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Attack Tree Analysis for phpdocumentor/reflectioncommon

Objective: Compromise application using reflection-common by exploiting vulnerabilities within the library or its usage (High-Risk Paths Only).

Attack Tree Visualization

[CRITICAL NODE] Compromise Application Using reflection-common [CRITICAL NODE] ├───[1.0] [CRITICAL NODE] Exploit Vulnerabilities in reflection-common Library │ └───[1.1] [CRITICAL NODE] Input Injection Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK PATH] │ ├───[1.1.1] [CRITICAL NODE] Class Name Injection [HIGH RISK PATH] │ │ └───[1.1.1.1] Malicious Class Name Provided as Input [HIGH RISK PATH] │ │ └───[1.1.1.1.a] Application uses user-controlled input to determine class name for reflection [HIGH RISK PATH] │ │ └───[1.1.1.1.b] Attacker injects name of a class designed for malicious actions [HIGH RISK PATH] │ │ └───[1.1.1.1.d] Application logic based on reflection output is exploited (e.g., instantiation, method calls) [HIGH RISK PATH] │ └───[1.1.2] [CRITICAL NODE] Method/Property Name Injection [HIGH RISK PATH] │ └───[1.1.2.1] Malicious Method/Property Name Provided as Input [HIGH RISK PATH] │ └───[1.1.2.1.a] Application uses user-controlled input to determine method/property name for reflection [HIGH RISK PATH] │ └───[1.1.2.1.b] Attacker injects name of a method/property intended for malicious actions or information disclosure [HIGH RISK PATH] │ └───[1.1.2.1.d] Application logic based on reflection output is exploited (e.g., method invocation, property access) [HIGH RISK PATH] └───[2.0] [CRITICAL NODE] Exploit Insecure Usage of reflection-common in Application [HIGH RISK PATH] └───[2.1] [CRITICAL NODE] Unvalidated Reflection Output [HIGH RISK PATH] │ └───[2.1.1] [CRITICAL NODE] Application Trusts Reflection Data Implicitly [HIGH RISK PATH] │ └───[2.1.1.a] Application uses reflection-common to retrieve class/method/property information [HIGH RISK PATH] │ └───[2.1.1.b] Application directly uses this information in security-sensitive operations without validation or sanitization [HIGH RISK PATH] │ └───[2.1.1.c] Attacker manipulates input (if possible) to influence reflection output and bypass security checks or logic [HIGH RISK PATH] └───[2.2] [CRITICAL NODE] Over-Reliance on Reflection for Security Decisions (Anti-Pattern) [HIGH RISK PATH] └───[2.2.1] [CRITICAL NODE] Using Reflection for Access Control or Authorization [HIGH RISK PATH] └───[2.2.1.a] Application uses reflection-common to dynamically check class/method annotations or attributes for authorization logic [HIGH RISK PATH] └───[2.2.1.b] Attacker finds ways to manipulate or bypass these reflection-based checks (e.g., through code injection elsewhere, or by exploiting subtle differences in reflection behavior) [HIGH RISK PATH] └───[2.2.1.c] Attacker gains unauthorized access or privileges [HIGH RISK PATH]

Attack Tree Path: 1.0 [CRITICAL NODE] Exploit Vulnerabilities in reflection-common Library

  • Attack Vector: Focuses on finding and exploiting vulnerabilities directly within the phpdocumentor/reflection-common library code itself. While less likely than insecure usage, it's a potential attack surface.

Attack Tree Path: 1.1 [CRITICAL NODE] Input Injection Vulnerabilities [HIGH RISK PATH]

  • Attack Vector: Exploits situations where an application takes user-controlled input and uses it to determine class names, method names, or property names for reflection operations without proper validation. This is the most prominent High-Risk Path.

Attack Tree Path: 1.1.1 [CRITICAL NODE] Class Name Injection [HIGH RISK PATH]

  • Attack Vector: The attacker aims to inject a malicious class name into the application's input.

Attack Tree Path: 1.1.1.1.a Application uses user-controlled input to determine class name for reflection [HIGH RISK PATH]

The application design flaw where user input directly influences class name resolution for reflection.

Attack Tree Path: 1.1.1.1.b Attacker injects name of a class designed for malicious actions [HIGH RISK PATH]

The attacker provides the name of a class they control, which contains code designed to perform malicious actions when instantiated or reflected upon.

Attack Tree Path: 1.1.1.1.d Application logic based on reflection output is exploited (e.g., instantiation, method calls) [HIGH RISK PATH]

The application's logic, after reflecting on the attacker-controlled class, performs actions (like instantiation or method calls) that execute the malicious code in the injected class, leading to compromise.

Attack Tree Path: 1.1.2 [CRITICAL NODE] Method/Property Name Injection [HIGH RISK PATH]

  • Attack Vector: Similar to Class Name Injection, but the attacker injects malicious method or property names.

Attack Tree Path: 1.1.2.1.a Application uses user-controlled input to determine method/property name for reflection [HIGH RISK PATH]

The application design flaw where user input directly influences method or property name resolution for reflection.

Attack Tree Path: 1.1.2.1.b Attacker injects name of a method/property intended for malicious actions or information disclosure [HIGH RISK PATH]

The attacker provides the name of a method or property that, when accessed or invoked via reflection, performs malicious actions or leaks sensitive information.

Attack Tree Path: 1.1.2.1.d Application logic based on reflection output is exploited (e.g., method invocation, property access) [HIGH RISK PATH]

The application's logic, after reflecting and accessing the attacker-controlled method or property name, executes unintended code or reveals sensitive data, leading to compromise.

Attack Tree Path: 2.0 [CRITICAL NODE] Exploit Insecure Usage of reflection-common in Application [HIGH RISK PATH]

  • Attack Vector: Focuses on vulnerabilities arising from how the application uses reflection-common insecurely, even if the library itself is secure. This is a major High-Risk Path.

Attack Tree Path: 2.1 [CRITICAL NODE] Unvalidated Reflection Output [HIGH RISK PATH]

  • Attack Vector: Exploits situations where the application trusts the output of reflection-common without proper validation or sanitization before using it in security-sensitive operations.

Attack Tree Path: 2.1.1 [CRITICAL NODE] Application Trusts Reflection Data Implicitly [HIGH RISK PATH]

  • Attack Vector: The core issue is the application's implicit trust in reflection data.

Attack Tree Path: 2.1.1.a Application uses reflection-common to retrieve class/method/property information [HIGH RISK PATH]

The application uses reflection to get information about code structure.

Attack Tree Path: 2.1.1.b Application directly uses this information in security-sensitive operations without validation or sanitization [HIGH RISK PATH]

The application uses the raw reflection output (e.g., method names, property types) directly in security checks or logic without validating if this data is safe or expected in the current context.

Attack Tree Path: 2.1.1.c Attacker manipulates input (if possible) to influence reflection output and bypass security checks or logic [HIGH RISK PATH]

If the application allows any form of input that can indirectly influence the code being reflected upon (even if not directly controlling class/method names), an attacker might manipulate this input to alter the reflection output and bypass security measures that rely on this output.

Attack Tree Path: 2.2 [CRITICAL NODE] Over-Reliance on Reflection for Security Decisions (Anti-Pattern) [HIGH RISK PATH]

  • Attack Vector: Exploits the flawed design of using reflection for core security decisions like access control or authorization. This is a critical anti-pattern.

Attack Tree Path: 2.2.1 [CRITICAL NODE] Using Reflection for Access Control or Authorization [HIGH RISK PATH]

  • Attack Vector: The application incorrectly uses reflection for enforcing security policies.

Attack Tree Path: 2.2.1.a Application uses reflection-common to dynamically check class/method annotations or attributes for authorization logic [HIGH RISK PATH]

The application attempts to determine user permissions or access rights by dynamically inspecting code annotations or attributes using reflection.

Attack Tree Path: 2.2.1.b Attacker finds ways to manipulate or bypass these reflection-based checks [HIGH RISK PATH]

Attackers identify weaknesses in this reflection-based authorization and find ways to circumvent the checks. This could involve code injection elsewhere in the application to alter the reflected code, or exploiting subtle differences in reflection behavior compared to the intended security logic.

Attack Tree Path: 2.2.1.c Attacker gains unauthorized access or privileges [HIGH RISK PATH]

Successful bypass of reflection-based authorization leads to the attacker gaining unauthorized access to resources or elevated privileges within the application.