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Attack Tree Analysis for phpdocumentor/reflectioncommon

Objective: To achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE) or Information Disclosure by exploiting vulnerabilities or misconfigurations related to phpDocumentor/reflection-common's handling of type reflection and constant resolution.

Attack Tree Visualization

[Attacker Achieves RCE or Information Disclosure] [CRITICAL]
    /
   /
[Exploit Type Resolution Vulnerabilities]
   /
  /
[Manipulate Input to Type Resolver] [CRITICAL]
 /
/
[Craft Malicious DocBlock]
 \
  \
   [Trigger Exception Revealing Constant Value] [CRITICAL]
    \
     \
      [Analyze Error Output for Sensitive Data] [CRITICAL]

Attack Tree Path: Root Node: Attacker Achieves RCE or Information Disclosure [CRITICAL]

  • Description: This is the ultimate objective of the attacker. It represents the successful compromise of the application, either by executing arbitrary code (RCE) or by gaining access to sensitive information.
  • Likelihood: Medium (Overall likelihood, dependent on the success of subsequent steps).
  • Impact: Very High (Complete system compromise or significant data breach).
  • Effort: Variable (Depends on the specific vulnerability and defenses).
  • Skill Level: Variable (Novice to Expert, depending on the exploit complexity).
  • Detection Difficulty: Variable (Depends on logging, monitoring, and intrusion detection).

Attack Tree Path: Node: Exploit Type Resolution Vulnerabilities

  • Description: This branch represents attacks that leverage weaknesses in how reflection-common handles type information, potentially leading to unexpected code execution or information disclosure.
  • Likelihood: Medium
  • Impact: High
  • Effort: Medium to High
  • Skill Level: Intermediate to Advanced
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium

Attack Tree Path: Node: Manipulate Input to Type Resolver [CRITICAL]

  • Description: This is the crucial entry point for many attacks. The attacker provides crafted input, often through DocBlocks, to influence the type resolution process. This is where untrusted data enters the reflection system.
  • Likelihood: High (Many applications fail to properly sanitize DocBlock comments and other inputs used in reflection.)
  • Impact: High (Successful manipulation can lead to arbitrary type resolution and subsequent exploitation.)
  • Effort: Low to Medium (Crafting malicious input can be simple, but bypassing strong validation is harder.)
  • Skill Level: Novice to Intermediate
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium (Input validation logs and anomaly detection can help, but sophisticated attacks might be harder to detect.)

Attack Tree Path: Node: Craft Malicious DocBlock

  • Description: The attacker creates a DocBlock containing specially crafted type hints, annotations, or other elements designed to trigger vulnerabilities in the parser or type resolver. This is a common technique because DocBlocks are often treated as trusted documentation, not as potentially malicious input.
  • Likelihood: High (DocBlocks are a common and often overlooked attack surface.)
  • Impact: Medium to High (The impact depends on how the parsed DocBlock information is used.)
  • Effort: Low (Creating a malicious DocBlock can be relatively straightforward.)
  • Skill Level: Intermediate (Requires understanding of DocBlock syntax and potential vulnerabilities in the parser.)
  • Detection Difficulty: Medium (Requires static analysis of code and potentially dynamic analysis of how DocBlocks are processed.)

Attack Tree Path: Node: Trigger Exception Revealing Constant Value [CRITICAL]

  • Description: The attacker's crafted input causes an exception during type or constant resolution. If error handling is poor, the exception message might include sensitive information, such as the value of a constant.
  • Likelihood: Medium (Depends heavily on the application's error handling practices.)
  • Impact: Medium (Can reveal sensitive configuration information, API keys, database credentials, etc.)
  • Effort: Low (Often just requires providing invalid or unexpected input.)
  • Skill Level: Novice
  • Detection Difficulty: Easy (Error logs will typically record the exception, but the sensitive information might be buried within.)

Attack Tree Path: Node: Analyze Error Output for Sensitive Data [CRITICAL]

  • Description: The attacker examines error messages, logs, or other output from the application to extract the leaked constant values or other sensitive information. This is the final step in the information disclosure attack.
  • Likelihood: High (If an exception reveals sensitive data, it's highly likely the attacker can access it.)
  • Impact: Medium (The value of the leaked information determines the impact.)
  • Effort: Low (Requires only observation of the application's output.)
  • Skill Level: Novice
  • Detection Difficulty: Easy (Error logs and monitoring can reveal exposed information, but the attacker might try to cover their tracks.)