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threat-modeling.md

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Threat Model Analysis for php-fig/container

Threat: Service Definition Overwrite

  • 1. Threat: Service Definition Overwrite

    • Description: An attacker exploits a vulnerability (e.g., insecure file permissions, configuration injection) to overwrite the definition of an existing service within the container's configuration. They replace the class name associated with a service ID with a malicious class they control. This is achieved by modifying a configuration file, manipulating environment variables used by the container, or exploiting a vulnerability in the configuration loading mechanism.
    • Impact: When the application requests the compromised service, the attacker's malicious code is executed instead of the intended service. This leads to arbitrary code execution, data theft, or complete system compromise.
    • Affected Component: Container configuration (e.g., XML file, YAML file, PHP array, database entries), Configuration loading mechanism (e.g., ConfigProvider, file parsing functions).
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • a. Strictly control file permissions on configuration files. Only the web server user (and ideally, a restricted user within that) should have read access. No write access should be granted to the web server user for production configurations.
      • b. Use a secure configuration loading mechanism that validates the integrity of the configuration data (e.g., checksums, digital signatures).
      • c. Treat container configuration as code: use version control (e.g., Git) to track changes and detect unauthorized modifications.
      • d. Implement input validation and sanitization if any part of the container configuration is derived from user input or external sources.
      • e. Consider using immutable configuration in production (e.g., a compiled container configuration that cannot be modified at runtime).

Threat: Unauthorized Service Injection (Runtime)

  • 2. Threat: Unauthorized Service Injection (Runtime)

    • Description: If the container implementation allows for runtime modification (adding or replacing services after the container is built), an attacker exploits a vulnerability (e.g., a code injection flaw) to inject a new, malicious service definition into the running container.
    • Impact: This leads to the execution of the attacker's malicious code when the injected service is requested, resulting in arbitrary code execution, data breaches, or other malicious actions.
    • Affected Component: Container's set() method (or equivalent, if the implementation provides one for runtime modification), any API or interface that allows modifying the container after initialization.
    • Risk Severity: High (if runtime modification is enabled)
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • a. Preferably, disable runtime modification of the container in production environments. This is the most secure approach.
      • b. If runtime modification is absolutely required, implement strict authentication and authorization checks before allowing any modifications to the container. Only trusted code/users should be able to modify the container.
      • c. Log all runtime modifications to the container, including the source of the modification, the changes made, and timestamps.
      • d. Implement input validation and sanitization for any data used in runtime service definitions.

Threat: Dependency Confusion (Supply Chain Attack) - Container Configuration Aspect

  • 3. Threat: Dependency Confusion (Supply Chain Attack) - Container Configuration Aspect

    • Description: While primarily a dependency management issue, the container configuration can be a factor. If the container configuration specifies package sources or influences how dependencies are resolved, a misconfiguration could lead the container to use a malicious package from a public repository instead of the intended private source. This is especially relevant if the container itself is responsible for fetching or configuring dependencies.
    • Impact: The attacker's malicious code is executed when the compromised dependency is used, leading to potential code execution, data theft, or other malicious actions.
    • Affected Component: Container configuration (if it specifies package sources or influences dependency resolution), get() method (when resolving the compromised dependency).
    • Risk Severity: High
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • a. Explicitly configure the container (if applicable) to use the correct package sources. Avoid relying on default configurations that might prioritize public repositories.
      • b. If the container configuration influences dependency resolution, ensure it's securely managed and validated.
      • c. Use a private package repository for internal dependencies.
      • d. Use package signing and verification.

Threat: Sensitive Data Exposure in Configuration

  • 4. Threat: Sensitive Data Exposure in Configuration

    • Description: The container's configuration file (or other configuration source) contains sensitive information (e.g., database credentials, API keys) in plain text. An attacker gains access to this configuration file through a vulnerability (e.g., directory traversal, file inclusion, misconfigured web server).
    • Impact: The attacker gains access to sensitive credentials, allowing them to access databases, external services, or other resources, potentially leading to data breaches or system compromise.
    • Affected Component: Container configuration files (e.g., XML, YAML, PHP), Environment variables (if used for configuration and exposed).
    • Risk Severity: Critical
    • Mitigation Strategies:
      • a. Never store sensitive data directly in configuration files.
      • b. Use environment variables to store sensitive data. Ensure these environment variables are properly secured and not exposed to unauthorized users or processes.
      • c. Use a secrets management system (e.g., HashiCorp Vault, AWS Secrets Manager, Azure Key Vault) to store and manage secrets. The container configuration should only contain references to these secrets.
      • d. Encrypt sensitive configuration data if it must be stored in files.
      • e. Restrict file permissions on configuration files to prevent unauthorized access.