Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History
32 lines (27 loc) · 3.96 KB

threat-modeling.md

File metadata and controls

32 lines (27 loc) · 3.96 KB

Threat Model Analysis for pestphp/pest

Threat: Threat 1: Compromised Pest Plugin/Dependency

  • Description: An attacker compromises a third-party Pest plugin or a dependency of Pest itself (or a plugin). The attacker injects malicious code into the compromised package. When developers run tests, this malicious code executes on their machines or CI/CD servers. This directly involves Pest because the attack vector is through a Pest-related package.
    • Impact: Execution of arbitrary code on developer machines or CI/CD servers, potential for lateral movement within the development environment, compromise of the codebase, data theft, or other malicious actions.
    • Affected Pest Component: Any installed Pest plugin (pestphp/* packages or third-party plugins). The composer.json and composer.lock files, which define the project's dependencies.
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Regular Dependency Updates: Keep Pest and all its dependencies (including plugins) up to date. Use composer update regularly and consider using automated dependency update tools (e.g., Dependabot).
      • Dependency Vulnerability Scanning: Use a dependency vulnerability scanner (e.g., composer audit, Snyk, Dependabot) to identify known vulnerabilities in dependencies. Integrate this into the CI/CD pipeline.
      • Vetting Third-Party Plugins: Carefully evaluate any third-party Pest plugins before using them. Consider:
        • Reputation: Is the plugin from a reputable source?
        • Maintenance: Is the plugin actively maintained?
        • Security Practices: Does the plugin author have a good track record for security?
        • Code Review: If possible, review the plugin's source code for potential security issues.
      • Pinning Dependencies: Use composer.lock to pin dependencies to specific versions. This prevents unexpected updates from introducing vulnerabilities. However, remember to regularly update the lock file after testing.
      • Private Package Repository: Consider using a private package repository (e.g., Private Packagist, Satis) to control which packages can be installed and to host internally vetted versions of dependencies.

Threat: Threat 2: Data Leakage via Test Output/Logs (When Using Pest Features Incorrectly)

  • Description: While data leakage is a general concern, it becomes directly related to Pest when Pest's features are misused to output sensitive data. For example, if a developer uses dd() or dump() within a Pest test to debug a test involving sensitive data, and that output is not properly redacted, this is a direct consequence of using Pest's debugging features. The attacker gains access to CI/CD logs, test reports, or developer machine output.
    • Impact: Exposure of sensitive data, potentially leading to account compromise, data breaches, or other security incidents.
    • Affected Pest Component: Pest's output mechanisms, specifically when used in conjunction with debugging functions like dd(), dump(), or custom logging within tests that handle sensitive data. The Pest runner itself.
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • Never Use Real Production Data: Use mock data, factories, or test-specific environment variables.
      • Environment Variable Management: Use .env.testing to isolate test environment variables.
      • Redaction in CI/CD: Configure CI/CD pipelines to redact sensitive information.
      • Avoid dd() and dump() with Sensitive Data: Be extremely cautious; remove or comment out these calls before committing.
      • Custom Logger Configuration: Configure any custom loggers used within tests to avoid logging sensitive data.