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Attack Tree Analysis for parse-community/parse-server

Objective: Gain unauthorized access to sensitive data or functionality within the Parse Server application, leveraging vulnerabilities specific to the Parse Server platform. This could include data exfiltration, data modification, denial of service, or privilege escalation within the context of Parse Server's features.

Attack Tree Visualization

                                     Compromise Parse Server Application
                                                  |
        ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
        |                                               |                               |
  1. Abuse Parse Server Features [HIGH RISK]          --                                3. Attack Parse Server Infrastructure
        |                                                                               |
  ---------------------                                                           --------------------------------
  |                   |                                                               |                      |
1.1. CLP            1.2. ACL                                                         3.1. Database         3.2. File Storage
Misconfiguration   Misconfiguration                                                  (e.g., MongoDB)      (e.g., S3, GCS)
        |                   |                                                               |                      |
  -------             -------                                                         -------             -------
  |     |             |     |                                                         |     |             |     |
1.1.1 1.1.2[HIGH]  1.2.1 1.2.2[HIGH]                                                -- 3.1.2[CRIT]    -- 3.2.2[CRIT]
Read  Write         Read  Write                                                           Weak              Weak
All   All           All   All                                                               Creds             Creds
      (Public)            (Public)
        |                   |
        --                  --
                                                                  2. Exploit Parse Server Vulnerabilities
                                                                                      |
                                                                                ----------------
                                                                                |              |
                                                                                --       2.3. Code Injection
                                                                                              |
                                                                                        -------
                                                                                        |     |
                                                                                        -- 2.3.1[CRIT]
                                                                                        RCE via Cloud Code

Attack Tree Path: 1. Abuse Parse Server Features [HIGH RISK]

  • Description: This attack path leverages misconfigurations of Parse Server's built-in permission systems (CLPs and ACLs) to gain unauthorized access to data. It relies on developer error rather than exploiting bugs in the Parse Server code itself.

Attack Tree Path: 1.1. Class Level Permissions (CLP) Misconfiguration

Attack Tree Path: 1.1.2 Write All (Public) [HIGH]

  • Description: A class is configured to allow any unauthenticated user to create, modify, or delete objects within that class.
  • Attack Scenario: An attacker sends a request to create a new object, modify an existing object, or delete an object in the vulnerable class. Because the CLP allows public write access, the request succeeds without authentication.
  • Impact: Data corruption, injection of malicious content, denial of service (by deleting all objects).
  • Mitigation: Never allow public write access to a class unless absolutely necessary and with extreme caution (e.g., a publicly writable "feedback" class with strong input validation and rate limiting). Use beforeSave and afterSave Cloud Code triggers for validation and sanitization. Use role-based or user-specific CLPs.

Attack Tree Path: 1.2. Object Level Permissions (ACL) Misconfiguration

Attack Tree Path: 1.2.2 Write All (Public) [HIGH]

  • Description: Individual objects within a class are configured with ACLs that allow any unauthenticated user to modify or delete them.
  • Attack Scenario: An attacker discovers the objectId of a vulnerable object (e.g., through a previous query or by guessing). They then send a request to modify or delete that object. Because the ACL allows public write access, the request succeeds.
  • Impact: Data corruption, deletion of specific sensitive objects.
  • Mitigation: Avoid public write ACLs. Use Cloud Code to control object modification based on user roles and context. Ensure that objects have appropriate ACLs set upon creation, typically restricting write access to the object's owner or specific roles.

Attack Tree Path: 2. Exploit Parse Server Vulnerabilities

Attack Tree Path: 2.3. Code Injection (Cloud Code)

Attack Tree Path: 2.3.1 RCE via Cloud Code [CRITICAL]

  • Description: An attacker exploits a vulnerability in the application's Cloud Code to inject and execute arbitrary code on the Parse Server. This is typically due to insufficient input validation or the use of unsafe functions like eval().
  • Attack Scenario: An attacker crafts a malicious input that, when processed by a vulnerable Cloud Code function, causes the server to execute arbitrary code. This could involve manipulating string inputs to database queries, file operations, or other server-side logic.
  • Impact: Complete server compromise. The attacker can gain full control over the Parse Server, access the database, modify files, and potentially pivot to other systems.
  • Mitigation:
    • Extremely careful input validation and sanitization in all Cloud Code functions. Assume all input is potentially malicious.
    • Avoid using eval() or similar functions that execute arbitrary code.
    • Use parameterized queries or the Parse Server SDK's query builders to prevent NoSQL injection.
    • Regularly review Cloud Code for potential injection vulnerabilities.
    • Consider using a linter and static analysis tools to identify potential security issues.
    • Implement least privilege for the Parse Server's execution environment.

Attack Tree Path: 3. Attack Parse Server Infrastructure

Attack Tree Path: 3.1. Database (e.g., MongoDB) Vulnerabilities

Attack Tree Path: 3.1.2 Weak Credentials (Database) [CRITICAL]

  • Description: The database used by Parse Server (typically MongoDB) is configured with weak, default, or easily guessable credentials.
  • Attack Scenario: An attacker attempts to connect to the database using common default credentials (e.g., admin/password, root/root) or uses brute-force or dictionary attacks to guess the credentials.
  • Impact: Full database access. The attacker can read, modify, or delete all data stored in the database.
  • Mitigation:
    • Use strong, unique passwords for the database user accounts.
    • Rotate database credentials regularly.
    • Restrict database access to only the Parse Server instances that require it (e.g., using firewall rules or network segmentation).
    • Monitor database access logs for suspicious activity.

Attack Tree Path: 3.2. File Storage (e.g., S3, GCS) Vulnerabilities

Attack Tree Path: 3.2.2 Weak Credentials (Cloud Storage) [CRITICAL]

  • Description: The cloud storage service used by Parse Server (e.g., AWS S3, Google Cloud Storage) is configured with weak, default, or easily guessable credentials (e.g., API keys, service account keys).
  • Attack Scenario: An attacker obtains the cloud storage credentials (e.g., through a leaked configuration file, a compromised server, or by guessing). They then use these credentials to access the file storage service.
  • Impact: Full access to file storage. The attacker can read, modify, or delete all files stored in the cloud storage service. This could include sensitive user data, application backups, or configuration files.
  • Mitigation:
    • Use strong, unique credentials for the cloud storage service.
    • Rotate credentials regularly.
    • Use IAM roles (AWS) or service accounts (GCP) with the principle of least privilege to grant Parse Server access to the storage service. Avoid using root or highly privileged accounts.
    • Store credentials securely (e.g., using environment variables, a secrets management service). Never hardcode credentials in the application code or configuration files.
    • Monitor cloud storage access logs for suspicious activity.