- Impact: Unauthorized access to application functionality, potentially leading to data breaches, data modification, or execution of privileged operations.
- Affected Component:
Laminas\Mvc\Router
,Laminas\Mvc\Controller\AbstractActionController
(and its subclasses), Route configuration files. - Risk Severity: High
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Define strict and specific routes with strong constraints (e.g., regex for parameters, HTTP method restrictions). Avoid overly permissive wildcard routes.
- Implement robust authorization checks within each controller action using
Laminas\Permissions\Acl
or a similar authorization component. Do not rely solely on routing for access control. - Validate all route parameters within the controller, even if they appear to match route constraints. Use
Laminas\InputFilter
for this validation. - Consider a whitelist approach for allowed controllers and actions, if feasible.
-
Threat: Request Parameter Tampering (Laminas-Specific Handling)
- Description: An attacker manipulates GET, POST, or route parameters in ways that bypass Laminas's intended parsing or validation. They might inject unexpected data types, exploit array handling vulnerabilities, or attempt to override internal Laminas variables. This focuses on how Laminas parses and provides these parameters to the application.
- Impact: Unexpected application behavior, potential bypass of security checks, data corruption, or code injection vulnerabilities.
- Affected Component:
Laminas\Http\Request
,Laminas\Mvc\Controller\Plugin\Params
,Laminas\InputFilter\InputFilter
. - Risk Severity: High
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Consistently use
Laminas\InputFilter
to validate all input from all sources (GET, POST, route parameters, headers). Define specific validation rules for each parameter. - Avoid direct access to superglobals (
$_GET
,$_POST
). Use theLaminas\Http\Request
object and controller plugins (e.g.,$this->params()
). - Thoroughly understand and validate how Laminas handles array and nested data structures in request parameters.
- Sanitize data after validation, before using it in sensitive operations (e.g., database queries, system commands).
- Consistently use
-
Threat: Service Manager Configuration Injection
- Description: An attacker gains write access to the application's configuration files (e.g.,
module.config.php
,services.config.php
) and modifies the Service Manager configuration to inject malicious services or alter the behavior of existing ones. This directly targets Laminas's dependency injection container. - Impact: Complete application compromise, as the attacker can control the instantiation and behavior of core application components. This could lead to arbitrary code execution, data theft, or denial of service.
- Affected Component:
Laminas\ServiceManager\ServiceManager
, Configuration files. - Risk Severity: Critical
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Protect configuration files with strict file system permissions (read-only for the web server user).
- Store sensitive configuration values (e.g., database credentials, API keys) in environment variables, not directly in configuration files.
- Implement file integrity monitoring to detect unauthorized changes to configuration files.
- Avoid loading configuration from untrusted sources (e.g., user-uploaded files, external APIs).
- Description: An attacker gains write access to the application's configuration files (e.g.,
Threat: Event Listener Hijacking
-
Threat: Event Listener Hijacking
- Description: An attacker registers a malicious event listener or modifies an existing one to intercept or alter the application's event flow. This could be done through configuration manipulation (if listeners are configured in files) or by exploiting vulnerabilities that allow dynamic listener registration. This directly targets Laminas's event system.
- Impact: The attacker can disrupt application logic, bypass security checks, steal sensitive data passed through events, or trigger unintended actions.
- Affected Component:
Laminas\EventManager\EventManager
, Event listener configuration. - Risk Severity: High
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Carefully review and audit all event listener configurations. Minimize the number of listeners and ensure they are well-understood.
- Avoid registering event listeners based on user input or untrusted data.
- If dynamic listener registration is necessary, implement strong authentication and authorization checks.
- Consider a whitelist approach for allowed event listeners, if feasible.
Threat: View Helper Code Injection
-
Threat: View Helper Code Injection
- Description: If custom view helpers are improperly implemented or loaded from untrusted sources, an attacker might be able to inject malicious code into the view rendering process. This is less common but can occur if view helper loading is dynamic or based on user input. This directly targets Laminas's view layer.
- Impact: Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities, data leakage, or potentially arbitrary code execution within the view rendering context.
- Affected Component:
Laminas\View\HelperPluginManager
, Custom view helper classes. - Risk Severity: High
- Mitigation Strategies:
- Ensure view helpers are loaded from trusted directories and that file permissions are appropriately restricted.
- Avoid dynamic loading of view helpers based on user input.
- Validate and sanitize any data passed to view helpers.
- Implement strict input validation and output encoding within view helpers.