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attack-surface.md

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Attack Surface Analysis for phpdocumentor/reflectioncommon

Attack Surface: Information Disclosure via Docblocks and Type Hints

Description: Exposure of sensitive information or internal application details through code analysis.

How reflection-common Contributes: The library's core purpose is to extract information from code, including docblocks and type hints. This functionality is directly used to expose the information. The attacker leverages the intended functionality of the library.

Example:

  1. A developer inadvertently includes an API key in a docblock comment: /** @var string $apiKey // API Key: mysecretkey123 */.
  2. An application using reflection-common processes this code (either intentionally or because the attacker has injected it).
  3. The reflection-common library extracts the docblock content, including the API key.
  4. The attacker gains access to the API key.

Impact: Varies depending on the disclosed information. Could range from revealing internal class names to exposing API keys, database credentials, or other secrets. The impact is directly tied to the sensitivity of the information exposed through the library's parsing.

Risk Severity: High (can be critical if highly sensitive data is exposed)

Mitigation Strategies:

  • Never Store Secrets in Code: Use environment variables, secure configuration files, or dedicated secrets management systems.
  • Code Reviews: Implement code review processes to catch accidental inclusion of sensitive information.
  • Automated Scanning: Use static analysis tools to scan code for potential secrets disclosure.
  • Input Sanitization (if applicable): If the application analyzes user-provided code, sanitize the input before passing it to reflection-common to remove or redact potentially sensitive information. This is crucial if user-supplied code is being analyzed.

Attack Surface: Code Injection via Dynamic Class Loading (Direct, if misused)

Description: Execution of arbitrary code by manipulating class names used in reflection.

How reflection-common Contributes: The library is directly used to interact with classes. If the class name passed to reflection-common (e.g., to ReflectionClass) is derived from untrusted input without proper validation, it creates a direct code injection vulnerability. The library's intended functionality (reflecting on a class) is abused.

Example:

  1. An application has a feature that allows users to specify a class name (e.g., via a URL parameter) to be analyzed. The code might look like: $className = $_GET['class']; $reflectionClass = new \ReflectionClass($className);
  2. An attacker provides a malicious class name, such as My\Evil\Class, designed to execute malicious code when loaded or instantiated.
  3. reflection-common (via ReflectionClass) attempts to load and reflect upon the attacker-controlled class. This is the direct involvement.
  4. The malicious code within My\Evil\Class is executed.

Impact: Complete system compromise. The attacker can execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the application.

Risk Severity: Critical

Mitigation Strategies:

  • Avoid Dynamic Class Names from Untrusted Input: This is paramount. Do not construct class names directly from user input.
  • Whitelist Allowed Classes: If dynamic class loading is absolutely necessary, maintain a strict whitelist of allowed class names and validate user input against this whitelist before using reflection-common.
  • Input Validation and Sanitization: Thoroughly validate and sanitize any user input that might influence class names, even if a whitelist is used. Ensure the input conforms to expected patterns and does not contain malicious characters. This validation must occur before the input is used with reflection-common.
  • Secure Autoloader: Use a secure autoloader that prevents the loading of classes from unexpected or untrusted locations. This provides a defense-in-depth layer.