Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History
94 lines (82 loc) · 7.41 KB

attack-tree.md

File metadata and controls

94 lines (82 loc) · 7.41 KB

Attack Tree Analysis for nikic/fastroute

Objective: To achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) or Denial of Service (DoS) on the application by exploiting vulnerabilities within the FastRoute library or its configuration.

Attack Tree Visualization

└── 🎯 Compromise Application Using FastRoute (RCE or DoS) [CRITICAL NODE - Root Goal] └── 🌳 Exploit Route Parsing/Matching Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK PATH] ├── 💥 Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) [CRITICAL NODE] │ └── 🐞 Craft malicious URLs to trigger catastrophic backtracking in route regexes [CRITICAL NODE] │ ├── 🏹 Cause excessive CPU usage on the server [HIGH IMPACT] │ └── 🏹 Cause application to become unresponsive (DoS) [HIGH IMPACT] └── 💥 Path Traversal via Route Parameters [HIGH-RISK PATH, CRITICAL NODE - Handler Vulnerability] └── 🐞 Manipulate route parameters to access files or resources outside intended scope [CRITICAL NODE - Handler Vulnerability] ├── 🏹 Read sensitive files [HIGH IMPACT] └── 🏹 Execute arbitrary code [HIGH IMPACT]

Attack Tree Path: 1. Root Goal: 🎯 Compromise Application Using FastRoute (RCE or DoS) [CRITICAL NODE - Root Goal]

  • Attack Vector Name: Root Goal - Compromise Application
  • Vulnerability Description: This is the overarching objective of the attacker, targeting the application through vulnerabilities related to FastRoute.
  • Exploitation Method: Exploiting any weakness in FastRoute configuration, route definitions, parsing, or handler implementation to gain unauthorized access or disrupt service.
  • Potential Impact: Remote Code Execution (RCE) allowing full control of the server, or Denial of Service (DoS) rendering the application unavailable.
  • Mitigation Strategies: Implement all mitigations outlined in the full attack tree, with a strong focus on securing route definitions, preventing ReDoS, and ensuring secure handler implementation.
  • Risk Level:
    • Likelihood: Varies depending on specific vulnerabilities present.
    • Impact: High (RCE or DoS).
    • Effort: Varies depending on the specific attack path.
    • Skill Level: Varies depending on the specific attack path.
    • Detection Difficulty: Varies depending on the specific attack path.

Attack Tree Path: 2. High-Risk Path: 🌳 Exploit Route Parsing/Matching Vulnerabilities [HIGH-RISK PATH]

  • Attack Vector Name: Route Parsing/Matching Exploitation
  • Vulnerability Description: Exploiting weaknesses in how FastRoute parses URLs and matches them against defined routes. This includes vulnerabilities related to regular expressions used in route definitions and how route parameters are extracted and processed.
  • Exploitation Method: Crafting malicious URLs designed to trigger vulnerabilities during route parsing or matching, leading to DoS or enabling further exploitation in handlers.
  • Potential Impact: Denial of Service (DoS) through ReDoS, or enabling Path Traversal or other handler-related vulnerabilities.
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Carefully review and test route regexes for ReDoS vulnerabilities.
    • Limit input URL length.
    • Implement robust error handling in routing logic.
    • Validate and sanitize route parameters within handlers.
  • Risk Level:
    • Likelihood: Medium (if vulnerable regexes or handler implementations exist).
    • Impact: High (DoS, potential for further exploitation).
    • Effort: Medium.
    • Skill Level: Medium.
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium to High (ReDoS can be hard to distinguish from legitimate traffic).

Attack Tree Path: 3. Critical Node: 💥 Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) [CRITICAL NODE]

  • Attack Vector Name: Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)
  • Vulnerability Description: Using regular expressions in route definitions that are susceptible to catastrophic backtracking. Maliciously crafted URLs can cause the regex engine to consume excessive CPU resources, leading to DoS.
  • Exploitation Method: 🐞 Craft malicious URLs to trigger catastrophic backtracking in route regexes [CRITICAL NODE]. Attackers send specific URLs designed to exploit the backtracking behavior of vulnerable regexes.
  • Potential Impact:
    • 🏹 Cause excessive CPU usage on the server [HIGH IMPACT].
    • 🏹 Cause application to become unresponsive (DoS) [HIGH IMPACT].
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Carefully review and test route regexes for ReDoS vulnerabilities using analysis tools.
    • Simplify complex regexes where possible.
    • Implement input validation and sanitization for URLs.
    • Limit input URL length.
    • Consider alternative routing strategies if regex complexity is unavoidable.
    • Implement request timeouts and rate limiting.
    • Use a Web Application Firewall (WAF) to detect and block ReDoS attack patterns.
  • Risk Level:
    • Likelihood: Medium (if vulnerable regexes are present).
    • Impact: High (DoS).
    • Effort: Medium.
    • Skill Level: Medium.
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium to High.

Attack Tree Path: 4. High-Risk Path & Critical Node: 🌳 Path Traversal via Route Parameters [HIGH-RISK PATH, CRITICAL NODE - Handler Vulnerability]

  • Attack Vector Name: Path Traversal via Route Parameters
  • Vulnerability Description: Application handlers incorrectly use route parameters to construct file paths or access resources without proper validation. This is not a vulnerability in FastRoute itself, but a common vulnerability in application code that uses route parameters.
  • Exploitation Method: 🐞 Manipulate route parameters to access files or resources outside intended scope [CRITICAL NODE - Handler Vulnerability]. Attackers modify route parameters in URLs to include path traversal sequences (e.g., ../) to access unauthorized files or directories.
  • Potential Impact:
    • 🏹 Read sensitive files [HIGH IMPACT] - Data Breach, Confidentiality loss.
    • 🏹 Execute arbitrary code [HIGH IMPACT] - if file inclusion vulnerabilities are present in handlers based on route parameters.
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Never directly use route parameters to construct file paths without strict validation and sanitization.
    • Use secure file handling practices.
    • Implement input validation and sanitization for route parameters within handlers.
    • Use whitelisting for allowed file paths if dynamic file access is necessary.
    • Avoid dynamic file inclusion based on user input.
    • Apply the principle of least privilege to handlers.
  • Risk Level:
    • Likelihood: Medium (if handlers are poorly implemented).
    • Impact: High (Data Breach, RCE).
    • Effort: Low.
    • Skill Level: Low.
    • Detection Difficulty: Medium (WAFs can detect common path traversal patterns).