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Attack Surface Analysis for parse-community/parse-server

Attack Surface: Unprotected API Endpoints

  • Description: Parse Server exposes REST and potentially GraphQL APIs for data interaction. If these endpoints lack proper authentication and authorization, they become vulnerable to unauthorized access and manipulation.
  • Parse Server Contribution: Parse Server's core functionality relies on these APIs. Without explicit security configurations (ACLs, CLPs, authentication), these endpoints are inherently open.
  • Example: An attacker directly interacts with the Parse Server API endpoint for creating new objects in a class without any authentication. They can successfully create unauthorized data entries, bypassing application logic and potentially polluting or corrupting data.
  • Impact: Data breaches, unauthorized data manipulation, data deletion, complete compromise of application data integrity and availability.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Mandatory Authentication: Enforce user authentication for all API access using Parse Server's built-in mechanisms or integrate with external authentication providers.
    • Robust Authorization (ACLs and CLPs): Define and rigorously enforce Access Control Lists (ACLs) at the object level and Class-Level Permissions (CLPs) at the class level to strictly control who can perform CRUD operations.
    • Principle of Least Privilege: Grant only the absolute minimum necessary permissions to users and roles.
    • Regular Security Audits: Periodically review and audit ACL and CLP configurations to ensure they remain effective and aligned with security requirements.

Attack Surface: NoSQL Injection

  • Description: Parse Server uses MongoDB. Insufficient input validation in API requests can enable NoSQL injection attacks, allowing attackers to bypass security and gain unauthorized database access or manipulate data beyond intended scope.
  • Parse Server Contribution: Parse Server's query mechanism translates client-side queries into MongoDB queries. Weak input sanitization in API handlers can allow manipulation of these translations.
  • Example: An attacker crafts a malicious query parameter in an API request, such as {"username": {"$regex": "^.*"}}. If not properly sanitized by Parse Server or Cloud Code, this could be injected into the MongoDB query, potentially bypassing intended filters and returning all user data instead of a specific user.
  • Impact: Data breaches, unauthorized access to sensitive data, data manipulation, potential for complete database compromise depending on the injection severity.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Strict Input Validation and Sanitization: Thoroughly validate and sanitize all user inputs in API requests, especially query parameters and object data, before they are used in database queries.
    • Parameterized Queries (Best Practices): Utilize Parse Server's query builders and methods that inherently help prevent direct string concatenation of user input into queries, minimizing injection risks.
    • Principle of Least Privilege for Database Access: Configure MongoDB user roles with the absolute minimum necessary permissions for Parse Server to function, limiting the impact of potential injection vulnerabilities.

Attack Surface: Code Injection in Cloud Functions

  • Description: Cloud Functions allow custom server-side logic. If external input is directly used in code execution within Cloud Functions without proper sanitization, attackers can inject code, potentially achieving arbitrary code execution on the Parse Server.
  • Parse Server Contribution: Cloud Functions are a core feature of Parse Server, designed for extensibility. However, they introduce a significant attack surface if input handling within these functions is not secure.
  • Example: A Cloud Function receives a user-provided filename and uses it in a shell command to process a file. If the filename is not sanitized, an attacker could inject shell commands within the filename, such as ; rm -rf / ;, leading to arbitrary code execution and potentially complete server compromise.
  • Impact: Server compromise, remote code execution, data breaches, denial of service, complete loss of confidentiality, integrity, and availability.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Mandatory Input Sanitization and Validation in Cloud Functions: Thoroughly sanitize and validate all input received by Cloud Functions before using it in any code execution, system commands, or database operations.
    • Avoid Dynamic Code Execution: Minimize or completely eliminate the use of dynamic code execution (e.g., eval, Function constructor with user input) within Cloud Functions.
    • Principle of Least Privilege for Cloud Function Execution Environment: Run Cloud Functions in a restricted environment with minimal necessary permissions to limit the potential damage from code injection.
    • Secure Coding Practices and Code Reviews: Implement secure coding practices in Cloud Functions and conduct thorough code reviews to identify and mitigate potential injection vulnerabilities.

Attack Surface: Unrestricted File Upload Vulnerabilities

  • Description: If file upload functionality in Parse Server is not properly secured, attackers can upload malicious files, such as web shells or malware, potentially leading to server compromise and various other attacks.
  • Parse Server Contribution: Parse Server provides file storage capabilities. The security of file uploads is heavily dependent on developer implementation and configuration around this feature.
  • Example: An application allows users to upload files. Without proper file type validation, an attacker uploads a PHP web shell disguised as a .png image. If the server is configured to execute PHP files in the upload directory, the attacker can access the web shell and gain remote code execution on the server.
  • Impact: Server compromise, remote code execution, cross-site scripting (XSS) if files are served directly, malware distribution, denial of service through resource exhaustion.
  • Risk Severity: High to Critical (depending on server configuration and file serving mechanisms).
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Strict File Type Validation (Server-Side): Implement robust file type validation on the server-side, allowing only explicitly permitted file types based on content inspection, not just file extensions.
    • File Size Limits: Enforce reasonable file size limits to prevent resource exhaustion and large malicious file uploads.
    • File Content Scanning (Malware Detection): Integrate with antivirus or malware scanning services to automatically scan uploaded files for malicious content.
    • Secure File Storage and Serving Configuration: Store uploaded files outside the web server's document root and serve them through a separate, secure mechanism that prevents direct execution of uploaded files and ideally uses a separate domain or subdomain to isolate user-uploaded content.
    • Content Security Policy (CSP): Implement CSP headers to mitigate potential XSS risks from user-uploaded content if files are served from the same origin as the application.

Attack Surface: Exposure of Sensitive Configuration Data

  • Description: Misconfiguration or insecure deployment practices can lead to the exposure of sensitive configuration data, such as database credentials, API keys, or Parse Server secret keys. This exposed information can be directly exploited to gain unauthorized access to critical systems and data.
  • Parse Server Contribution: Parse Server requires configuration, often including highly sensitive credentials for database access and security keys. Insecure handling of these configurations is a direct risk arising from Parse Server deployment.
  • Example: Database connection strings, including usernames and passwords, are hardcoded directly in application code or stored in publicly accessible configuration files within the web server's document root. An attacker gains access to these files (e.g., through misconfigured web server or directory listing vulnerability) and retrieves the database credentials, leading to unauthorized database access and potential data breach.
  • Impact: Data breaches, unauthorized access to databases and backend services, complete server compromise, loss of control over the Parse Server instance and associated data.
  • Risk Severity: Critical
  • Mitigation Strategies:
    • Environment Variables for Sensitive Data: Store all sensitive configuration data (database credentials, API keys, master key, client keys, etc.) exclusively in environment variables, never hardcoding them in code or configuration files.
    • Secure Configuration Management: Utilize secure configuration management tools and practices to manage and protect configuration data, ensuring access control and encryption where appropriate.
    • Principle of Least Privilege for File System Access: Restrict file system permissions to prevent unauthorized access to configuration files and environment variable storage mechanisms.
    • Regular Security Audits and Secrets Scanning: Conduct regular security audits and automated secrets scanning to identify and remediate any potential exposure of sensitive configuration data in code, logs, or configuration files.