attack-tree.md

Attack Tree Analysis for laravel/framework

Objective: Compromise Laravel Application

Attack Tree Visualization

Compromise Laravel Application **[CRITICAL NODE - Root Goal]**
├─── Configuration Exploitation **[CRITICAL NODE - Configuration is Key]**
│   ├─── .env File Exposure **[HIGH-RISK PATH]** **[CRITICAL NODE - .env Exposure]**
│   │   └─── Access Sensitive Credentials (DB, API Keys, App Key)
│   │       └─── Data Breach, Account Takeover, Lateral Movement **[CRITICAL NODE - Impact of Credential Theft]**
│   ├─── Debug Mode Enabled in Production **[HIGH-RISK PATH]**
│   │   └─── Information Disclosure (Path Disclosure, Configuration Details, Stack Traces) **[CRITICAL NODE - Debug Info Leakage]**
│   ├─── Insecure APP_KEY **[HIGH-RISK PATH]** **[CRITICAL NODE - APP_KEY Security]**
│   │   └─── Session Hijacking, Data Decryption (if used for encryption)
│   │       └─── Account Takeover, Data Breach **[CRITICAL NODE - Impact of APP_KEY Compromise]**
├─── Routing and Request Handling Exploitation **[HIGH-RISK PATH - Common Web Attack Surface]**
│   ├─── Unvalidated User Input in Controllers **[HIGH-RISK PATH]** **[CRITICAL NODE - Input Validation is Crucial]**
│   │   └─── Code Injection (if input used in `eval`, `exec` - less Laravel specific but possible) **[CRITICAL NODE - Code Injection Risk]**
│   └─── Insecure Deserialization (if using `unserialize` or similar without validation - less common in core Laravel, but possible in custom code or packages) **[CRITICAL NODE - Deserialization Risk]**
│       └─── Remote Code Execution (RCE) **[CRITICAL NODE - RCE]**
│           └─── Full System Compromise **[CRITICAL NODE - Full Compromise]**
├─── Blade Templating Engine Exploitation **[HIGH-RISK PATH - View Layer Attacks]**
│   ├─── Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI) **[CRITICAL NODE - SSTI Risk]**
│   │   └─── Remote Code Execution (RCE) (if user input directly rendered in Blade without proper escaping) **[CRITICAL NODE - RCE via SSTI]**
│   ├─── Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) via Blade **[HIGH-RISK PATH]** **[CRITICAL NODE - XSS Risk]**
├─── Eloquent ORM Exploitation (Misuse leading to vulnerabilities) **[HIGH-RISK PATH - Data Layer Attacks]**
│   ├─── Insecure Query Building (Raw Queries without Parameter Binding) **[HIGH-RISK PATH]** **[CRITICAL NODE - SQL Injection Risk]**
│   │   └─── SQL Injection **[CRITICAL NODE - SQL Injection]**
│   │       └─── Data Breach, Data Manipulation, Authentication Bypass **[CRITICAL NODE - Impact of SQLi]**
│   ├─── Mass Assignment Vulnerability **[HIGH-RISK PATH]**
├─── Authentication and Authorization Weaknesses **[HIGH-RISK PATH - Access Control Failures]**
│   ├─── Default Authentication Setup Vulnerabilities **[HIGH-RISK PATH]**
│   ├─── Insecure Password Reset Mechanism **[HIGH-RISK PATH]**
├─── Vulnerable Dependencies (Indirect Framework Risk - Ecosystem related) **[HIGH-RISK PATH - Supply Chain Risk]** **[CRITICAL NODE - Dependency Management]**
│   ├─── Outdated Laravel Framework Version **[HIGH-RISK PATH]** **[CRITICAL NODE - Framework Update]**
│   │   └─── Exploiting Known Framework Vulnerabilities **[CRITICAL NODE - Known Vulnerabilities]**
│   │       └─── Varies depending on vulnerability - RCE, XSS, etc. **[CRITICAL NODE - Impact of Known Vulns]**
│   ├─── Vulnerable Laravel Packages (Third-party) **[HIGH-RISK PATH]** **[CRITICAL NODE - Package Vulnerabilities]**
│   │   └─── Exploiting Vulnerabilities in Packages used by the Application **[CRITICAL NODE - Package Vuln Exploitation]**
│   │       └─── Varies depending on package vulnerability - RCE, SQLi, etc. **[CRITICAL NODE - Impact of Package Vulns]**
├─── Artisan Console Misuse (Less direct web attack vector, but potential if exposed)
│   ├─── Unsecured Artisan Routes (if accidentally exposed via web) **[CRITICAL NODE - Artisan Exposure Risk]**
│   │   └─── Arbitrary Command Execution **[CRITICAL NODE - Arbitrary Command Execution]**

Attack Tree Path: .env File Exposure [CRITICAL NODE - .env Exposure]

• Attack Vector: Attacker gains access to the .env file, typically due to web server misconfiguration or directory traversal vulnerabilities.
• Potential Impact: Exposure of sensitive credentials like database passwords, API keys, and the APP_KEY. This can lead to full data breach, account takeover, and lateral movement within connected systems.
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Ensure .env file is not web-accessible through web server configuration.
  • Use environment variables in production deployments for enhanced security.
  • Regularly review and rotate sensitive credentials.

Attack Tree Path: Debug Mode Enabled in Production [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE - Debug Info Leakage]

• Attack Vector: Application is mistakenly deployed with APP_DEBUG=true in the .env file.
• Potential Impact: Information disclosure including path disclosure, configuration details, and stack traces. This aids attackers in reconnaissance and identifying further vulnerabilities.
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • NEVER enable debug mode (APP_DEBUG=false) in production.
  • Use separate environments (development, staging, production) with appropriate debug settings.

Attack Tree Path: Insecure APP_KEY [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE - APP_KEY Security]

• Attack Vector: Using a weak or default APP_KEY, or if the APP_KEY is compromised.
• Potential Impact: Session hijacking, decryption of encrypted data (if used), and potentially CSRF token bypass in older Laravel versions. Leads to account takeover and data breach.
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Generate a strong, unique APP_KEY during installation using php artisan key:generate.
  • Keep the APP_KEY secret and secure; do not commit it to version control.
  • Rotate the APP_KEY if compromise is suspected.

Attack Tree Path: Unvalidated User Input in Controllers [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE - Input Validation is Crucial]

• Attack Vector: User-provided input is not properly validated and sanitized in controllers before being used in application logic or database queries.
• Potential Impact: Code injection (if input used in unsafe functions), logic bugs, application errors, DoS, data corruption, and unintended behavior.
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Validate ALL user input using Laravel's validation rules.
  • Sanitize user input before using it in database queries, views, or sensitive operations.
  • Avoid using unsafe functions like eval, exec, unserialize with user-controlled input.

Attack Tree Path: Insecure Deserialization [CRITICAL NODE - Deserialization Risk] -> RCE [CRITICAL NODE - RCE] -> Full System Compromise [CRITICAL NODE - Full Compromise]

• Attack Vector: Application uses unserialize or similar functions on untrusted data without proper validation.
• Potential Impact: Remote Code Execution (RCE), leading to full system compromise.
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Avoid using unserialize or other insecure deserialization functions with untrusted input.
  • If deserialization is necessary, use secure formats like JSON and validate data structure and content after deserialization.

Attack Tree Path: Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI) [CRITICAL NODE - SSTI Risk] -> RCE via SSTI [CRITICAL NODE - RCE via SSTI]

• Attack Vector: User input is directly rendered in Blade templates without proper escaping, allowing injection of template directives.
• Potential Impact: Remote Code Execution (RCE), leading to full system compromise.
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Always use Blade's escaping mechanisms ({{ $variable }}) to prevent XSS and SSTI.
  • Use raw output ({!! $variable !!}) only when explicitly needed and data source is absolutely trusted.
  • Never directly render user-controlled input as raw Blade code.

Attack Tree Path: Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) via Blade [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE - XSS Risk]

• Attack Vector: Improper escaping of user input in Blade templates allows injection of malicious JavaScript code.
• Potential Impact: Client-side attacks, session hijacking, account takeover, data breach, and reputation damage.
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Use Blade's default escaping ({{ $variable }}) for all user-provided data in views.
  • Be cautious with raw output ({!! $variable !!}) and sanitize data before rendering if used.
  • Implement Content Security Policy (CSP) to further mitigate XSS risks.

Attack Tree Path: Insecure Query Building (Raw Queries without Parameter Binding) [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE - SQL Injection Risk] -> SQL Injection [CRITICAL NODE - SQL Injection] -> Impact of SQLi [CRITICAL NODE - Impact of SQLi]

• Attack Vector: Using raw database queries without proper parameter binding, leading to SQL injection vulnerabilities.
• Potential Impact: SQL Injection, leading to data breach, data manipulation, and authentication bypass.
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Always use Eloquent's query builder or parameter binding when constructing database queries, especially with user input.
  • Avoid using raw queries (DB::raw()) unless absolutely necessary and ensure proper sanitization and parameterization.

Attack Tree Path: Mass Assignment Vulnerability [HIGH-RISK PATH]

• Attack Vector: Exploiting mass assignment to modify unintended model attributes by sending extra parameters in requests.
• Potential Impact: Data manipulation, privilege escalation (e.g., setting admin flags), data breach, and account takeover.
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Use $fillable or $guarded properties in Eloquent models to control mass-assignable attributes.
  • Be explicit about updated attributes in controllers, avoiding request->all() for updates.

Attack Tree Path: Default Authentication Setup Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK PATH]

• Attack Vector: Exploiting weaknesses in default authentication setups if not customized securely, such as predictable usernames or weak passwords.
• Potential Impact: Account takeover.
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Customize the default authentication setup. Change default usernames if applicable.
  • Enforce strong password policies using Laravel's validation rules.
  • Implement multi-factor authentication (MFA) for enhanced security.

Attack Tree Path: Insecure Password Reset Mechanism [HIGH-RISK PATH]

• Attack Vector: Exploiting flaws in the password reset process, such as predictable reset tokens, lack of rate limiting, or insecure token delivery.
• Potential Impact: Account takeover.
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Use Laravel's built-in password reset features securely.
  • Implement rate limiting on password reset requests.
  • Ensure password reset tokens are unpredictable and expire quickly.
  • Use HTTPS for password reset links.

Attack Tree Path: Outdated Laravel Framework Version [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE - Framework Update] -> Exploiting Known Framework Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE - Known Vulnerabilities] -> Impact of Known Vulns [CRITICAL NODE - Impact of Known Vulns]

• Attack Vector: Exploiting publicly known vulnerabilities in older, outdated versions of the Laravel framework.
• Potential Impact: Varies depending on the vulnerability, ranging from XSS to RCE, potentially leading to full system compromise.
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Keep the Laravel framework updated to the latest stable version.
  • Regularly check for and apply security updates promptly.
  • Monitor Laravel security advisories.

Attack Tree Path: Vulnerable Laravel Packages (Third-party) [HIGH-RISK PATH] [CRITICAL NODE - Package Vulnerabilities] -> Exploiting Vulnerabilities in Packages [CRITICAL NODE - Package Vuln Exploitation] -> Impact of Package Vulns [CRITICAL NODE - Impact of Package Vulns]

• Attack Vector: Exploiting vulnerabilities in third-party Laravel packages used by the application.
• Potential Impact: Varies depending on the package vulnerability, ranging from SQL Injection to RCE, potentially leading to full system compromise.
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Regularly audit and update Laravel packages using composer outdated.
  • Monitor security advisories for Laravel packages.
  • Choose reputable and well-maintained packages.
  • Consider using dependency vulnerability scanning tools.

Attack Tree Path: Unsecured Artisan Routes [CRITICAL NODE - Artisan Exposure Risk] -> Arbitrary Command Execution [CRITICAL NODE - Arbitrary Command Execution]

• Attack Vector: Accidental exposure of Artisan console routes via the web, often in development or misconfigured environments.
• Potential Impact: Arbitrary command execution on the server, leading to full system compromise.
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • NEVER expose Artisan console routes to the public web in production.
  • Disable or protect Artisan routes in non-development environments.