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attack-surface.md

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Attack Surface Analysis for octobercms/october

Attack Surface: Unrestricted File Uploads (via October CMS Features)

  • Description: Attackers upload malicious files (e.g., PHP scripts) using October CMS's media manager or file upload functionality within plugins/themes, leading to RCE.
  • October CMS Contribution: October's built-in file handling features, if misused by developers or if plugins/themes have vulnerabilities, create this attack vector. The framework provides validation tools, but their correct implementation is crucial.
  • Example: A poorly coded plugin using October's FileUpload component doesn't validate file types, allowing an attacker to upload a .php file and execute it.
  • Impact: Complete server compromise.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Strict Whitelisting: Implement strict file type whitelisting (extension and content type) using October's validation rules. Validate content, not just extensions.
    • Safe Naming: Use October's file renaming features to generate random, safe filenames.
    • Storage Outside Webroot: Store uploads outside the webroot using October's storage system, serving them through controlled scripts.
    • Disable PHP Execution: Configure the web server (via .htaccess or server config) to prevent PHP execution in upload directories managed by October.
    • Plugin Security: Thoroughly vet any plugin using October's file upload features. Keep plugins updated.

Attack Surface: Vulnerable Third-Party Plugins/Themes (October CMS Ecosystem)

  • Description: Plugins and themes from the October CMS marketplace or other sources contain vulnerabilities (known or zero-day) exploitable due to their integration with October.
  • October CMS Contribution: October's plugin and theme system is a core feature, creating a direct attack surface. The framework relies on third-party developers for security.
  • Example: A popular October CMS plugin for managing user roles has a privilege escalation vulnerability, allowing attackers to gain admin access.
  • Impact: Varies (data breaches to server compromise), highly dependent on the specific plugin/theme vulnerability.
  • Risk Severity: High (potentially Critical)
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Trusted Sources Only: Install only from the official October CMS marketplace or highly reputable developers.
    • Code Review (if possible): Examine plugin/theme code before installation, focusing on security-sensitive areas (input handling, database queries, etc.).
    • Aggressive Updates: Immediately update plugins/themes upon release of security patches.
    • Minimize Plugins: Use the absolute minimum number of plugins required.
    • Monitor Advisories: Actively follow October CMS security announcements and plugin-specific vulnerability reports.

Attack Surface: Authentication/Authorization Bypass (October CMS Backend)

  • Description: Attackers gain unauthorized access to the October CMS /backend due to weak credentials, session flaws, or misconfigured October CMS permissions.
  • October CMS Contribution: October's backend and its permission system are core components. Misconfiguration or bugs in October's permission checks are the primary concern.
  • Example: An October CMS administrator account uses a weak password, or a custom plugin incorrectly implements October's permission checks, allowing privilege escalation.
  • Impact: Complete website control, data theft, potential server compromise.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Strong Passwords & 2FA: Enforce strong passwords and require Two-Factor Authentication (2FA) for all backend users.
    • Principle of Least Privilege: Meticulously configure October's user permissions, granting only the minimum necessary access.
    • Session Security: Ensure October's session configuration uses HttpOnly and Secure flags. Review session timeout settings.
    • Brute-Force Protection: Implement rate limiting (plugin, server-level, or WAF) specifically targeting the October CMS backend login.
    • Audit Permissions: Regularly review and audit October CMS user roles and permissions.

Attack Surface: Template Injection (October CMS Twig Environment)

  • Description: Attackers inject malicious Twig code into templates, exploiting October CMS's rendering process, potentially leading to server-side code execution.
  • October CMS Contribution: October's use of Twig as its templating engine creates this risk if user input is not perfectly handled within templates.
  • Example: A custom October CMS component renders user-supplied data directly in a Twig template without escaping, allowing an attacker to inject {{ system('id') }}.
  • Impact: Potential server-side code execution, data manipulation.
  • Risk Severity: High (potentially Critical)
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Twig Auto-Escaping: Always use Twig's automatic escaping features. Ensure it's enabled and correctly applied.
    • Strict Input Validation: Validate and sanitize all user input before it reaches any Twig template. Use October's validation rules.
    • Contextual Escaping: Use the correct Twig escaping strategy (HTML, JS, etc.) based on the output context.
    • No Dynamic Templates: Never load Twig templates dynamically based on user input.
    • Review Custom Components: Carefully review any custom components that interact with Twig, paying close attention to how user input is handled.

Attack Surface: YAML Parsing Vulnerabilities (October CMS Configuration and Plugins)

  • Description: Unsafe parsing of YAML files, particularly within October CMS plugins or configurations that accept user input, can lead to Remote Code Execution (RCE).
  • October CMS Contribution: October CMS uses YAML for plugin configurations and other areas. If a plugin or a custom implementation allows user-supplied YAML, and it's parsed unsafely, this is a direct attack vector.
  • Example: A custom October CMS plugin allows users to upload a YAML file for configuration, and the plugin uses a vulnerable YAML parser, enabling RCE.
  • Impact: Remote code execution, complete server compromise.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Safe YAML Parser: Exclusively use a secure YAML parser (e.g., symfony/yaml with appropriate flags) that prevents arbitrary object instantiation. Never use yaml_parse() with untrusted input.
    • Avoid User-Supplied YAML: Strongly prefer alternative configuration methods that don't involve user-supplied YAML.
    • Strict Validation: If user-supplied YAML is unavoidable, implement extremely strict validation of the YAML structure before parsing.
    • Sanitize Input: If user input is embedded within YAML, sanitize it thoroughly to remove any potentially dangerous characters or constructs.