Skip to content

Latest commit

 

History

History
71 lines (60 loc) · 7.17 KB

mitigations.md

File metadata and controls

71 lines (60 loc) · 7.17 KB

Mitigation Strategies Analysis for ramsey/uuid

Mitigation Strategy: Prefer Version 4 UUIDs

  • Description:
    1. When initializing the UuidFactory or directly using Uuid class from ramsey/uuid, explicitly choose Version 4 for UUID generation. For example, use Uuid::uuid4() instead of Uuid::uuid1() or Uuid::uuid3().
    2. Review existing codebase and identify instances where UUIDs are generated. If Version 1 UUIDs are used without a strong justification, refactor the code to use Version 4 UUIDs.
    3. Update project coding standards and developer documentation to clearly recommend Version 4 UUIDs as the default and preferred choice for most use cases, especially when security and privacy are concerns.
    4. Conduct code reviews to ensure new code adheres to the Version 4 UUID preference.
  • Threats Mitigated:
    • Information Leakage (High Severity) - Exposing the server's MAC address, potentially revealing network location and server identity.
  • Impact: Significantly reduces the risk of information leakage by eliminating the dependency on MAC addresses and timestamps inherent in Version 1 UUIDs.
  • Currently Implemented: Partially implemented. User account creation and password reset token generation utilize Version 4 UUIDs.
  • Missing Implementation: Session ID generation in legacy authentication modules still uses Version 1. API request tracing IDs are also currently using Version 1.

Mitigation Strategy: Avoid Version 1 UUIDs Unless Absolutely Necessary

  • Description:
    1. Conduct a thorough review of all use cases for UUIDs in the application.
    2. For each use case, explicitly justify the need for a specific UUID version.
    3. If Version 1 is proposed, rigorously evaluate if the time-based ordering is truly essential and if the risk of MAC address exposure is acceptable and mitigated by other security measures (e.g., network segmentation, anonymization).
    4. Document the justification for using Version 1 UUIDs in specific cases, outlining the accepted risks and mitigation measures.
    5. If no strong justification exists, replace Version 1 with Version 4 UUIDs.
  • Threats Mitigated:
    • Information Leakage (High Severity) - Unnecessary exposure of server MAC address when Version 1 is used without a valid reason.
  • Impact: Significantly reduces the overall attack surface by minimizing instances where potentially sensitive information (MAC address) is exposed via UUIDs.
  • Currently Implemented: Partially implemented. A general guideline exists to prefer Version 4, but no formal review process is in place for justifying Version 1 usage.
  • Missing Implementation: Formalize a review process for justifying Version 1 UUID usage. Implement automated code analysis to flag Version 1 UUID generation for review.

Mitigation Strategy: Use Strong and Unpredictable Inputs for Version 3 and 5 UUIDs

  • Description:
    1. If Version 3 or 5 UUIDs are required, carefully select the namespace and name components.
    2. Avoid using static, predictable, or easily enumerable values for namespaces and names.
    3. Utilize dynamic and unpredictable data sources for name components, such as user-specific data combined with random salts.
    4. If possible, use universally unique namespaces (URNs) for namespaces to reduce predictability.
    5. Regularly review the namespace and name generation logic to ensure they remain unpredictable and secure.
  • Threats Mitigated:
    • UUID Predictability (Medium Severity) - Guessing or predicting Version 3/5 UUIDs if namespace and name are weak, potentially leading to unauthorized access or manipulation if UUIDs are used for security purposes.
  • Impact: Partially reduces the risk of UUID predictability by making it harder to guess or compute UUIDs based on known or predictable inputs.
  • Currently Implemented: Not Implemented. Version 3 UUIDs are used for generating API keys based on user email, which is somewhat predictable.
  • Missing Implementation: Refactor API key generation to use Version 4 UUIDs or implement salting and more unpredictable name components for Version 3 if absolutely necessary. Review and secure namespace usage.

Mitigation Strategy: Consider Salting Name Input for Version 3 and 5 UUIDs

  • Description:
    1. When generating Version 3 or 5 UUIDs, incorporate a secret, randomly generated salt into the name input before hashing.
    2. Store the salt securely and separately from the application code.
    3. Retrieve the salt securely during UUID generation.
    4. Ensure the salt is sufficiently long and cryptographically random.
    5. Regularly rotate the salt to further enhance unpredictability.
  • Threats Mitigated:
    • UUID Predictability (Medium Severity) - Reduces the risk of predicting Version 3/5 UUIDs even if parts of the namespace or name become known, making brute-force attacks more difficult.
  • Impact: Significantly reduces the risk of UUID predictability by making it computationally infeasible to reverse-engineer or predict UUIDs without knowing the secret salt.
  • Currently Implemented: Not Implemented. No salting is currently used for Version 3 UUID generation for API keys.
  • Missing Implementation: Implement salt generation, secure storage, and integration into the API key generation process using Version 3 UUIDs (if Version 3 is still deemed necessary).

Mitigation Strategy: Utilize Cryptographically Secure Random Number Generation (CSPRNG)

  • Description:
    1. Verify that the PHP environment and underlying operating system are configured to use a CSPRNG for random number generation.
    2. Consult the PHP documentation and operating system documentation for instructions on configuring CSPRNG.
    3. For Linux-based systems, ensure /dev/urandom is properly functioning.
    4. For Windows-based systems, ensure the CryptoAPI is used correctly.
    5. Regularly monitor system configurations to ensure CSPRNG remains enabled and properly configured.
  • Threats Mitigated:
    • UUID Collision Probability (Low Severity, but potentially High Impact in specific cases) - Reduces the already extremely low probability of UUID collisions by ensuring a high-quality source of randomness for Version 4 UUID generation.
  • Impact: Minimally reduces the already negligible risk of UUID collisions, but provides assurance that the randomness source is robust, especially important for high-security applications.
  • Currently Implemented: Likely Implemented by Default. The server environment is generally configured to use CSPRNG, but explicit verification has not been performed.
  • Missing Implementation: Perform explicit verification of CSPRNG configuration on all production and development environments. Document the verification process.