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Threat Model Analysis for myclabs/deepcopy

Threat: Object Injection via Unserialize

  • Description: An attacker crafts malicious serialized data and injects it into the application. If this data is then deep copied using deepcopy's default serialization mechanism (which uses unserialize()), the attacker can trigger the instantiation of arbitrary objects, potentially leading to Remote Code Execution (RCE). The attacker might achieve this by controlling input that is later deep copied, or by exploiting vulnerabilities that allow them to modify serialized data before it is deep copied.
  • Impact: Remote Code Execution (RCE), complete compromise of the server and application.
  • Affected Deepcopy Component: Default cloning strategy (using serialize() and unserialize()).
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Avoid deep copying untrusted data.
    • Implement custom cloning strategies that do not rely on serialize() and unserialize() for sensitive objects or data potentially influenced by users.
    • If serialize()/unserialize() is unavoidable, ensure that input data is strictly validated and sanitized, although this is generally not a robust defense against object injection.
    • Regularly update PHP and the deepcopy library to patch potential vulnerabilities.

Threat: CPU Resource Exhaustion through Large Object Copying

  • Description: An attacker triggers deep copies of extremely large and complex object graphs. This can consume excessive CPU resources on the server, leading to performance degradation or a complete Denial of Service (DoS). The attacker might achieve this by manipulating application logic to deep copy large datasets, or by uploading large files or data structures that are subsequently deep copied.
  • Impact: Denial of Service (DoS), application unavailability, performance degradation for legitimate users.
  • Affected Deepcopy Component: Core deep copy algorithm, especially when handling large object graphs.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Implement limits on the size and complexity of objects that can be deep copied.
    • Monitor server resource usage (CPU, memory) and implement rate limiting for deep copy operations.
    • Optimize cloning strategies for performance, potentially using shallow copies or selective property cloning where appropriate.
    • Implement timeouts for deep copy operations to prevent indefinite resource consumption.

Threat: Memory Exhaustion through Deep Object Copying

  • Description: Similar to CPU exhaustion, an attacker can trigger deep copies of very large objects, leading to excessive memory consumption. This can exhaust available server memory, causing application crashes or a Denial of Service (DoS). The attacker's methods are similar to those described in the CPU exhaustion threat.
  • Impact: Denial of Service (DoS), application crashes, instability.
  • Affected Deepcopy Component: Core deep copy algorithm, memory management during cloning.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Implement limits on the size and complexity of objects that can be deep copied.
    • Monitor server resource usage (memory) and implement resource quotas for deep copy operations.
    • Optimize cloning strategies for memory efficiency.
    • Use memory profiling tools to identify and address potential memory leaks or inefficiencies related to deep copy operations.