threat-modeling.md

Threat Model Analysis for php-fig/container

Threat: Dependency Substitution via Configuration Manipulation

• Description: An attacker gains unauthorized write access to the container's configuration source (e.g., configuration files, database entries). By modifying this configuration, they can redefine service definitions, replacing legitimate services with malicious ones. When the application requests a compromised service, the container instantiates and injects the attacker's malicious component instead of the intended, secure one. This allows the attacker to intercept application flow and inject arbitrary code.
• Impact:
  • Code Execution: The attacker can execute arbitrary code within the application context, gaining full control over application logic.
  • Data Breach: Malicious services can be designed to steal, modify, or delete sensitive application data.
  • Privilege Escalation: Attackers can potentially escalate privileges by replacing services responsible for authorization or access control.
• Affected Component: Container Configuration Loading, Service Definition Resolution
• Risk Severity: High
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Implement strict access control mechanisms to protect container configuration sources.
  • Store configuration files in secure locations with restricted file system permissions.
  • Utilize configuration file integrity checks (e.g., checksums, digital signatures) to detect unauthorized modifications.
  • If configuration is loaded from external sources, rigorously validate and sanitize the input to prevent injection attacks.

Threat: Dependency Substitution via Container Implementation Vulnerability

• Description: A vulnerability exists within the specific container library implementation being used (e.g., a bug in dependency resolution logic, service instantiation, or internal container mechanisms). An attacker can exploit this vulnerability to bypass the intended dependency injection process and inject arbitrary services or manipulate existing service instances without needing to modify the configuration directly. This could involve crafting specific input to the container or exploiting weaknesses in its internal parsing or handling of service definitions.
• Impact:
  • Code Execution: Exploiting vulnerabilities in the container implementation can lead to arbitrary code execution within the application's process.
  • Full System Compromise: In severe cases, container vulnerabilities could be leveraged to gain control over the entire application server.
  • Data Exfiltration: Attackers can use compromised services to access and exfiltrate sensitive data stored or processed by the application.
• Affected Component: Container Implementation (Dependency Resolution Logic, Service Instantiation, Internal Mechanisms)
• Risk Severity: Critical
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Choose reputable and actively maintained container implementations with a strong security track record.
  • Proactively monitor security advisories and vulnerability databases for the specific container library in use.
  • Apply security patches and updates for the container library promptly upon release.
  • Include container-specific security testing (penetration testing, static analysis) in the application's security assessment process, focusing on potential vulnerabilities in the chosen container implementation.

Threat: Insecure Factory Function Implementation leading to Object Injection

• Description: When factory functions are used to dynamically create services within the container, vulnerabilities can arise if the factory logic is not securely implemented. If a factory function uses untrusted input (e.g., user-provided data, external parameters) to determine which class to instantiate, configure the object, or set its properties without proper validation and sanitization, an attacker can manipulate this input to inject arbitrary objects. This object injection vulnerability allows the attacker to instantiate and control objects they shouldn't have access to, potentially leading to further exploitation.
• Impact:
  • Object Injection: Attackers can inject arbitrary objects into the application's object graph, bypassing intended instantiation mechanisms.
  • Remote Code Execution (Chained): Object injection vulnerabilities can often be chained with other application vulnerabilities (e.g., magic method calls in PHP, deserialization issues) to achieve remote code execution.
  • Data Manipulation and Corruption: Injected objects can be designed to manipulate application data, state, or business logic in malicious ways.
• Affected Component: Factory Functions, Service Instantiation
• Risk Severity: High
• Mitigation Strategies:
  • Avoid using untrusted input directly within factory functions to determine object instantiation or configuration.
  • If dynamic object creation based on input is necessary, implement strict input validation and sanitization.
  • Use a whitelist approach to restrict the classes that can be instantiated by factory functions based on input.
  • Carefully review and audit the implementation of all factory functions for potential object injection vulnerabilities.
  • Consider using alternative, more secure patterns for dynamic service creation if possible, minimizing reliance on factory functions with untrusted input.