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Attack Surface Analysis for matomo-org/matomo

Attack Surface: Unvalidated URL Parameters (XSS & Injection)

  • Description: Attackers can manipulate URL parameters to inject malicious code (e.g., JavaScript for XSS, SQL for SQL injection if parameters are used in database queries) or trigger unintended application behavior.
  • Matomo Contribution: Matomo heavily relies on URL parameters for tracking, reporting, and API interactions. Many functionalities are accessed and controlled through URL parameters, making it a core part of Matomo's design and thus a direct contributor to this attack surface.
  • Example: A crafted URL with malicious JavaScript in a parameter intended for a report title could be used to execute XSS when the report is viewed by another user. Alternatively, a parameter used in an API call could be manipulated to inject SQL if not properly sanitized before database interaction.
  • Impact:
    • XSS: Account compromise, data theft, website defacement, redirection to malicious sites.
    • SQL Injection: Data breach, data manipulation, complete database compromise, potential server takeover.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Input Validation: Strictly validate all URL parameters on the server-side within Matomo's codebase. Use whitelisting to allow only expected characters and formats. This needs to be implemented in Matomo's parameter handling logic.
    • Output Encoding: Encode output when displaying data derived from URL parameters in web pages to prevent XSS. Matomo's templating engine and output mechanisms should be configured to automatically encode output.
    • Parameterized Queries/ORMs: Use parameterized queries or Object-Relational Mappers (ORMs) within Matomo's database interaction layer to prevent SQL injection. Avoid constructing SQL queries by directly concatenating user input in Matomo's code.
    • Security Audits & Penetration Testing: Regularly audit Matomo's code and perform penetration testing specifically targeting parameter handling vulnerabilities within Matomo.

Attack Surface: User-Provided Data in Settings & Reports (Injection & File Upload)

  • Description: Input fields within Matomo's administrative interface, used for settings, report customization, or file uploads, can be exploited for injection attacks or malicious file uploads if not properly handled.
  • Matomo Contribution: Matomo provides numerous configuration options and report customization features directly within its application interface that rely on user input. It also may allow file uploads for features like GeoIP database updates or custom plugins, all features implemented by Matomo.
  • Example:
    • An administrator could inject malicious JavaScript into a custom report name field within Matomo, leading to XSS when other users view the report.
    • An attacker could upload a PHP shell disguised as a legitimate file through a Matomo file upload feature if file upload validation within Matomo is insufficient, potentially gaining remote code execution.
  • Impact:
    • Injection (XSS, SQL, Command): Account compromise, data theft, website defacement, server compromise.
    • Malicious File Upload: Remote code execution, server takeover, data breach.
  • Risk Severity: High (especially if file upload functionality is present and not secured within Matomo).
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Input Validation & Sanitization: Validate and sanitize all user input received through forms and file uploads within Matomo's input processing functions. Use whitelisting and appropriate sanitization functions based on the expected data type and context in Matomo's code.
    • Output Encoding: Encode user-provided data when displaying it in web pages within Matomo's views to prevent XSS.
    • Secure File Upload Handling:
      • Validate file types and extensions rigorously (server-side validation implemented in Matomo).
      • Store uploaded files outside the web root (Matomo's file storage mechanisms should enforce this).
      • Rename uploaded files to prevent predictable filenames and potential directory traversal attacks (Matomo should handle file renaming).
      • Implement file size limits (configured within Matomo).
      • Consider using virus scanning on uploaded files (integration point for Matomo to potentially include).
    • Principle of Least Privilege: Grant users only the necessary permissions within Matomo's user management system to configure settings and create reports.

Attack Surface: API Input Vulnerabilities (Injection & Authorization)

  • Description: Matomo's API endpoints, which accept data and commands via HTTP requests, are vulnerable to injection attacks and authorization bypass if input validation and access controls are insufficient.
  • Matomo Contribution: Matomo exposes a comprehensive API for data retrieval, reporting, and administration. This API is a core component of Matomo, designed and implemented by the Matomo team, making API security directly attributable to Matomo.
  • Example:
    • An attacker could inject SQL code into an API parameter intended for filtering report data, leading to unauthorized data access or modification through Matomo's API.
    • An API endpoint intended for administrators only might be accessible to lower-privileged users due to authorization flaws in Matomo's API access control.
  • Impact:
    • Injection (XSS, SQL, Command): Data breach, data manipulation, server compromise, unauthorized access.
    • Authorization Bypass: Unauthorized access to sensitive data or administrative functions, privilege escalation within Matomo.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • API Input Validation: Thoroughly validate all API request parameters and data payloads within Matomo's API request handling logic. Use schema validation and input sanitization in Matomo's API code.
    • API Authentication & Authorization: Implement robust API authentication mechanisms (e.g., API keys, OAuth 2.0) within Matomo's API framework. Enforce strict authorization checks on all API endpoints within Matomo's API code to ensure only authorized users can access specific resources and actions.
    • Rate Limiting & Abuse Prevention: Implement rate limiting within Matomo's API infrastructure to prevent API abuse and denial-of-service attacks.
    • API Security Audits: Regularly audit Matomo's API endpoints for security vulnerabilities and authorization flaws.

Attack Surface: Plugin Vulnerabilities (Code Execution & Data Access)

  • Description: Third-party plugins for Matomo can introduce vulnerabilities if they contain security flaws. These vulnerabilities can be exploited to compromise the Matomo instance.
  • Matomo Contribution: Matomo's plugin architecture, while designed for extensibility, inherently introduces an attack surface through third-party code. Matomo's design decision to allow plugins directly contributes to this risk.
  • Example: A poorly coded plugin for Matomo might contain an XSS vulnerability, allowing attackers to inject malicious JavaScript into Matomo. Another plugin might have an SQL injection vulnerability, leading to database compromise of Matomo's database. A malicious plugin could be designed to steal data from or gain control of the Matomo instance.
  • Impact:
    • Code Execution: Remote code execution on the server running Matomo, server takeover.
    • Data Breach: Access to sensitive analytics data, user credentials, and other stored information within Matomo.
    • Denial of Service: Plugin vulnerabilities could lead to Matomo application crashes or performance degradation.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Plugin Security Audits: Carefully vet and audit plugins before installation in Matomo. Prefer plugins from trusted sources and with good security reputations.
    • Minimize Plugin Usage: Install only necessary plugins in Matomo to reduce the attack surface.
    • Keep Plugins Updated: Regularly update plugins to the latest versions to patch known vulnerabilities. Matomo's plugin update mechanism should be used.
    • Plugin Isolation (if available): Explore if Matomo offers any mechanisms to isolate plugins from the core application to limit the impact of plugin vulnerabilities.
    • Security Monitoring: Monitor Matomo logs and system activity for suspicious behavior that might indicate plugin exploitation.

Attack Surface: Insecure Deserialization (if applicable in Matomo's dependencies)

  • Description: If Matomo or its dependencies use object serialization and deserialization, vulnerabilities can arise if untrusted data is deserialized. This can lead to remote code execution.
  • Matomo Contribution: If Matomo's codebase or its chosen PHP libraries and frameworks are vulnerable to insecure deserialization, this becomes a direct attack surface of Matomo. Matomo's dependency choices and coding practices contribute to this risk.
  • Example: An attacker could craft a malicious serialized object and provide it as input to Matomo (e.g., via a URL parameter or API request) if Matomo's application deserializes data without proper validation. Deserialization of this object within Matomo's code could trigger arbitrary code execution on the server.
  • Impact: Remote Code Execution: Complete server takeover.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Avoid Deserialization of Untrusted Data: Ideally, Matomo's developers should avoid deserializing untrusted data in their code.
    • Input Validation: If deserialization is necessary in Matomo, rigorously validate the input data before deserialization within Matomo's code.
    • Use Secure Serialization Libraries: If possible, Matomo's developers should use secure serialization libraries that are less prone to deserialization vulnerabilities.
    • Regular Dependency Updates: Matomo's development team must keep all PHP libraries and frameworks up-to-date to patch known deserialization vulnerabilities.
    • Web Application Firewalls (WAFs): WAFs can sometimes detect and block attempts to exploit deserialization vulnerabilities targeting Matomo.