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Threat Model Analysis for nikic/fastroute

Threat: Threat: Route Information Disclosure via Error Messages

  • Description: An attacker sends crafted requests that trigger errors within FastRoute's dispatcher or related components. The attacker aims to elicit verbose error messages that reveal internal route definitions, parameter names, or dispatcher logic. This is distinct from general application error handling; it focuses on errors originating from FastRoute itself.
  • Impact:
    • Exposure of sensitive internal application structure (routes, parameters).
    • Facilitates further attacks by providing a roadmap of the application's routing.
    • Potential leakage of FastRoute version information.
  • FastRoute Component Affected:
    • FastRoute\Dispatcher (specifically, error handling within the dispatcher logic).
    • Any custom error handlers directly integrated with FastRoute's internal mechanisms.
  • Risk Severity: High
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Disable Debug Mode: Ensure that FastRoute's internal debug mode (if any) is completely disabled in production. This is paramount.
    • Generic Error Handling (FastRoute Specific): Implement custom error handling within FastRoute's dispatcher (if extending or modifying it) to ensure that no internal routing details are exposed in error messages. This might involve catching exceptions within the dispatcher and returning generic responses.
    • Log Securely: Log detailed FastRoute-specific error information to a secure, inaccessible location.

Threat: Threat: Unvalidated Route Parameter Injection (Direct FastRoute Handling)

  • Description: While the vulnerability is a general injection (SQLi, etc.), this threat focuses on the scenario where FastRoute's handling of parameters directly contributes to the vulnerability. This would occur if, for example, a custom dispatcher or route collector were implemented that directly used parameters without proper sanitization before passing them to application logic. This is not the standard usage, but it's a potential risk if extending FastRoute.
  • Impact:
    • Data breaches (SQLi).
    • Unauthorized file access (path traversal).
    • Remote code execution (command injection).
    • Complete system compromise.
  • FastRoute Component Affected:
    • FastRoute\Dispatcher (custom implementations that directly handle parameters unsafely).
    • FastRoute\RouteCollector (custom implementations).
    • Any custom code that interacts directly with FastRoute's internal data structures.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Sanitize Within Custom Components: If creating custom dispatchers, route collectors, or other components that interact directly with FastRoute's internal data, always sanitize route parameters before using them in any sensitive context. This is crucial for any custom FastRoute extensions.
    • Follow Secure Coding Practices: Adhere to secure coding principles when extending or modifying FastRoute. Assume all data from route parameters is untrusted.
    • Code Review: Thoroughly review any custom FastRoute code for potential injection vulnerabilities.