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Attack Tree Analysis for php-fig/container

Objective: Compromise application that uses PHP-FIG Container by exploiting weaknesses related to the container or its usage (High-Risk Paths and Critical Nodes only).

Attack Tree Visualization

Compromise Application via Container Exploitation [CRITICAL NODE] ├───[1.0] Exploit Container Configuration Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ ├───[1.1] Access and Modify Container Configuration Files [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ ├───[1.1.1] Directory Traversal to Configuration Files [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ │ └───[Actionable Insight 1.1.1]: Implement robust input validation and sanitization to prevent directory traversal attacks. Restrict web server access to sensitive directories. │ │ │ └───[Likelihood: Medium, Impact: High, Effort: Low, Skill Level: Low, Detection Difficulty: Medium] [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ ├───[1.1.2] Exposed Configuration Files due to Misconfiguration [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ │ └───[Actionable Insight 1.1.2]: Ensure proper web server configuration to prevent direct access to configuration files (e.g., .yaml, .json, .php). │ │ │ └───[Likelihood: Medium, Impact: High, Effort: Low, Skill Level: Low, Detection Difficulty: Low] [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ ├───[1.2] Inject Malicious Configuration Data [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ ├───[1.2.1] Configuration Injection via Environment Variables [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ │ └───[Actionable Insight 1.2.1]: Validate and sanitize environment variables used in container configuration. Avoid directly using user-controlled environment variables for critical configuration. │ │ │ └───[Likelihood: Medium, Impact: High, Effort: Medium, Skill Level: Medium, Detection Difficulty: Medium] [HIGH-RISK PATH] ├───[2.0] Exploit Dependency Resolution Vulnerabilities [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ ├───[2.1] Dependency Confusion Attack [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ ├───[2.1.3] Application Resolves and Installs Malicious Package [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ │ └───[Actionable Insight 2.1.3]: Implement dependency pinning and integrity checks (e.g., using composer.lock and verifying package hashes). Use private package repositories where possible and control access. │ │ │ └───[Likelihood: Low, Impact: Critical, Effort: Medium, Skill Level: Medium, Detection Difficulty: Medium] [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ ├───[2.2] Dependency Substitution Attack (Internal/Local) [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ ├───[2.2.2] Replace Legitimate Dependency File with Malicious Code [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ │ └───[Actionable Insight 2.2.2]: Implement file integrity monitoring for critical application files, including dependency definitions and code. Use version control and code review processes. │ │ │ └───[Likelihood: Low, Impact: Critical, Effort: Medium, Skill Level: Medium, Detection Difficulty: High] [HIGH-RISK PATH] ├───[3.0] Exploit Vulnerabilities in Container Implementation Code (Implementation Specific) [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ ├───[3.1] Code Bugs in Container Implementation [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ ├───[3.1.1] Identify and Exploit Known Vulnerabilities in Specific Container Implementation [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ │ └───[Actionable Insight 3.1.1]: Stay updated with security advisories for the chosen container implementation. Apply security patches promptly. │ │ │ └───[Likelihood: Low, Impact: Critical, Effort: Medium, Skill Level: Medium, Detection Difficulty: Medium] [HIGH-RISK PATH] ├───[4.0] Exploit Misuse of Container by Developers [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ ├───[4.1] Registering Unsafe Factories or Providers [CRITICAL NODE] [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ ├───[4.1.1] Register Factory Function with Code Execution Vulnerability [HIGH-RISK PATH] │ │ │ └───[Actionable Insight 4.1.1]: Carefully review and audit all factory functions and providers registered in the container. Ensure they do not introduce vulnerabilities. │ │ │ └───[Likelihood: Medium, Impact: High, Effort: Low, Skill Level: Medium, Detection Difficulty: Medium] [HIGH-RISK PATH]

This is the root goal of the attacker. Success at any of the child nodes contributes to achieving this goal. It is marked as critical because compromising the application is the ultimate objective.

This is a critical node and high-risk path because container configuration often dictates application behavior, service instantiation, and may contain sensitive information like database credentials or API keys. Exploiting configuration vulnerabilities can lead to significant compromise.

Directly accessing and modifying configuration files allows an attacker to completely control the container's behavior. This is a critical node and high-risk path due to the direct control it grants.

Attack Vector: Attackers exploit directory traversal vulnerabilities (e.g., using ../ in file paths) to access configuration files located outside the intended webroot.

  • Impact: Reading configuration files to obtain sensitive data or modifying them to inject malicious services or alter application behavior.
  • Why High-Risk: Directory traversal vulnerabilities are relatively common in web applications, and configuration files are highly sensitive.

Attack Vector: Web server misconfiguration (e.g., incorrect access rules in Apache or Nginx) allows direct access to configuration files via web requests.

  • Impact: Publicly exposing configuration files, leading to information disclosure and potential modification if write access is also misconfigured.
  • Why High-Risk: Misconfigurations are frequent, and exposed configuration files are easily exploitable.

Injecting malicious data into the container configuration process can lead to the container instantiating malicious services or altering the behavior of existing ones. This is a critical node and high-risk path because it bypasses intended configuration and injects attacker-controlled settings.

Attack Vector: Attackers manipulate environment variables that are used to build the container configuration. This could be through local access, or in some cases, via web server configuration or other injection points.

  • Impact: Injecting malicious configuration values, potentially leading to code execution or altered application logic.
  • Why High-Risk: Environment variables are often used for configuration, and if not properly validated, they can be a viable injection vector.

Exploiting how the container resolves and manages dependencies can lead to the execution of malicious code. This is a critical node and high-risk path because it targets the core dependency management functionality.

Attack Vector: Attackers create a malicious package with the same name as a legitimate internal or private dependency and publish it to a public repository. If the application's dependency resolution process prioritizes or mistakenly uses the public repository, the malicious package will be installed.

  • Impact: Execution of arbitrary code within the application's context when the malicious dependency is loaded and instantiated by the container.
  • Why High-Risk: Dependency confusion attacks can be difficult to detect and can lead to complete compromise if successful.

This is the successful outcome of the Dependency Confusion Attack, where the malicious package is installed and ready to be exploited.

Attack Vector: Attackers gain access to the application's file system and replace a legitimate dependency file (code) with malicious code.

  • Impact: Execution of arbitrary code when the container loads and instantiates the substituted dependency.
  • Why High-Risk: Direct file system access leading to code substitution is a severe vulnerability, resulting in immediate code execution.

This is the successful action of the Dependency Substitution Attack, directly leading to code execution.

If the specific container implementation used has vulnerabilities in its code, these can be exploited to compromise the application. This is a critical node and high-risk path because it targets the underlying container library itself.

Bugs in the container implementation's code can lead to various vulnerabilities, including code execution, privilege escalation, or denial of service. This is a critical node and high-risk path as it represents flaws in a core component.

Attack Vector: Attackers research and exploit publicly known vulnerabilities (CVEs) in the specific container implementation library being used.

  • Impact: Ranging from code execution to denial of service, depending on the nature of the vulnerability.
  • Why High-Risk: Known vulnerabilities are often easily exploitable if patches are not applied promptly.

Developers can introduce vulnerabilities through incorrect or insecure usage of the container, even if the container itself is secure. This is a critical node and high-risk path because developer errors are a common source of vulnerabilities.

Factory functions and providers are developer-defined code executed by the container. If these are not written securely, they can introduce vulnerabilities. This is a critical node and high-risk path because it involves developer-written code within the container's execution flow.

Attack Vector: Developers register factory functions that contain code execution vulnerabilities, such as command injection, insecure deserialization, or other flaws.

  • Impact: Arbitrary code execution when the container invokes the vulnerable factory function to instantiate a service.
  • Why High-Risk: Factory functions are executed within the application's context, and vulnerabilities within them can directly lead to compromise.