threat-modeling.md

Threat Model Analysis for laravel/framework

Threat: Sensitive Configuration Exposure

• Threat: Sensitive Configuration Exposure

  • Description: An attacker gains access to the .env file or configuration files within the config/ directory. They might achieve this through directory traversal vulnerabilities, misconfigured web server permissions (allowing direct access to these files), or by finding the .env file accidentally committed to a public source code repository. The attacker then extracts database credentials, API keys, application secrets, and other sensitive information. This is framework-specific because Laravel relies heavily on these configuration files.
  • Impact: Complete application compromise. The attacker can access and modify the database, impersonate users, interact with external services using stolen API keys, and potentially gain control of the server.
  • Affected Component: .env file, config/* files, Web Server Configuration (Apache, Nginx) interacting with Laravel's file structure.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Never commit .env to version control; use .env.example as a template.
    • Configure the web server to deny direct access to .env and the config/ directory.
    • Use environment variables directly on the production server (preferred over .env).
    • Implement a secrets management solution (e.g., HashiCorp Vault, AWS Secrets Manager).
    • Regularly audit server configurations and file permissions.

Threat: Weak Application Key Compromise

• Threat: Weak Application Key Compromise

  • Description: An attacker obtains the APP_KEY, either through configuration exposure (see above) or by exploiting a vulnerability that allows them to read server memory. With the APP_KEY, the attacker can decrypt encrypted data (like cookies, session data, and potentially data stored in the database if encrypted using Laravel's encryption features), forge valid session cookies to impersonate users, and potentially decrypt other sensitive information. This is framework-specific because the APP_KEY is central to Laravel's encryption and session management.
  • Impact: Data breach, user impersonation, potential for further attacks. The attacker can access sensitive user data and perform actions on behalf of legitimate users.
  • Affected Component: APP_KEY setting in .env and config/app.php, Laravel's Encryption and Session Management components.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Generate a strong, random APP_KEY using php artisan key:generate.
    • Store the APP_KEY securely, outside the codebase (environment variables or secrets manager).
    • Implement a key rotation policy with a secure procedure for handling existing encrypted data.

Threat: Mass Assignment Exploitation

• Threat: Mass Assignment Exploitation

  • Description: An attacker crafts a malicious HTTP request that includes unexpected parameters. Because the Eloquent model lacks proper $fillable or $guarded definitions, the attacker can modify attributes they shouldn't have access to. For example, they might change their user role from "user" to "admin," bypass price validation during a purchase, or modify other sensitive data. This is framework-specific due to Laravel's Eloquent ORM and its mass assignment features.
  • Impact: Unauthorized data modification, privilege escalation, potential for financial fraud or data corruption.
  • Affected Component: Eloquent Models (lack of $fillable or $guarded), Controller logic handling user input within the Laravel framework.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Always define either $fillable (whitelist) or $guarded (blacklist) on all Eloquent models. Prefer $fillable.
    • Use Laravel's Form Requests for validation and to explicitly define allowed fields.
    • Avoid using Model::create($request->all()) or Model::update($request->all()) without proper guarding.
    • Validate all user input thoroughly, even when using framework features.

Threat: Insecure File Upload Exploitation

• Threat: Insecure File Upload Exploitation

  • Description: An attacker uploads a malicious file (e.g., a PHP script disguised as an image) to the server. Due to misconfigured filesystem settings (e.g., using the public disk with overly permissive permissions) or lack of file validation, the attacker can then access and execute the uploaded file, gaining control of the application or server. This is framework-specific due to Laravel's Storage facade and filesystem configuration.
  • Impact: Remote code execution, complete application compromise, potential server compromise.
  • Affected Component: Laravel's Storage facade, Filesystem configuration (config/filesystems.php), File upload handling logic in controllers interacting with the framework.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Carefully configure filesystem disks, especially public, with appropriate permissions.
    • Validate file types, sizes, and contents before storing them using Laravel's validation rules.
    • Store uploaded files outside the web root whenever possible.
    • Use a dedicated storage service (e.g., AWS S3) with proper security configurations, integrated with Laravel's filesystem.
    • Rename uploaded files to prevent direct access via predictable URLs, leveraging Laravel's file handling capabilities.

Threat: Route Model Binding Authorization Bypass

• Threat: Route Model Binding Authorization Bypass

  • Description: An attacker manipulates the URL to access a resource (e.g., a specific user's profile) they shouldn't have access to. Route Model Binding automatically resolves the model based on the URL parameter, but the application fails to check if the authenticated user is authorized to view that specific model instance. This is framework-specific because it leverages Laravel's Route Model Binding feature.
  • Impact: Unauthorized data access, information disclosure.
  • Affected Component: Laravel's Route Model Binding, Controller logic, Laravel's Authorization mechanisms (Policies, Gates).
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Implement authorization checks within the controller or middleware, even when using Route Model Binding.
    • Use Laravel Policies to define access rules for models.
    • Ensure that authorization logic is consistently applied across all relevant routes, leveraging Laravel's middleware.

Threat: Misuse of Queues and Scheduled Tasks

• Threat: Misuse of Queues and Scheduled Tasks

  • Description: An attacker gains the ability to inject malicious jobs into the application's queue or manipulate scheduled tasks. This could be achieved through vulnerabilities in the application's input validation, compromised queue credentials, or exploiting vulnerabilities in the queue worker environment. The attacker's malicious jobs could then perform unauthorized actions. This is framework-specific because it leverages Laravel's Queue and Task Scheduling system.
  • Impact: Data breach, system compromise, denial of service.
  • Affected Component: Laravel's Queue system (e.g., Redis, database, Beanstalkd), app/Console/Kernel.php (scheduled tasks), Jobs (app/Jobs).
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Secure queue connections (e.g., use Redis with authentication and TLS) as configured for Laravel.
    • Validate and sanitize all data passed to queued jobs, using Laravel's validation features.
    • Monitor queue activity for suspicious behavior.
    • Limit the privileges of queue workers to the minimum required.
    • Ensure scheduled tasks are properly authenticated and authorized (if they interact with sensitive data or systems), using Laravel's authentication and authorization.
    • Regularly review and audit scheduled tasks defined within Laravel.
    • Use signed jobs if supported by the Laravel queue driver.