attack-tree.md

Attack Tree Analysis for magento/magento2

Objective: Compromise Magento 2 Application to Gain Control and Access Sensitive Data.

Attack Tree Visualization

Compromise Magento 2 Application (CRITICAL NODE) ├── Exploit Magento 2 Core Vulnerabilities (CRITICAL NODE) │ ├── Exploit Known Magento 2 Vulnerabilities (CRITICAL NODE) │ │ ├── Remote Code Execution (RCE) Vulnerabilities (CRITICAL NODE) │ │ │ └── Unauthenticated RCE (CRITICAL NODE) │ │ ├── Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Vulnerabilities │ │ │ └── Stored XSS │ │ └── SQL Injection (SQLi) Vulnerabilities (CRITICAL NODE) │ │ └── SQLi in Magento Core Queries ├── Exploit Magento 2 Extension/Theme Vulnerabilities (CRITICAL NODE) │ └── Exploit Vulnerable Third-Party Extensions (CRITICAL NODE) │ └── Known Extension Vulnerabilities (CRITICAL NODE) ├── Exploit Magento 2 Configuration Weaknesses (CRITICAL NODE) │ ├── Insecure Admin Panel Configuration (CRITICAL NODE) │ │ ├── Brute-force/Dictionary Attack on Admin Credentials │ │ └── Publicly Exposed Admin Panel (CRITICAL NODE) │ ├── Unpatched Magento 2 Installation (CRITICAL NODE) │ │ └── Exploit Outdated Magento Versions (CRITICAL NODE) │ ├── Insecure File Permissions and Configurations (CRITICAL NODE) │ │ └── Web Server Writable Sensitive Files │ └── Insecure API Configurations (CRITICAL NODE) │ └── Publicly Accessible APIs without Authentication

Attack Tree Path: Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution (RCE)

• Attack Vector: Exploiting a known vulnerability in the Magento 2 core code that allows an attacker to execute arbitrary code on the server without needing to authenticate.
• How it works:
  • Attacker identifies a publicly disclosed RCE vulnerability in a specific Magento 2 version.
  • They craft a malicious request targeting the vulnerable endpoint or functionality. This request could be through HTTP, API calls, or other exposed interfaces.
  • The malicious request exploits the vulnerability, allowing the attacker to inject and execute code on the Magento server.
  • This could involve techniques like:
    • Insecure deserialization of PHP objects.
    • File upload vulnerabilities allowing execution of uploaded files.
    • Exploiting flaws in input validation or sanitization in core functionalities.
• Impact: Full compromise of the Magento 2 server, allowing the attacker to:
  • Steal sensitive data (customer data, financial information, admin credentials).
  • Modify website content and functionality.
  • Install backdoors for persistent access.
  • Use the server for further attacks.

Attack Tree Path: Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)

• Attack Vector: Injecting malicious JavaScript code into data stored within the Magento 2 application (e.g., database), which is then executed in the browsers of users who view this data.
• How it works:
  • Attacker finds input fields or functionalities where user-supplied data is stored and displayed without proper sanitization. Common areas include:
    • Product descriptions.
    • Customer reviews.
    • CMS blocks.
    • Admin configurations (e.g., email templates).
  • Attacker injects malicious JavaScript code into these fields.
  • When other users (including admins or customers) view pages containing this stored data, the malicious JavaScript code is executed in their browsers.
• Impact:
  • Account takeover (stealing session cookies, credentials).
  • Redirection to malicious websites.
  • Defacement of website content.
  • Information theft from the user's browser.
  • Spreading malware to users.

Attack Tree Path: SQL Injection (SQLi) in Magento Core Queries

• Attack Vector: Exploiting vulnerabilities in Magento 2 core code where user-supplied input is directly incorporated into SQL queries without proper sanitization, allowing the attacker to manipulate the database queries.
• How it works:
  • Attacker identifies input parameters (e.g., search terms, product filters, URL parameters) that are used in SQL queries within Magento core functionalities.
  • They craft malicious input containing SQL syntax to modify the intended query logic.
  • Magento executes the modified SQL query, which can allow the attacker to:
    • Bypass authentication and authorization.
    • Extract sensitive data from the database (customer data, admin credentials, financial information).
    • Modify or delete data in the database.
    • In some cases, even execute operating system commands on the database server (depending on database server configuration).
• Impact:
  • Database compromise and data breach.
  • Loss of data integrity.
  • Potential full system compromise if database access is further exploited.

Attack Tree Path: Known Extension Vulnerabilities

• Attack Vector: Exploiting publicly disclosed vulnerabilities in third-party Magento 2 extensions that are installed on the application.
• How it works:
  • Attacker identifies installed third-party extensions on the target Magento 2 application (often through publicly accessible information or fingerprinting techniques).
  • They research known vulnerabilities for these specific extensions and versions. Public databases and security advisories are common sources.
  • If a vulnerable extension is found, the attacker uses available exploits or crafts their own to target the vulnerability.
  • Extension vulnerabilities can range from simple XSS to critical RCE or SQLi, depending on the nature of the flaw in the extension's code.
• Impact: Impact depends on the type of vulnerability in the extension, but can range from:
  • XSS and client-side attacks.
  • Information disclosure.
  • SQL Injection and database compromise.
  • Remote Code Execution and full system compromise.

Attack Tree Path: Brute-force/Dictionary Attack on Admin Credentials

• Attack Vector: Attempting to guess admin panel login credentials by systematically trying a large number of possible usernames and passwords.
• How it works:
  • Attacker targets the Magento 2 admin panel login page.
  • They use automated tools to try a list of common usernames and passwords (dictionary attack) or systematically try all combinations of characters within a certain length (brute-force attack).
  • If weak passwords are used or if there are no account lockout mechanisms, the attacker may successfully guess valid admin credentials.
• Impact: Gain access to the Magento 2 admin panel, allowing the attacker to:
  • Full control over the Magento store and its data.
  • Modify website content and functionality.
  • Access and steal sensitive data.
  • Install malicious extensions or code.
  • Create new admin accounts for persistent access.

Attack Tree Path: Publicly Exposed Admin Panel

• Attack Vector: The Magento 2 admin panel is accessible directly from the public internet without any access restrictions (e.g., IP whitelisting, VPN).
• How it works:
  • Attacker simply accesses the admin panel URL (often /admin or a custom admin path if known) from the public internet.
  • Because the admin panel is publicly accessible, it becomes a target for all types of attacks, including:
    • Brute-force attacks on admin credentials.
    • Exploiting authentication bypass vulnerabilities.
    • Targeting known vulnerabilities in the admin panel itself.
• Impact: Significantly increases the attack surface of the Magento 2 application, making all admin panel related attacks much easier to perform.

Attack Tree Path: Exploit Outdated Magento Versions

• Attack Vector: Targeting a Magento 2 installation that is running an outdated version and has not been patched for known security vulnerabilities.
• How it works:
  • Attacker identifies the Magento 2 version of the target application (often through website fingerprinting or error messages).
  • They check public vulnerability databases and security advisories for known vulnerabilities affecting that specific Magento version.
  • If known vulnerabilities exist, the attacker uses readily available exploits or crafts their own to target these vulnerabilities.
• Impact: Impact depends on the specific vulnerabilities present in the outdated version, but can range from:
  • Information disclosure.
  • XSS and client-side attacks.
  • SQL Injection and database compromise.
  • Remote Code Execution and full system compromise.

Attack Tree Path: Web Server Writable Sensitive Files

• Attack Vector: Exploiting misconfigured file permissions that allow the web server user to write to sensitive files within the Magento 2 installation directory.
• How it works:
  • Attacker identifies files or directories within the Magento 2 installation that are writable by the web server user (e.g., www-data, apache, nginx).
  • Sensitive files that are often targeted include:
    • Configuration files (env.php, config.php).
    • PHP files (for code injection).
    • Web server configuration files (if accessible).
  • Attacker exploits this write access to:
    • Modify configuration files to gain access or change application behavior.
    • Inject malicious PHP code into existing PHP files or create new malicious PHP files for execution.
• Impact:
  • Code injection and Remote Code Execution.
  • Disclosure of sensitive configuration data (credentials, API keys).
  • Full compromise of the Magento 2 application.

Attack Tree Path: Publicly Accessible APIs without Authentication

• Attack Vector: Exploiting Magento 2 APIs that are exposed to the public internet without proper authentication or authorization mechanisms.
• How it works:
  • Attacker identifies publicly accessible Magento 2 APIs (e.g., REST or GraphQL endpoints).
  • They analyze these APIs to understand their functionalities and identify any lack of authentication or authorization checks.
  • If APIs are insecurely configured, the attacker can:
    • Access sensitive data through the APIs without proper credentials.
    • Perform unauthorized actions through the APIs (e.g., modify data, place orders, delete records).
    • Potentially exploit vulnerabilities within the API endpoints themselves.
• Impact:
  • Data breaches through unauthorized API access.
  • Unauthorized modification or deletion of data.
  • Abuse of API functionalities for malicious purposes.
  • Potential for further exploitation if API vulnerabilities exist.