Mitigation Strategy: Strict Input Validation (Whitelisting)
- Define Allowed Characters: Create a regular expression that precisely defines the allowed characters and structure of a valid cron expression for your application. Start with a very restrictive regex and only add what's absolutely necessary. Example (adjust to your needs!):
var validCronRegex = regexp.MustCompile(`^(\*|\d+(-\d+)?(,\d+(-\d+)?)*)(/\d+)? (\*|\d+(-\d+)?(,\d+(-\d+)?)*)(/\d+)? (\*|\d+(-\d+)?(,\d+(-\d+)?)*)(/\d+)? (\*|\d+(-\d+)?(,\d+(-\d+)?)*)(/\d+)? (\*|\d+(-\d+)?(,\d+(-\d+)?)*)(/\d+)?$`);
- Validate Before Parsing: Before calling
cron.Parse()
, use thevalidCronRegex.MatchString(inputString)
function to check if the input cron expression matches the allowed pattern. - Reject Invalid Input: If the input does not match the regex, immediately reject it. Do not attempt to sanitize or modify the input. Return a clear error message (e.g., "Invalid cron expression format").
- Additional Range Checks (Optional but Recommended): After the regex match, perform additional checks to ensure that the numerical values within each field are within the allowed ranges (e.g., minutes: 0-59, hours: 0-23, etc.). This adds another layer of validation.
- Whitelist specific non-standard descriptors: If you use non-standard descriptors, create a list of allowed descriptors.
-
Threats Mitigated:
- Denial of Service (DoS) via Complex Expressions (High Severity): Maliciously crafted, overly complex cron expressions can cause excessive CPU and memory consumption during parsing, leading to a denial-of-service attack. Strict validation prevents these complex expressions from being processed.
- Unexpected Behavior (Medium Severity): Invalid or unexpected cron expressions could lead to the scheduler running tasks at unintended times or with unintended frequencies. Validation ensures only expected expressions are used.
- (Low Probability, but possible) Code Execution via Unsafe Output Handling (Critical Severity): If the output of the cron library (calculated dates) is used unsafely (e.g., in shell commands without escaping), a carefully crafted input could (though unlikely with this specific library) influence the output in a way that leads to code execution. Strict input validation minimizes the attack surface.
-
Impact:
- DoS: Significantly reduces the risk of DoS attacks caused by malicious cron expressions. The risk is reduced from high to low.
- Unexpected Behavior: Eliminates the risk of unexpected behavior due to invalid input. The risk is reduced from medium to negligible.
- Code Execution: Indirectly reduces the risk by limiting the potential for manipulated output. The risk is reduced from low probability to extremely low probability.
-
Currently Implemented:
- Basic regex validation is implemented in the
validateCronExpression
function inutils/cron_validator.go
. - This function is called before parsing any cron expression received from user input in the
api/schedule_task.go
endpoint.
- Basic regex validation is implemented in the
-
Missing Implementation:
- The
config/scheduler_config.go
file reads cron expressions from a configuration file. No validation is currently performed on these expressions. This is a potential vulnerability if the configuration file can be tampered with. - Range checks (e.g., ensuring minutes are between 0-59) are not currently implemented.
- Non-standard descriptors are not explicitly whitelisted.
- The
Mitigation Strategy: Resource Limitation (Timeout and Iteration Limit)
- Context with Timeout for Parsing: Wrap all calls to
cron.Parse()
within acontext.WithTimeout()
. This sets a maximum time limit for the parsing operation.ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 5*time.Second) // Example: 5 seconds defer cancel() expr, err := cron.Parse(expression, cron.WithContext(ctx))
- Context with Timeout for Date Calculation: Similarly, wrap calls to
GetNext()
,GetPrev()
, and any other methods that calculate dates with acontext.WithTimeout()
. ```go ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 2*time.Second) // Example: 2 seconds defer cancel() nextTime := expr.Next(currentTime, cron.WithContext(ctx)) - Iteration Limit: When calling
GetNext()
orGetPrev()
repeatedly (e.g., to get multiple future execution times), implement a maximum iteration count to prevent infinite loops or excessively long calculations.maxIterations := 100 for i := 0; i < maxIterations; i++ { // ... get next execution time with timeout ... }
- Choose Appropriate Timeout Values: The timeout values (e.g., 5 seconds, 2 seconds) should be chosen based on the expected complexity of the cron expressions and the performance characteristics of your system. Start with relatively short timeouts and adjust as needed.
-
Threats Mitigated:
- Denial of Service (DoS) via Long-Running Calculations (High Severity): Malicious expressions could be designed to cause extremely long calculation times for
GetNext()
orGetPrev()
, tying up resources. Timeouts prevent these calculations from running indefinitely. - Denial of Service (DoS) via Infinite Loops (High Severity): Certain expressions might lead to infinite loops when calculating future times. The iteration limit prevents this.
- Denial of Service (DoS) via Long-Running Calculations (High Severity): Malicious expressions could be designed to cause extremely long calculation times for
-
Impact:
- DoS (Long-Running Calculations): Significantly reduces the risk of DoS by limiting the execution time of date calculations. Risk reduced from high to low.
- DoS (Infinite Loops): Eliminates the risk of DoS due to infinite loops. Risk reduced from high to negligible.
-
Currently Implemented:
- Timeouts are implemented for
cron.Parse()
calls inapi/schedule_task.go
.
- Timeouts are implemented for
-
Missing Implementation:
- Timeouts are not consistently implemented for
GetNext()
andGetPrev()
calls throughout the application. Specifically, thescheduler/worker.go
component, which handles the actual execution of scheduled tasks, does not use timeouts when calculating the next execution time. - An iteration limit is not implemented anywhere in the code.
- Timeouts are not consistently implemented for
Mitigation Strategy: Error Handling
-
Check for Errors: Always check the
error
return value fromcron.Parse()
and othercron-expression
functions. -
Log Detailed Errors: Log any errors, including the input cron expression that caused the error, to a secure log file. This is crucial for debugging and identifying potential attacks.
-
Generic User Messages: Do not expose internal error messages or stack traces to the user. Instead, return a generic error message, such as "Invalid input" or "An error occurred."
-
Handle Timeouts: When using contexts with timeouts, handle the
context.DeadlineExceeded
error appropriately. Log the timeout and return a suitable error message.-
Threats Mitigated:
- Information Disclosure (Medium Severity): Prevents sensitive information (e.g., internal code structure, library versions) from being leaked to attackers through error messages.
- Debugging and Auditing (Low Severity): Proper error logging facilitates debugging and auditing, making it easier to identify and fix issues, including security vulnerabilities.
-
Impact:
- Information Disclosure: Reduces the risk of information disclosure. Risk reduced from medium to low.
- Debugging and Auditing: Improves the ability to debug and audit the application.
-
Currently Implemented:
- Basic error checking is performed for
cron.Parse()
inapi/schedule_task.go
.
- Basic error checking is performed for
-
Missing Implementation:
- Error handling is inconsistent throughout the application. Some functions do not check for errors or do not log them properly.
- Error messages returned to the user are sometimes too verbose and may reveal internal details.
- Timeout errors are not always handled explicitly.
-