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Attack Tree Analysis for php-fig/log

Objective: To compromise the application by exploiting vulnerabilities related to the logging mechanism, focusing on high-risk attack paths.

Attack Tree Visualization

  • [AND] [HIGH-RISK] Exploit Log Injection Vulnerabilities
    • [OR] [HIGH-RISK] Log File Injection
    • [OR] Database Injection (if logging to database - implementation specific) [CRITICAL NODE]
  • [AND] [HIGH-RISK] Abuse Logging Functionality for Denial of Service (DoS)
    • [OR] [HIGH-RISK] Log Flooding [CRITICAL NODE]
  • [AND] [HIGH-RISK] Exploit Information Disclosure via Logs [CRITICAL NODE]
    • [OR] [HIGH-RISK] Sensitive Data Logging [CRITICAL NODE]
    • [OR] [HIGH-RISK] Error Message Leakage [CRITICAL NODE]
  • [AND] Exploit Configuration/Implementation Flaws
    • [OR] [HIGH-RISK] Insecure Log Storage [CRITICAL NODE]
      • [OR] [HIGH-RISK] Logs stored in publicly accessible locations (web-accessible directory) [CRITICAL NODE]
      • [OR] [HIGH-RISK] Logs stored with weak file permissions allowing unauthorized access [CRITICAL NODE]

Attack Tree Path: [HIGH-RISK] Exploit Log Injection Vulnerabilities Path

Attack Vector: Attackers inject malicious data into log messages, aiming to manipulate log files, downstream log processing, or databases (if logs are stored there).

  • Sub-Vectors:
    • [HIGH-RISK] Log File Injection:
      • Attack: Injecting control characters or code snippets into log messages that are written to log files.
      • Impact: Log manipulation, potential code execution on systems processing logs.
      • Mitigation: Output encoding/escaping of log messages, secure log processing tools, principle of least privilege for log access.
    • Database Injection (if logging to database - implementation specific) [CRITICAL NODE]:
      • Attack: Injecting SQL/NoSQL commands into log messages when logs are written to a database without proper sanitization.
      • Impact: Full database compromise, data breach, data manipulation, denial of service.
      • Mitigation: Parameterized queries/prepared statements for database logging, input sanitization specific to database context, principle of least privilege for database access.

Attack Tree Path: [HIGH-RISK] Abuse Logging Functionality for Denial of Service (DoS) Path

Attack Vector: Attackers intentionally generate excessive log messages to overwhelm system resources, leading to application unavailability.

  • Sub-Vectors:
    • [HIGH-RISK] Log Flooding [CRITICAL NODE]:
      • Attack: Generating a large volume of requests or actions that trigger excessive logging.
      • Impact: Application unavailability, performance degradation, resource exhaustion (disk space, CPU, I/O).
      • Mitigation: Rate limiting, log level control, log rotation and archiving, resource monitoring and alerting.

Attack Tree Path: [HIGH-RISK] Exploit Information Disclosure via Logs [CRITICAL NODE] Path

Attack Vector: Developers unintentionally log sensitive information in log messages, which can be accessed by attackers.

  • Sub-Vectors:
    • [HIGH-RISK] Sensitive Data Logging [CRITICAL NODE]:
      • Attack: Application logs sensitive user data (passwords, API keys, PII) or internal system details.
      • Impact: Data breach, compliance violations, reputational damage, aiding further attacks.
      • Mitigation: Data minimization in logging, data masking/redaction, code reviews and security audits, developer training.
    • [HIGH-RISK] Error Message Leakage [CRITICAL NODE]:
      • Attack: Application logs verbose error messages revealing sensitive internal details (paths, configurations, etc.).
      • Impact: Information disclosure, aiding attackers in reconnaissance and further attacks.
      • Mitigation: Generic error messages in production, error handling and sanitization, log level configuration (production vs. development).

Attack Tree Path: Insecure Log Storage [CRITICAL NODE] Path (within Exploit Configuration/Implementation Flaws)

Attack Vector: Logs are stored in insecure locations or with weak permissions, allowing unauthorized access and potential data breaches.

  • Sub-Vectors:
    • [HIGH-RISK] Logs stored in publicly accessible locations (web-accessible directory) [CRITICAL NODE]:
      • Attack: Logs are placed within the web root, making them directly accessible via the internet.
      • Impact: Confidentiality breach, access to all logged information, including sensitive data.
      • Mitigation: Secure log storage location outside web root, regular security audits.
    • [HIGH-RISK] Logs stored with weak file permissions allowing unauthorized access [CRITICAL NODE]:
      • Attack: File permissions on log files and directories are too permissive, allowing unauthorized users or processes to read them.
      • Impact: Confidentiality breach, access to all logged information by unauthorized users on the server.
      • Mitigation: Restrict file permissions, principle of least privilege, regular security audits and file permission checks.