Objective: Exfiltrate data, disrupt application, or achieve code execution via logging. [CRITICAL]
Attacker Goal: Exfiltrate data, disrupt application, or achieve code execution via logging. [CRITICAL]
├── 1. Log Injection (Manipulate Log Content) [HR]
│ ├── 1.1 Inject Malicious Payloads into Log Messages [CRITICAL]
│ │ ├── 1.1.2 Code Injection (If logs are later interpreted/executed)
│ │ │ ├── 1.1.2.2 Inject Shell Commands (If logs are processed by shell scripts) [HR]
│ │ │ └── 1.1.2.3 Inject HTML/JavaScript (If logs are displayed in a web UI without sanitization - XSS) [HR]
│ │ ├── 1.1.3 Data Exfiltration via Oversized/Controlled Log Entries [HR]
│ │ │ └── 1.1.3.1 Flood Logs with Sensitive Data (If error handling leaks data into logs) [HR]
│ └── 1.2 Bypass Log Sanitization/Filtering [CRITICAL]
├── 2. Log Target Exploitation (Attack the Log Storage/Processing)
│ ├── 2.1 File System Attacks
│ │ ├── 2.1.1 Log File Overwrite/Deletion (DoS)
│ │ │ └── 2.1.1.1 Exploit File Permissions (If log files are writable by the web server user) [HR]
│ │ ├── 2.1.2 Log File Disclosure [HR]
│ │ │ ├── 2.1.2.1 Direct File Access (If log files are in a web-accessible directory) [HR]
│ │ │ └── 2.1.2.2 Path Traversal Vulnerabilities (If log file paths are constructed from user input) [HR]
│ ├── 2.2 Database Attacks (If logs are stored in a database)
│ │ └── 2.2.1 SQL Injection (If log messages are inserted into the database without proper escaping) [HR] [CRITICAL]
│ └── 2.3 External Service Attacks (If logs are sent to a remote service like syslog, Logstash, etc.)
│ └── 2.3.1 Network Eavesdropping (If logs are sent unencrypted) [HR]
└── 3. Exploiting Context Data [HR]
└── 3.1 Sensitive Data Leakage in Context [HR] [CRITICAL]
├── 3.1.1 Accidental Inclusion of Credentials, API Keys, etc. [HR]
└── 3.1.2 PII Exposure (e.g., Usernames, Emails, IP Addresses) [HR]
Attack Tree Path: Attacker Goal
- Attacker Goal: Exfiltrate data, disrupt application, or achieve code execution via logging. [CRITICAL]
- This is the overarching goal and is considered critical because it represents the ultimate objective of an attacker targeting the logging system. All other nodes contribute to achieving this goal.
Attack Tree Path: Log Injection
- 1. Log Injection (Manipulate Log Content) [HR]
- This is a high-risk area because it allows direct manipulation of the logging process.
- 1.1 Inject Malicious Payloads into Log Messages [CRITICAL]: This is the core of log injection and is critical. If an attacker can inject arbitrary content, they can potentially achieve any of the sub-goals.
Attack Tree Path: Inject Shell Commands
* **1.1.2.2 Inject Shell Commands (If logs are processed by shell scripts) [HR]**:
* **Description:** The attacker injects shell commands into log messages. If these logs are later processed by a script that executes them (e.g., using `system()`, `exec()`, or backticks), the attacker gains code execution.
* **Likelihood:** Low (requires specific, insecure log processing).
* **Impact:** Very High (full system compromise).
* **Effort:** Low to Medium (depends on the complexity of the injection).
* **Skill Level:** Intermediate (requires understanding of shell scripting and injection techniques).
* **Detection Difficulty:** Medium (requires analysis of log processing scripts and potentially network traffic).
Attack Tree Path: Inject HTML/JavaScript
* **1.1.2.3 Inject HTML/JavaScript (If logs are displayed in a web UI without sanitization - XSS) [HR]**:
* **Description:** The attacker injects HTML or JavaScript code into log messages. If these logs are displayed in a web-based log viewer without proper sanitization, the attacker can execute arbitrary JavaScript in the context of the viewer's browser.
* **Likelihood:** Medium (common vulnerability in log viewers).
* **Impact:** Medium to High (session hijacking, defacement, data theft).
* **Effort:** Low (basic XSS payloads).
* **Skill Level:** Intermediate (understanding of XSS).
* **Detection Difficulty:** Medium (requires analysis of the log viewing interface).
Attack Tree Path: Data Exfiltration via Oversized/Controlled Log Entries
* **1.1.3 Data Exfiltration via Oversized/Controlled Log Entries [HR]**: This is a high-risk path because it allows attackers to steal sensitive information.
Attack Tree Path: Flood Logs with Sensitive Data
* **1.1.3.1 Flood Logs with Sensitive Data (If error handling leaks data into logs) [HR]**:
* **Description:** The attacker triggers errors or exploits verbose logging to cause the application to log sensitive data (e.g., database credentials, session tokens, internal data structures).
* **Likelihood:** Medium (depends on error handling practices).
* **Impact:** High (data breach).
* **Effort:** Low to Medium (depends on the application's error handling).
* **Skill Level:** Intermediate (understanding of application logic and error handling).
* **Detection Difficulty:** Medium to Hard (requires monitoring log size and content for anomalies).
Attack Tree Path: Bypass Log Sanitization/Filtering
* **1.2 Bypass Log Sanitization/Filtering [CRITICAL]**: This node is critical because if an attacker can bypass sanitization, all injection attacks become much easier.
Attack Tree Path: Log Target Exploitation
- 2. Log Target Exploitation (Attack the Log Storage/Processing)
Attack Tree Path: File System Attacks
* **2.1 File System Attacks**
Attack Tree Path: Log File Overwrite/Deletion
* **2.1.1 Log File Overwrite/Deletion (DoS)**
Attack Tree Path: Exploit File Permissions
* **2.1.1.1 Exploit File Permissions (If log files are writable by the web server user) [HR]**:
* **Description:** The attacker exploits misconfigured file permissions to overwrite or delete log files, causing a denial of service or loss of audit data.
* **Likelihood:** Medium (common misconfiguration).
* **Impact:** Medium (DoS, data loss).
* **Effort:** Low (basic file system commands).
* **Skill Level:** Novice.
* **Detection Difficulty:** Easy (file system monitoring).
Attack Tree Path: Log File Disclosure
* **2.1.2 Log File Disclosure [HR]**: This sub-branch is high risk due to the potential for direct data exposure.
Attack Tree Path: Direct File Access
* **2.1.2.1 Direct File Access (If log files are in a web-accessible directory) [HR]**:
* **Description:** The attacker directly accesses log files through a web browser because they are stored in a publicly accessible directory.
* **Likelihood:** Medium (common misconfiguration).
* **Impact:** High (data breach).
* **Effort:** Very Low (simply browsing to the file).
* **Skill Level:** Novice.
* **Detection Difficulty:** Very Easy (directory listing, common file paths).
Attack Tree Path: Path Traversal Vulnerabilities
* **2.1.2.2 Path Traversal Vulnerabilities (If log file paths are constructed from user input) [HR]**:
* **Description:** The attacker manipulates user input to access log files outside of the intended directory, potentially accessing sensitive system files.
* **Likelihood:** Low (requires vulnerable code).
* **Impact:** High (read arbitrary files).
* **Effort:** Medium (requires crafting specific input).
* **Skill Level:** Intermediate (understanding of path traversal).
* **Detection Difficulty:** Medium (requires analysis of log file path handling).
Attack Tree Path: Database Attacks
* **2.2 Database Attacks (If logs are stored in a database)**
Attack Tree Path: SQL Injection
* **2.2.1 SQL Injection (If log messages are inserted into the database without proper escaping) [HR] [CRITICAL]**:
* **Description:** The attacker injects SQL code into log messages, which are then executed against the database.
* **Likelihood:** Medium (depends on database interaction).
* **Impact:** Very High (data breach, data modification, RCE).
* **Effort:** Low to Medium (depends on the complexity of the injection).
* **Skill Level:** Intermediate (understanding of SQL injection).
* **Detection Difficulty:** Medium (requires analysis of database queries and log content).
Attack Tree Path: External Service Attacks
* **2.3 External Service Attacks (If logs are sent to a remote service)**
Attack Tree Path: Network Eavesdropping
* **2.3.1 Network Eavesdropping (If logs are sent unencrypted) [HR]**:
* **Description:** The attacker intercepts log data transmitted over the network because it is not encrypted.
* **Likelihood:** Medium (depends on network configuration).
* **Impact:** High (data breach).
* **Effort:** Low (passive network sniffing).
* **Skill Level:** Intermediate (understanding of network protocols).
* **Detection Difficulty:** Medium (requires network traffic analysis).
Attack Tree Path: Exploiting Context Data
- 3. Exploiting Context Data [HR]
Attack Tree Path: Sensitive Data Leakage in Context
* **3.1 Sensitive Data Leakage in Context [HR] [CRITICAL]**: This is a critical and high-risk area because it's a common source of unintentional data exposure.
Attack Tree Path: Accidental Inclusion of Credentials, API Keys, etc.
* **3.1.1 Accidental Inclusion of Credentials, API Keys, etc. [HR]**:
* **Description:** Developers inadvertently include sensitive information (passwords, API keys, tokens) in the `context` array passed to the logging functions.
* **Likelihood:** Medium (common developer error).
* **Impact:** Very High (credential compromise).
* **Effort:** Very Low (attacker simply needs to access the logs).
* **Skill Level:** Novice.
* **Detection Difficulty:** Medium (requires log analysis and potentially code review).
Attack Tree Path: PII Exposure
* **3.1.2 PII Exposure (e.g., Usernames, Emails, IP Addresses) [HR]**:
* **Description:** Personally Identifiable Information (PII) is logged in the `context` array, violating privacy regulations.
* **Likelihood:** High (common practice, often unintentional).
* **Impact:** Medium to High (privacy violation, legal consequences).
* **Effort:** Very Low (attacker simply needs to access the logs).
* **Skill Level:** Novice.
* **Detection Difficulty:** Medium (requires log analysis and potentially code review).